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Abstract 
This thesis considers the relationship between global obligations and particular duties. I 
argue that there is a core tension in our moral thought that both cosmopolitans and 
particularists must confront. This tension is between our ability to fulfill obligations to 
particular others with whom we stand in a meaningful relationship (e.g. family, friends, 
co-nationals) and our global obligations. It is argued in the literature that strong moral 
cosmopolitanism is neither tenable nor desirable, as it requires us to forgo these special 
duties. This is seen as problematic as it does not resonate with our lived moral experience 
– we desire meaningful relationships that, by their nature, generate special duties. The 
task for a successful theory of cosmopolitanism, then, is to account for special duties in 
some manner. Cosmopolitan theory, I contend, needs to be reformed so as to make it 
consistent with special duties in such a way that does not reduce their structure or 
content. In the alternative, however, we may have obligations to associates that are, by 
their nature, inconsistent with our global obligations. In this thesis, I explore three 
attempts at reconciling these sets of obligations; I consider each of these to be attempts at 
‘rooting’ cosmopolitanism. My goal, then, is to determine whether we can interpret 
cosmopolitanism in such a way that adequately responds to the claims of both 
particularists and universalists. I conclude the thesis with an alternative argument for 
rooted cosmopolitanism. I argue that if the moral ends of cosmopolitanism are to be met 
without undermining our particular moral duties, we may need to adjust the institutional 
structures that generate obligations to provide a more efficient way to fulfill both sets of 
duties without thereby reducing their content.  
 
Keywords 
Cosmopolitanism, General Duties, Associative Duties, Particularism, Nationalism, 
Egalitarianism, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, Embedded Cosmopolitanism, Moderate 
Cosmopolitanism  
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Preface 
 This thesis is motivated by what I take to be a fundamental issue of contemporary 
moral thought. The cosmopolitan ideal – that all humans are equal – is a very attractive 
thesis, and one that obtains intuitive support. At the same time, we generally desire to 
dedicate resources and energy to those with whom we stand in a meaningful relationship. 
Yet, these two sets of obligations are generally seen to be at odds with one another. As 
such, the goals of cosmopolitanism may be seen to be at odds with partiality. Both theses, 
nonetheless, are worth consideration. My goal in this project, then, is to establish whether 
or not there is a coherent theory that can account for both our partial and our 
cosmopolitan duties. This theory is entitled rooted cosmopolitanism; it is a form of 
cosmopolitanism that takes our partiality seriously. In this thesis I begin by providing the 
framework for analysis and then move to assessing three different versions of rooted 
cosmopolitanism. I conclude with an alternative approach to the theory.  
 The thesis begins by exploring cosmopolitanism more generally. In the first 
chapter I attempt to attain some conceptual clarity. In doing so, I establish that all 
cosmopolitan claims can be separated into three different categories: claims about 
morality, politics, or culture. By distinguishing the claims in this way, I am better able to 
assess what cosmopolitanism requires. Although I distinguish between three forms of 
cosmopolitan claims, it is important to note that most arguments do not follow this strict 
distinction. In fact, most of the arguments that I discuss here overlap between two or all 
of the different forms. It is nonetheless useful to distinguish here to gain some clarity 
about the concept. I conclude the chapter by providing some frames of reference for my 
analysis of rooted forms of cosmopolitanism. 
 In the second chapter I continue by describing what I call ‘Scheffler’s tension’. 
Samuel Scheffler argues that our commitments to particularism and globalism are in 
tension with one another. I take this to be the central issue for theories of rooted 
cosmopolitanism. In the chapter I describe the tension in two ways. First, I show it as 
a tension between general and associative duties. This version helps to show how it is 
an issue of obligations and our ability to fulfill both sets simultaneously. Second, I 
  
 
v
describe it as a tension between egalitarianism and nationalism. This version I take to 
be providing an example of how our particularist duties can come into conflict with a 
commitment to global equality. Both versions of the tension represent a theme that 
runs throughout the project. In subsequent chapters I describe various versions of 
rooted cosmopolitanism in the language of Scheffler’s tension. 
 In the third, fourth, and fifth chapters I explore three versions of rooted 
cosmopolitanism against Scheffler’s tension. The third chapter focuses on Kwame 
Anthony Appiah’s rooted cultural cosmopolitanism. Appiah’s theory is explored here 
as it represents one of the earliest accounts of rooted cosmopolitanism. He contends 
that we cannot separate arguments for cosmopolitanism from our cultural identities. I 
conclude that Appiah’s cosmopolitanism helpfully highlights the need for 
intercultural dialogue, but he does not fully account for the political implications of 
cultural cosmopolitanism. His argument implies a political cosmopolitanism that can 
account for intercultural power dynamics and ensure basic universal rights. Given 
this, I conclude that Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism begins to put us on the right 
path but is insufficient to resolve Scheffler’s tension. 
 In the fourth chapter I explore David Miller’s nationalist-minimalist cosmopolitan 
position. He advocates national responsibility, which limits cosmopolitan obligations. 
His argument gives space for minimalist cosmopolitanism, but rejects any stronger 
globalist positions. I argue that Miller’s nationalism misconstrues international 
politics and his minimalist position is insufficient. Given my rejection of his 
nationalism, I contend that a stronger form of moral and political cosmopolitanism is 
required, but his own framework appears to imply a stronger argument than he 
defends. In the end, his focus on nationalism helps to highlight the importance of 
nationalist ties, but it does not resolve Scheffler’s tension. 
 In the fifth chapter I discuss the work of Kok-Chor Tan. In particular, I address his 
global luck egalitarianism. Although Tan’s position is very helpful, and his focus on 
the background context of international interaction can help us discover principles of 
global justice, I find his position to be unsatisfactory. Tan’s global distributivist focus 
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is questionable, and we need to reconcile global distributive justice with what I call 
the ‘shared values thesis’. I argue that the goods that are susceptible to distribution are 
dependent upon shared values. Although there are goods that are susceptible to global 
distribution, we need to assess how we can effectively distribute across contexts. 
Additionally, the way in which Tan prioritizes global obligations above particular 
ones is problematic. Certainly, some of our global obligations ought to take priority, 
but it is not categorical priority. I conclude that Tan’s argument allows us to more 
effectively discover principles of global justice once we incorporate an analysis of the 
shared-values thesis.  
 The final chapter explores an alternative approach to rooted cosmopolitanism. I 
argue that if rooted cosmopolitanism is to be a successful theory it should be 
conceived of as complex and open-ended. It is complex in the sense that it 
incorporates moral, political, and cultural variants of cosmopolitanism, and it is open-
ended in the sense that it is subject to continual re-negotiation over time. I argue that 
rooted cosmopolitanism depends upon changing current norms around state 
sovereignty and establishing global governance. I contend that this is necessary as our 
national obligations are institutionally separated from our global ones. If we augment 
state sovereignty and develop stronger forms of global governance then our two 
spheres of obligations may not necessarily be separated. At the same time, 
establishing global forms of governance will rely on successful intercultural dialogue. 
In order to establish principles of global justice that are universal and sensitive to 
context we need to engage in dialogue with others that recognizes who others are and 
where they come from.  
 I see my approach as an initial step in establishing a theory of rooted 
cosmopolitanism. I see the theory as a potential response to Scheffler’s tension, but 
one that requires much political and theoretical work. Rooted cosmopolitanism has 
the potential to allow us to recognize and fulfill our particular and global duties. 
Achieving global justice is possible, but it depends upon on our ability to elaborate 
principles of justice that recognize the strength and role of our particular obligations. I 
argue that rooted cosmopolitanism may be able to achieve this. 
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Chapter 1 
1 Varieties of Cosmopolitanism 
1.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I aim to address the varieties of cosmopolitanism. My goal here is 
to demonstrate that all cosmopolitan claims can be described in terms of a claim about 
morality, politics, or culture. Additionally, for my argument here, political and cultural 
cosmopolitan claims attain strength through a commitment to moral cosmopolitanism. 
This suggests that there is significant overlap between the three forms. Throughout this 
thesis I defend a version of moral cosmopolitanism that implies claims about political 
institutions and about culture. More importantly, I argue that rooted cosmopolitanism – as 
a sub-type of cosmopolitanism – can be described in terms of a tension within our moral 
thought. As such, the central task of this thesis is to attain conceptual clarity on the 
intersection between global and local moral obligations. I argue throughout that 
understanding these obligations will have an impact on both political and cultural claims 
as well. I argue, then, that in order for a cosmopolitan argument to carry weight, it must 
necessarily first be a claim about moral obligations that then impacts politics or culture. 
This is not to suggest that all cosmopolitan arguments are based on a claim about 
morality, but the ones I focus on throughout this project can be described in this way.  
 As well, this chapter will help set the terms of reference for the discussions of 
rooted cosmopolitanism that are at the heart of this project. Rooted cosmopolitanism 
cannot be fully understood without first providing some background on the larger theory. 
I begin the chapter by exploring a brief history of the concept, detailing its generation in 
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Cynic thought through to 20th century liberalism. I then explore the different varieties of 
the theory. Here I divide it into claims about morality, political institutions, and culture. 
First, I offer some preliminary thoughts on a key distinction between strong and weak 
moral cosmopolitanism: this discussion includes an analysis of global justice. Second, I 
explore political cosmopolitanism, which looks at the role of institutions and governance. 
And, finally, I address cosmopolitanism about culture, which questions the role of 
cultural membership and identity. I end the chapter with a discussion of rooted versions 
of cosmopolitanism. I argue that this distinction – between moral, political, and cultural 
cosmopolitanism – is a useful way of categorizing the theory when we look at rooted 
cosmopolitanisms. The distinction between the three types is not absolute, however. It is 
worth mentioning here that as I conceive of the theory, there is significant overlap 
between the types, and as I mention above, we need to give priority to moral claims. 
Nonetheless, by offering them as distinct types I am better able to conceptualize the 
debate before showing how the types are importantly linked. 
 The term cosmopolitanism derives from the Greek kosmospolitēs, or world 
citizen. Early versions of the theory questioned the limitations placed upon citizenship 
and emphasized a world community. More modern versions of cosmopolitanism are not 
necessarily focused on the civic component, but citizenship, nonetheless, remains an 
important aspect of the theory.1 Simon Caney helpfully lists what he takes to be the 
central tenets of a cosmopolitan position, as derived from Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, 
and Brian Barry: “They all argue that cosmopolitanism contains (and derives its 
                                                 
1
 By this I mean that cosmopolitan obligations are not necessarily civic obligations. Derek Heater, however, 
has written extensively on world citizenship. See: Derek Heater, World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan 
Thinking and its Opponents (London: Continuum Press, 2002); Derek Heater, “Does Cosmopolitan 
Thinking Have a Future?”, Review of International Studies, 25 (5) (2000), 179-197.  
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plausibility from) the following intuitively appealing claims: (a) individuals have equal 
moral worth, (b) they have this equally, and (c) people’s equal moral worth generates 
moral reasons that are binding on everyone.”2 He continues by claiming that these claims 
are fairly non-controversial and they imply tacit support for a claim about global justice.3 
That is, however, a much more controversial claim than simply claiming universal equal 
moral worth. As I discuss below, some question whether or not obligations that arise out 
of universal equality are obligations of justice. Nonetheless, the term cosmopolitan can 
refer to one or more of a variety of things, all of which relate to the status of our 
relationship to distant strangers. I now move to exploring the historical origins before 
looking at the varieties much more closely.    
 
1.2 Historical Cosmopolitanism  
 Cosmopolitanism was first articulated by the Greek Cynic Diogenes (c.412-323). 
He reportedly remarked, “I am a citizen of the world.” when asked what country he was 
from.4 This is the first known account of someone claiming to be a cosmopolitan. For 
Diogenes, cosmopolitanism and 'being' cosmopolitan were represented in purely negative 
                                                 
2
 Simon Caney, “International Distributive Justice,” Political Studies, vol. 49 (2001): 977; See also: Brian 
Barry, “Statism and Nationalism: a Cosmopolitan Critique,’ in Global Justice: NOMOS Volume XLI, 
eds. Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, 12-66, (New York: New York University Press, 1999); Charles 
Beitz, “Bounded Morality: justice and the state in world politics,” International Organisation, vol. 33 
(3) (1979): 405-424; Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 80 (10) (1983): 591-600; Charles Beitz, “Recent International Thought,” International 
Journal, vol. 43 (1988): 183-204; Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System,” in 
Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown, 123-136, (London: 
Routledge, 1994); Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” in Political Restructuring in 
Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. Chris Brown, 89-122, (London: Routledge, 1994). 
3
 Caney, 977. 
4
 The most famous account of this remark comes from Diogenes Laertius' The Lives and Opinions of 
Eminent Philosophers: “The question was put to him what countryman he was, and he replied, "A 
Citizen of the world" (kosmopolitês).” See: Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent 
Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge, (London: H.G. Bohn, 1853). 
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terms. He was known for rejecting all local custom and culture. By claiming to be a 
citizen of the world, and not a citizen of Sinope or Athens or any other polis, Diogenes 
questioned the role and strength of co-citizen obligations.  
 Cosmopolitanism as we understand it began to get its more contemporary form 
when it was articulated by Chrysippus. Most notably, the work of Chrysippus 
demonstrates early versions of what we term the cosmopolitan ideal. In his On Lives it is 
clear that we have obligations to humanity writ large, but that we may be serving 
humanity best by dispensing our obligations through political engagement.5 Here we also 
begin to see new developments in the way citizenship is conceived. Citizenship for the 
Greeks (specifically Aristotle) was limited to one's polis. There was a strong ethnic 
component to citizenship, and for reasons of practicality one could only really participate 
within one's own polis.6 The Stoics argued, however, that people should not be treated 
differently because of where they come from – all people have the capacity for reason 
and should be treated as such. Our obligations, then, can be extended beyond our local 
polis.  
 We also see several advances in political technology and machinery of 
government that allow for this to occur. Roman citizenship was notably different from 
Athenian/Greek citizenship and was supplanted by a large bureaucracy. One of the key 
differences between Rome and Greece was the removal of the ethnic component of 
citizenship that was replaced by a legal component. Due to a strong bureaucracy and a 
                                                 
5
 See: J.B. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, (New York: SUNY Press, 1970); Christoph Jedan, Stoic 
Virtues: Chrysippus and the Theological Foundations of Stoic Ethics, (New York: Continuum, 2010). 
6
 Aristotle's view of citizenship was quite limited. He presumed that only propertied ethnically Athenian 
males could be citizens due to the requirements of proper governance. One needed the ability to 
deliberate on political matters and thus needed the resources (i.e. leisure time) to be able to do this. See: 
Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair, (London: Penguin Books, 1983), esp. book III. 
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subdivided government that extended to all reaches of the Roman republic (and empire), 
citizenship could be afforded beyond the city of Rome itself. Roman citizenship was 
divided into several classes and sub-classes, but there was still the element of slavery, the 
denial of citizenship for women, and various other aspects that would be considered non-
cosmopolitan by contemporary standards. Nonetheless, we can see early vestiges of a 
form of cosmopolitan citizenship: one need not claim to be ethnically Roman in order to 
enjoy the benefits of citizenship. The largely legalistic version of citizenship, and the 
existence of a substantial bureaucracy that could be expanded, relieved people of the 
burdens of political office and allowed for the vestiges of the state to be far reaching 
enough to govern a large citizenry not bound by ethnicity.  
 Contemporary cosmopolitanism tends to be influenced by more modern thinkers. 
Although there are some prominent thinkers who derive their theory from Aristotelian, 
Cynic, or Stoic roots, most cosmopolitans refer to contemporary liberalism or Kantianism 
(or some combination). Kant had an interesting relationship with cosmopolitanism. The 
most prominent example of his cosmopolitan thought is the argument found in his 
Perpetual Peace. In it he describes what would be needed to institute world peace. The 
central idea is that treaties and agreements are needed to foster peace. For example, he 
argues for a duty of non-interference and calls for the abolition of standing armies.7 He 
contends that these types of policies can be achieved when state economies are 
interdependent. 
 Although Kant can be seen as a major influence for some contemporary thinkers, 
                                                 
7
 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, in The Global Justice Reader, ed. Thom Brooks, (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008), 316-331. 
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modern cosmopolitanism need not be Kantian.8 With some thinkers there is a clear 
influence of Aristotelian virtue ethics and Stoicism, with others their cosmopolitanism is 
distinctly Kantian, Utilitarian, and some even Hegelian.9 As in much of contemporary 
political philosophy it is easy to identify the historical influences at play. 
Cosmopolitanism as a modern set of theories, at least for my purposes, really gathers 
strength in the latter half of the twentieth century. Thinkers like Barry, Pogge, and Beitz, 
writing in the aftermath of Rawls’s seminal A Theory of Justice, composed cosmopolitan 
arguments that were direct extensions of Rawls’s theory of domestic liberal justice.10 
Although Barry, Pogge, and Beitz call for a ‘cosmopolitanized Rawls’ built from a global 
difference principle and global original position, they later refine their claims and 
distinguish themselves further from Rawls. Importantly, Rawls did not see A Theory of 
Justice as cosmopolitan in nature; instead he issued his formal response and his view of 
international relations theory much later in his Law of Peoples.11 Although this should not 
be taken to be the official starting point of contemporary cosmopolitan thought, I will use 
this, effectively, as a marker. This is primarily due to the fact that Pogge’s, Barry’s, and 
Beitz’s responses are three of the most well known early attempts at formalizing a 
                                                 
8
 Onora O’Neill presents an important Kantian version of cosmopolitanism, but I am unable to discuss it in 
much detail here. See: Onora O’Neill, “Rights, Obligations, and World Hunger”, in Poverty and Social 
Justice: Critical Perspectives: A Pilgrimage Toward Our Own Humanity, ed. Francisco Jiménez, 86-
100, (Tempe: Bilingual Press, 1987). 
9
 Nussbaum is very clear about her ancient influences and Benhabib expresses cosmopolitanism in Kantian 
terms, for example. Mervyn Frost offers a Hegelian inspired cosmopolitan argument. See: Mervyn 
Frost, Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom & International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008). 
10
 Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles Beitz, Political 
Theory and International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Charles Beitz, 
“Justice and International Relations,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (4) (1975): 360-389; Brian 
Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). 
11
 John Rawls, Law of Peoples, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). Charles Betiz’s discussion of 
the Law of Peoples is also worth noting: Charles Beitz, “Human Rights and the Law of Peoples”, in The 
Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen Chatterjee, 193-216, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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cosmopolitan position, and to the fact that their work has spawned an immense literature 
in the field.  Moreover, for my purposes here, I do not rely on historical cosmopolitanism 
to provide the framework for a rooted version of the theory. 
 In the remainder of the chapter I consider several distinctions in cosmopolitanism 
as a way to sort through these complex and often overlapping arguments. The distinctions 
I offer follow the traditional understanding of cosmopolitanism, however I wish to 
challenge the compartmentalization of the theory as it misconstrues the full implications 
of the argument. Thus, following Simon Caney, in what follows I distinguish between 
moral, cultural, and political cosmopolitanism.12 Though I distinguish three separate 
forms, it should be noted here that most cosmopolitan arguments overlap between the 
three spheres. Importantly, I argue that moral cosmopolitanism must necessarily act as the 
base of all cosmopolitan claims. Political and cultural claims are toothless without a 
description of the universal nature of our moral obligations. Thus, those political and 
cultural arguments that are not based on moral cosmopolitanism are unconvincing. 
Prioritizing moral claims in this way is necessary as it allows me to develop a more 
successful rooted cosmopolitan theory in chapter six. I argue that moral cosmopolitanism 
must act as the base of all political and cultural claims, we cannot defend either the 
extension of the scope of political institutions or make claims about the nature and 
relationships between cultural groups without first making a claim about the nature and 
scope of our obligations. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the relation of 
the varieties discussed here to the rooted forms of the theory discussed in the succeeding 
                                                 
12
 Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitanism,” in Ethics and World Politics, ed. Duncan Bell, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 146-163. 
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chapters.  
 
1.3 Moral Cosmopolitanism and Claims About Justice 
 The first form of cosmopolitanism I discuss is at the same time the most 
universally accepted and contested form. How it earns both such a great amount of 
acceptance and derision becomes clear once we look at the basic claims of moral 
cosmopolitanism and then the implications of those claims. Put in its most simple terms, 
moral cosmopolitanism claims that we are in an important moral relationship with all 
people and all people are ‘universally equal’. That is, our ‘sphere of moral concern’13 is 
global and we ought to consider our relations with distant others a moral one. However, 
moral cosmopolitans tend to disagree about what universal equality means and requires. 
It takes on a variety of forms and I briefly would like to explore several of them. Here I 
distinguish between strong, weak, and moderate moral cosmopolitanism.  
 The distinction between strong, weak, and moderate forms is perhaps best 
explicated by Pogge and David Miller. Miller rejects strong cosmopolitanism as a viable 
position. He contends that it “…requires that as agents we should acknowledge equal 
duties or equal responsibilities to everyone in the world without exception.”14  He claims 
that it only makes sense under the framework of a world government.15 At the same time, 
however, moral cosmopolitanism, at least under Beitz’s definition, need not require a 
defence of world government. The way Beitz defines cosmopolitanism appears to make it 
                                                 
13
 This is the term used by Toni Erskine, I explore it in much greater detail later. See: Toni Erskine, 
Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated Communities’, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
14
 David Miller, “Cosmopolitanism: A Critique,” Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, 5 (2002): 84.  
15
 Ibid. 
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compatible with the state system: “Indeed, cosmopolitanism is consistent with a 
conception of the world in which states constitute the principle forms of human social 
and political organization.”16 Miller claims, however, that the type of cosmopolitanism 
that Beitz is referring to here is only a ‘weak ethical’ formulation with which almost 
everyone would agree. He claims that weak moral cosmopolitanism is “…formulated in 
terms of a principle of equal moral worth or equal moral concern…[that would be 
accepted by] almost anybody barring a few racists and other bigots.”17 Weak moral 
cosmopolitanism, formulated in this way, is platitudinous; and strong moral 
cosmopolitanism, understood as requiring equal moral treatment, is highly controversial. 
Miller goes so far as to connect strong moral cosmopolitanism with imperialism as it 
ignores salient differences (be they moral, cultural, or political) that impact how we 
should interact with others.18 Eduardo Mendieta suggests that this form of 
cosmopolitanism (which he links to Kant) implies ‘imperial material foundations’ and 
‘hubristic epistemic orientations’ due to the assumptions of norms implied by strong 
moral cosmopolitanism.19 It would appear that these scholars are concerned with a 
perceived assumption that equal treatment would be determined by what liberal justice 
requires. Despite his wariness surrounding strong moral cosmopolitanism, Miller does 
not reject all global duties, but merely attempts to differentiate them from our local 
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duties. In his words: “…we owe more to some than to others.”20  
 Miller’s rejection of strong moral cosmopolitanism is similar to one that I would 
defend. If global equality requires equal treatment, as implied by strong moral 
cosmopolitanism, then it cannot be defended. The notion of rooted cosmopolitanism, as 
described in §1.6, relies on a defence of differentiated treatment (or on the ability to 
incorporate partiality into cosmopolitanism). Strong moral cosmopolitanism is best 
described as rejecting all forms of partiality (in its strongest form) or supporting a claim 
about universal equal treatment, but this position is untenable. Describing moral 
obligations in this way would leave us unable to account for our most basic partial 
obligations – family and friends. In our everyday moral experience, we give partial 
consideration to those with whom we stand in a significant relationship. Most important 
out of these relationships would be our family and friends. As a parent, spouse, or child, 
we want to be able to devote more moral consideration to our family members than we 
would to others. Bernard Williams claimed that when considering how we treat our 
significant others we should avoid making impartial claims or unnecessarily moral 
calculi.21 This suggests that when we make moral priorities to our closest associates, we 
do not (or should not) consciously consider them on the same moral plane as others with 
whom we do not have a significant relationship. Moral cosmopolitanism must account, in 
some way, for partiality. My rejection of strong moral claims does not require me to 
defend all forms of partiality. Rather, I argue throughout the thesis that some forms of 
partiality are self-evident (such as partiality to family members) and others require 
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justification. In chapters four and five I assess the viability of nationalist partiality to 
determine whether or not nationalism undermines the goals of moral cosmopolitanism. 
Partial treatment in relationships such as these require justification primarily because the 
type of relationship may not appear to generate overriding moral obligations in the same 
way that ones to family would. Indeed as I describe in the second chapter, the strength of 
our obligations comes (in part) from the nature of the relationship and what maintenance 
of it demands of us. However, I argue in chapters four, five, and six that partiality to co-
nationals requires justification in ways that partiality to family members does not. 
Nonetheless, partiality in some form is part of our lived moral experience and must be 
accounted for by cosmopolitans. Strong moral cosmopolitanism is untenable as it is 
unable to account for partiality in a meaningful way. 
 Pogge agrees with David Miller that strong cosmopolitanism is untenable. Miller 
claims that the strong position is untenable as it does not allow for any differentiated 
treatment, even to those who we would necessarily prioritize (e.g. family and friends). 
Pogge argues that “…[Miller’s] example suffices to refute strong cosmopolitanism: we do 
not all have equal responsibilities to everyone.”22 Pogge helpfully breaks Miller’s 
argument down into three specific claims, which he (as a cosmopolitan) accepts: “1. Weak 
cosmopolitanism does not entail strong cosmopolitanism; 2. Strong cosmopolitanism is 
false; 3. Weak cosmopolitanism is undistinctive in the sense that almost anyone…accepts 
it.”23 Thus, Pogge has to offer an alternative, which he terms ‘intermediate 
cosmopolitanism’ that I take to be akin to moderate cosmopolitanism. He shifts the focus 
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of global duties from positive to negative: “…compatriotism makes no difference to our 
most important negative duties.”24 Put in other words, the duty to not murder someone is 
not affected by whether or not a person is a fellow citizen. Pogge claims that moderate 
cosmopolitanism “…asserts the fundamental negative duty of justice as one that every 
human being owes to every other…We have a negative duty not to impose an unjust 
institutional order upon any human beings – compatriots or foreigners.”25 His moderate 
cosmopolitanism is thus seen as sufficiently stronger than weak cosmopolitanism, to the 
point where it is not platitudinous, and sufficiently weaker than strong cosmopolitanism 
to avoid the controversial ‘equal worth, equal treatment’ claim that Pogge asserts is 
‘righteous idiocy’.26 This is a form of moderate cosmopolitanism that focuses on 
institutional arrangements. Though my discussion of special responsibilities comes later, 
it is worth mentioning briefly that Pogge’s cosmopolitanism is consistent with special 
responsibilities if understood as increasing our overall share of moral responsibility: 
“…special relationships can increase what we owe our associates, but they cannot 
decrease what we owe everyone else.”27 His version of moral cosmopolitanism 
recognizes that even though we may owe foreigners less than we owe compatriots, we 
still have duties to them.28 Pogge’s cosmopolitanism may not be the version of moderate 
cosmopolitanism that I defend, but it helpfully sets out three moral claims. Moderate 
cosmopolitanism, as an intermediary between strong and weak, is the position I defend as 
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most plausible throughout the thesis. There are thus three forms of moral 
cosmopolitanism: 
1. Weak Moral Cosmopolitanism: asserts that all people are of equal 
moral worth 
2. Strong Moral Cosmopolitanism: asserts that the equal worth of all 
persons requires that each person be treated equally 
3. Moderate Moral Cosmopolitanism: asserts the equal moral worth of all 
persons but allows for differentiated treatment insofar as it does not 
come into conflict with universal equality.  
 
With the three forms of moral cosmopolitanism defined, I now move to exploring strong 
and moderate moral cosmopolitanism in more detail.  
 Despite the repudiation of strong moral cosmopolitanism offered thus far, it is 
worth noting that several key thinkers defend a variant of the position. Strong 
cosmopolitanism as described by Miller is untenable, but in the literature we find 
positions that allow for partiality but can be described as strong. Hence, almost all 
defendable versions of the theory allow for partiality in some way. As an example, Robert 
Goodin’s argument in his “What is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?” finds 
that any partial treatment to fellow nationals is only justified insofar as it is an expedient 
way of fulfilling global obligations.29 My analysis in chapter two focuses much more 
closely on partiality and the distinction between general and special obligations, but it is 
worth saying here that the ‘expediency thesis’ does not satisfactorily respond to the 
claims of nationalists or other partialists who claim that special obligations have a value 
separate from universal equality. Equal treatment here requires that we do not make 
moral distinctions based on nationality or really any other factor. For Goodin, we owe 
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something to humanity but are best suited to direct our actions locally. There are several 
reasons why we may be best suited to adopt the ‘think globally, act locally’ idea implied 
by Goodin’s thesis. Primarily, it appears as though directing our actions locally is more 
efficient and, due to institutional impediments, more effective. This suggests that if we 
consider our moral obligations to be owed to humanity, and not to a variety of categories, 
we would not need to distinguish what is owed in different categories. Partialists 
generally argue that we have differentiated obligations that can be distinguished along the 
lines of category of association – I owe something to my wife that would be different 
than what I owe to a co-worker, for example. If we did not differentiate what we owe, 
then we simply have to look to how we can fulfil our obligations. So, if we define our 
obligation as X, then we need to look at the most efficient and effective ways at fulfilling 
X. Under the current global institutional arrangement we are best suited to fulfil 
obligations more locally. This is due both to geographic (i.e. I am better able to help those 
closer to me) and institutional reasons (i.e. I am a participant in a redistributive structure 
that allows me to impact others under the same set of institutions).  
 Conceiving of our partial obligations as ‘efficient global obligations’ 
fundamentally misconstrues their nature and our impetus for fulfilling them. We do not 
(to use a famous example) provide for our children because it is good for children to be 
provided for and these ones happen to be ours, rather we do so because we care for these 
particular children in a way that we do not and can not care for others. When we act in a 
certain way towards our children, then, we are not doing so as a way to fulfil an 
obligation owed to children around the world, but we are doing so because we care about 
these particular children. Indeed, engaging in this type of moral calculus can lead us quite 
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quickly to one thought too many. Again, this argument may carry intellectual purchase, 
but it does not resonate with our actual experience of fulfilling obligations to our loved 
ones. I provide a much more detailed rejection of Goodin’s thesis in chapter three, §3.3.  
 Peter Singer famously advocates a strong moral cosmopolitan position from a 
utilitarian perspective. He contends that we ought to do what we can (in terms of shifting 
resources) to alleviate poverty around the world. He goes so far as to say that we should 
give up our wealth to such a degree that giving more would either not seriously improve 
the lives of others or significantly worsen our lives.30 Unlike most of the cosmopolitan 
thinkers focused on here, Singer does not distinguish between the value of socioeconomic 
goods in different cultural contexts. As opposed to concerning himself with discovering 
who is responsible for the plight of the world’s poorest, Singer simply sees the world in 
the categories of harm and happiness. Peter Unger arrives at a similar conclusion in his 
Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence; he concludes that we are morally 
obligated to make sacrifices to mitigate human suffering.31 Much in the same way that I 
reject Goodin’s argument, the Singer/Unger claims fail to adequately account for 
differentiated treatment. Though they are both correct that much needs to be done to 
account for global poverty, and that global redistribution will likely factor into it, their 
conclusion does not distinguish between our obligations. Singer and Unger’s 
consequentialist views (i.e. moral priorities are determined by the consequences of 
actions) fails to account for other motivations in our actions. That is, by focusing on 
consequences, they miss other (possibly more convincing) sources of moral motivation or 
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ways to judge the rightness of an act. Consequentialists are unable to account for 
partiality as the value of a relationship or association with others cannot factor into our 
moral calculus. It is clear, then, that these positions are untenable, but in describing 
another reason why I reject this brand of moral cosmopolitanism, I can help clarify the 
connections between political and moral variants.  
 In addition to the discussion of responsibility (one I address in §4.4), there is the 
issue of understanding the role of social context in determining the meaning and value of 
particular goods (also explored in §5.3, 5.4, 5.5). Simply put, while there may be space 
for distributive justice at the global level, we need to understand what we are distributing 
and how the value and meaning of distributable goods is subject to context. Moreover, 
before we can effectively implement distributive justice on this scale, we need to develop 
an institutional structure that can effectively govern and implement distribution. This 
helpfully demonstrates the complexity of cosmopolitan arguments. Here I am effectively 
making two claims: 1. As a matter of moral obligation, we ought to redistribute across 
borders; and 2. This redistribution requires substantial political institutions to make it 
effective. The argument does not work without both of these claims. That is, I cannot 
make the moral cosmopolitan argument that global justice is distributive without 
recognizing the impact on political institutions. In the inverse, I cannot defend the 
expansion of political institutions beyond the state without justifying it with a claim about 
moral obligation or duties of justice.  
 To briefly reiterate, strong moral cosmopolitanism is problematic for several 
reasons. Of primary importance to my analysis here is the fact that it does not adequately 
account for partiality. Instead, most strong cosmopolitans appear to be motivated by the 
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extreme poverty and gross inequalities they see around the world, things that certainly 
need to be addressed. However, this motivation leads into an argument that collapses 
political memberships into one category, usually either a notion of a global political 
community (i.e. a cosmopolis) or a reference to shared humanity to justify their position. 
The notion of shared humanity is one commonly referred to in the work of Martha 
Nussbaum, another strong moral cosmopolitan. She contends that we all belong to the 
same human community, and as such we should recognize our responsibilities to others.32 
Nussbaum adopts a position similar to Goodin that is equally untenable. She does, 
however, offer much more to the debate that I consider later in the thesis (specifically in 
§4.5 and 4.6). I therefore reject strong moral cosmopolitanism as a tenable position.  
 Moderate moral cosmopolitanism maintains a claim for universal equal worth, but 
does not require equal treatment, at least to the same degree that strong cosmopolitans 
would defend. Samuel Scheffler’s seminal text, Boundaries and Allegiances, helpfully 
distinguishes between strong and moderate positions.33 Moderate positions are those that 
claim that the cosmopolitan ideal does not necessarily require relinquishing other 
obligations or loyalties we may have. It would appear, then, that moderate moral 
cosmopolitanism might be compatible with partiality.   
 These cosmopolitans tend not to deny that we are members of a human 
community, but that membership there must be understood alongside membership in 
other communities. Pogge argues for a weak cosmopolitan position when he contends 
that moral cosmopolitanism need not commit us to the rootless life that some have argued 
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it does. This rootless life is the one described by strong cosmopolitans and is devoid of 
the deep connections to family, friends, and local community members. He claims that 
moral cosmopolitanism need not be understood strictly as seeing ourselves as belonging 
to one moral community, but rather as belonging to many morally relevant communities. 
His cosmopolitanism relies on a schema of negative rights that are based on a claim that 
all humans are of moral concern. Contained within these negative rights is a ‘duty to not 
impose unjust social institutions’ on others.34 This is a defensible claim, but one that 
appears to be problematic upon closer examination. Specifically, Pogge’s schema of 
negative rights implies institutional change. Using the ‘non-imposition duty’ as an 
example we can see that the negative rights have significant implications for how we 
understand the scope and role of statist and international political institutions. Given the 
current nature of international politics and the ways in which global capitalist institutions 
(e.g. corporations, markets, trade organizations, trade law) impose unjust social 
institutions on others, we could say that we are currently failing to fulfil the non-
imposition duty. If we were to begin to meet our global obligation, then it would require 
substantial restructuring of international infrastructure. We would need to remove the 
institutions that negatively impose on others, which would require significant positive 
action. The negative duty, then, implies positive action: in fulfilling a duty of non-
imposition, we would be required to actively restructure global capitalism to be consistent 
with his schema of negative duties. Pogge recognizes the implication of positive duties, 
but may not agree with me on the degree of change and action that is required.35 To be 
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fair to his position, he is not necessarily attempting to elaborate on what moderate moral 
cosmopolitanism implies or entails, merely that it exists as a plausible moral claim 
between strong and weak.36  
 We can identify a moderate moral cosmopolitanism in the way that distinguishes 
between different levels of moral obligation. While the strong cosmopolitan position 
claims that our global obligations are most pressing, the moderate moral cosmopolitan 
position does not necessarily rely on the priority of global obligations over more local 
ones. Lenard and Moore helpfully illustrate the importance of prioritizing our moral 
obligations without abandoning a cosmopolitan stance.37 For Lenard and Moore, this 
means that certain global duties may trump our associative ones, but we have to carefully 
elaborate which ones, “…since it appears implausible to suggest that all possible 
[general] duties, especially on a fairly expansive view of what these might be, trump all 
possible associative duties.”38 This position is marked by an attempt to make a 
compromise between local and global obligations and an understanding that we are part 
of a global moral community alongside other communities. Put in other words, moderate 
forms of moral cosmopolitanism attempt to account for partiality. 
 When we claim that we are part of a universal moral community, we can see that 
as one of the many moral communities of which we are members. Moreover, we need not 
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claim that cosmopolitan duties necessarily take priority over local duties. Thus, Robert 
Goodin’s attempt to dilute local moral commitments by claiming that obligations to 
family, friends, and citizens are fulfilled only as a way of efficiently fulfilling 
cosmopolitan duties fails to convince most moderate moral cosmopolitans.39 As opposed 
to seeing our local moral commitments as being derivative from our global ones, we tend 
to want to put independent weight on the strength of our local obligations. In almost all of 
the subsequent chapters, the scholars I address espouse some variety of moderate moral 
cosmopolitanism. Samuel Scheffler, the focus of the second chapter, helpfully 
distinguishes between what he takes to be an apparent tension in our moral thought - that 
between fulfilling particular obligations and universal ones. For Scheffler, universal 
obligations born out of a moral cosmopolitanism are legitimate and ought to be 
considered alongside our particular ones. In this way, then, it could be claimed that he 
supports a moderate moral cosmopolitan position. This matter is explored in much more 
detail in the second chapter. David Miller’s liberal nationalist argument does not 
necessarily preclude moral cosmopolitanism. Miller’s substantively weaker 
cosmopolitanism supports a schema of human rights: “I shall suggest, in other words, that 
when basic human rights go unprotected, any agent, individual or collective, who is able 
to help protect them may in principle bear remedial responsibilities.”40  Though I contend 
that moral cosmopolitanism requires more than just support for a ‘moral minimum’ (in 
this case as elaborated in the language of human rights), Miller advocates a moderate 
moral position. Kok-Chor Tan presents a political argument, but it is worth noting that it 
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is premised upon a stronger version of moral cosmopolitanism. In particular, he argues 
for a globalized form of egalitarianism. Tan’s global egalitarianism, while controversial, 
is borne out of a commitment to moral cosmopolitanism. Further, he provides a great 
example of how most cosmopolitans are not concerned solely with moral, cultural, or 
political/institutional claims. His political cosmopolitanism only works insofar as it is 
premised on the cosmopolitan ideal - i.e. universal equal moral worth.  
 As it is likely becoming clear at this point, I feel I should state this plainly: most 
cosmopolitans defend some form of universal moral equality, the controversy arises when 
we discuss what equality requires. Hence, although I go to great effort to distinguish 
between moral, political, and cultural forms of cosmopolitanism there is significant 
overlap between the forms. Additionally, I argue that political and cultural cosmopolitan 
claims must necessarily be generated or derived from a concern for moral 
cosmopolitanism. A concern for global governance or international institutions tends to 
be derived from a notion of a global moral community. Additionally, acknowledgement 
of and concern for the role and value of culture in one’s life and culture as part of the 
diversity of the human community, is usually paired with acknowledgement that all 
people are part of a moral community and due some consideration. I explain this in more 
detail below. 
 So far I have explored claims of strong and moderate moral cosmopolitanism, 
however it is important at this point to distinguish moral cosmopolitanism from claims 
about global justice. Moral cosmopolitanism simply claims that all people are morally 
equal; exactly what equality requires varies between cosmopolitans. Global justice 
typically emerges out of a moral cosmopolitan argument, but the two are not 
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synonymous. That is, not all moral cosmopolitans make an argument for global justice. 
Miller, for example, makes a moderate moral claim when he defends human rights – i.e. 
the justification for human rights is bound in the notion that all people are due moral 
consideration.41 However, he also rejects claims of justice beyond state borders. ‘Justice’ 
requires very particular social relations that are not exhibited on the international or 
global scale according to these theorists. Thomas Nagel similarly rejects the idea of 
‘global justice’ due to the fact that relations of justice can only be established under 
social-institutional conditions that do not exist at the global level. For Nagel, there is an 
inextricable link between justice and sovereignty.42 Both Miller and Nagel contend that 
all people are due some ethical consideration, and in this way they are both defending a 
(substantively) weak moral cosmopolitan position. Hence, it is helpful to distinguish 
between what moral cosmopolitanism implies, and what a claim about the scope of 
justice implies. Relations of justice exist under the conditions of social and institutional 
interaction. Rawls’s theory of justice, for example, is a theory of social justice – “For us 
the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in 
which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine 
the division of advantages from social cooperation.”43 On this reading, principles of 
justice “…regulate the relations of people living in the same society, specifying their 
duties to one another and society’s duties to them.”44 Although any defence of global 
justice is necessarily cosmopolitan, a defence of cosmopolitanism need not imply a claim 
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about global justice.45 One may contend that we have cosmopolitan duties of 
humanitarian assistance, following Miller, but these do not include duties of justice. Tan, 
on the other hand, contends that our cosmopolitan duties do extend into duties of 
justice.46 To distinguish the two more clearly, a duty of humanitarian assistance is a moral 
commitment with a definable end-point (i.e. once the duty has been fulfilled), and a duty 
of justice regulates interaction without a particular end-point in mind.47  
 Moral cosmopolitanism, thus, refers to a wide-ranging diverse set of claims 
centred around the belief that all people are of equal moral worth and are due 
consideration regardless of their citizenship. As I have shown, what consideration they 
are due will vary. Some have claimed that they are due equal treatment by way of a strict 
global egalitarian framework, as demonstrated by Singer and Unger. Others contend that 
moral cosmopolitanism requires moral consideration that develops into a framework of 
negative rights, as seen in Pogge’s response to Miller’s scepticism surrounding the 
cosmopolitan ideal. Additionally I have tried to distinguish between moral claims and 
claims about global justice. We can therefore distinguish between three forms of moral 
cosmopolitanism each premised on universal equality but separated by what equality 
requires: 1. Strong moral cosmopolitanism requires equal treatment; 2. Weak moral 
cosmopolitanism requires a belief in universal equal worth that does not necessarily 
impact treatment or outcome; 3. Moderate moral cosmopolitanism requires equal worth 
that can lead to (or require) differentiated treatment. 
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1.4 Political Cosmopolitanism 
 The next form of cosmopolitanism I wish to address here is political 
cosmopolitanism. For my purposes I will use the term ‘political cosmopolitanism’ to 
represent a variety of positions that address the role and scope of governing institutions. 
Political cosmopolitans argue for a diverse set of globalized and international institutions 
of governance that augment or otherwise move authority above the state. Many political 
cosmopolitans are motivated by a claim about justice or moral cosmopolitanism that 
leads to a dissatisfaction with contemporary forms of governance. Although there are 
some arguments for world government, and those would be political cosmopolitan 
arguments, political cosmopolitanism does not necessarily imply a claim about world 
government. Kant’s Perpetual Peace, for example, highlights the fact that world 
government would have the propensity to descend into global tyranny. Thus, my focus 
here is on looking at a variety of positions that support global governance.  
 Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace is one of the foremost political cosmopolitan 
arguments. He argues that the only way to attain peace among nations is to intertwine 
national institutions. As opposed to many of the other political cosmopolitans under study 
here, Kant does not advocate for changing state sovereignty, but rather establishing a 
situation in which the costs of war with other states far outweigh the benefits.48 Much of 
his argument is fairly radical and includes calls to remove all standing armies, demands 
that no state can interfere with another, and demand that all states ought to be republican. 
Although many of these proclamations may not be currently attainable, Kant’s argument 
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is still relevant today for the reasons discussed above. Nonetheless, we should recall that 
he is anti-world government due to the tendency towards tyranny; a federation of states 
economically intertwined is preferable as they can act as a check on each other.  
 The question of democratic governance seems to be of central importance to 
political cosmopolitans, and David Held provides substantial arguments for global 
democracy.49 As political cosmopolitans are concerned with governing institutions at the 
international and global level, the question of democratic global governance is often 
debated. Many argue that legitimate global governance must necessarily be democratic, 
but attaining the necessary legitimacy beyond the nation-state is highly problematic. 
Additionally, political cosmopolitanism is not represented by one set of arguments, or by 
defence of a particular set of institutions. Daniele Archibugi, for example, looks at the 
possibilities for increasing the legitimacy and political strength of already existing 
institutions, such as the United Nations.50 Instead of having to establish a new set of 
governing institutions, we could benefit from a highly reformed version of existing ones. 
This would greatly reduce cost and could be done much more quickly than having to rely 
on developing entirely new governing bodies. There is a significant drawback, however, 
in that the problem of institutional history could not be removed, even from highly 
reformed institutions. The United Nations, despite many of the benefits it has as a 
governing body, carries with it significant historical baggage. Finally, Daniel Bray in his 
Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism is fundamentally concerned with the issues of democratic 
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governance and representation at the global level. His focus is on ensuring adequate 
levels of representation in global democratic forums.51 As such, the question of global 
democracy is of central concern for some political cosmopolitans. Yet, the impetus for 
expanding political institutions has not yet been discussed. 
 We must justify political cosmopolitanism, as it requires the creation or 
strengthening of political institutions that are coercively imposed and thereby need to be 
justified.52 That is, individuals are subject to the rules of their state and if political 
cosmopolitans wish to augment the rules or interactions, or otherwise change the way 
individuals and groups are governed; they need to offer good reasons for doing so. This is 
especially true, as the institutions envisioned by political cosmopolitans will necessarily 
limit the liberty of individuals and groups (e.g. States) to act in particular ways. Returning 
briefly to the discussion of negative rights from Pogge, we can make the argument that 
negative duties imply a claim about political institutions. In order to fulfil our negative 
duties we may need stronger global governance that can limit the ability for others to 
negatively impose social institutions. This will, quite apparently, limit the ways in which 
certain groups and institutions can act. Presumably, this would require governing 
institutions that limit the ways corporations act, change international trade law, or 
possibly even redistribute between states. Under this arrangement some groups will be 
positively impacted, while others will be forced to change their practices. If these 
institutions are to be democratic, which I argue they ought to be, then the impositions and 
limitations they create need to be justified to the affected groups.  
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 As I argued in the previous section, I conceive of political cosmopolitanism as 
emerging out of moral claims. Utilizing a claim about moral equality or the scope of 
moral obligation can thereby justify the impositions and restrictions generated by 
governing institutions. Certainly, a political cosmopolitan argument that is independent of 
moral claims can be made. However, I argue that these types of claims are ultimately 
unsatisfactory as they lack a justificatory mechanism that accounts for the restrictions and 
limitations of individual liberty and state sovereignty.  
 As mentioned above, Tan presents a political-moral cosmopolitan argument; it is 
useful to refer to Tan’s argument here as it overlaps between moral and political 
cosmopolitanism.53 Tan argues for the development of international governing institutions 
that can properly and effectively distribute socioeconomic resources to better fulfil the 
principles of global justice as he conceives of them. Although Tan’s position is 
controversial, it brings forward the important idea that he conceives of the international 
sphere as generating socioeconomic relations between individuals and between groups. 
His moral position helps to support his political cosmopolitanism. 
 Though political cosmopolitanism occupies less space here than moral forms, I 
see an important link between it and moral forms. In addition to acting as a justificatory 
measure, moral cosmopolitanism can also provide the impetus or act as a source of 
political will. Outside of the issues I explore in subsequent chapters, cosmopolitanism 
faces an issue of motivation. That is, once we recognize our global moral obligations we 
may be more inclined to act.54  This helps to further explain the important overlaps 
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between the different types of cosmopolitanism. Moral and cultural cosmopolitanism, as I 
conceive of them, fail without being implemented politically and enforced by governing 
institutions. Political cosmopolitanism, then, can be seen to be a diverse set of positions 
that explore the possibilities for global governance or institutional arrangements above 
the state. My conception of political cosmopolitanism narrows the field substantially. By 
classifying political cosmopolitanism as such I can help to focus the discussion onto 
formal institutions of governance. 
 
1.5 Cultural Cosmopolitanism 
 The final form of cosmopolitanism I will explore focuses on culture. Unlike moral 
cosmopolitanism, cultural cosmopolitanism does not necessarily concern itself with the 
question of rights or duties to others. Rather, here scholars are concerned with the 
relationships between cultural groups and on the relationship between cultural groups and 
the self. I begin by looking at Samuel Scheffler’s account of cultural cosmopolitanism, 
which claims that individual identity is not dependent upon fixed cultural membership. 
My exploration then looks at Jeremy Waldron’s cultural cosmopolitanism that focuses 
more on hybridity and our ability to draw and learn from a variety of cultural sources. 
Cultural cosmopolitanism plays a much more minor role in this project than either moral 
or political forms. It is, nonetheless, important to the overall analysis. The conclusions of 
Scheffler and Waldron helpfully illustrate the nature of cultural identities that informs my 
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position in the sixth chapter. I argue that the more fluid approach to group identity that 
Scheffler and Waldron take can be reconciled with more conservative stances such as 
those adopted by Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor.   
 Scheffler’s cultural cosmopolitanism is directly “…opposed to any suggestion that 
individuals’ well-being or their identity or their capacity for effective human agency 
normally depends on their membership in a determinate cultural group whose boundaries 
are reasonably clear and whose stability and cohesion are reasonably secure.”55 
Scheffler’s cultural argument focuses on two related claims about cultural identity: 1. 
Cultures are constantly in flux; 2. Individual identity is fluid.56 Scheffler later builds on 
the notion of fluid cultural identities in his “Immigration and the Significance of Culture” 
where he contends that cultures must change in order to stay relevant in people’s lives.57 
On his reading here, cultural groups ought to be open to change, which he sees as an 
inevitable process: new membership brings new identities and experiences into the 
group.58 This ethic of cultural change, which he terms ‘Heraclitean pluralism’,59 does not 
imply that cultural groups have no continuity between generations. Cultural change may 
be rapid or it may be gradual, with new interpretations on the meaning of central beliefs 
slowly changing over a period of several generations.60 The second aspect of his cultural 
cosmopolitanism focuses on the fluidity of individual identity. He claims that cultural 
cosmopolitanism insists on our “…remarkable capacity to forge new identities using 
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materials from diverse cultural sources, and to flourish while so doing.”61 This should be 
seen in direct opposition to any claim that humans require deep immersion within a single 
cultural group to develop an identity. Scheffler goes so far as to suggest that our 
individual ability to adapt to new social circumstances and adopt new cultural practices 
and identities “…demonstrate[s] the very capacities that make it possible for human 
beings to create culture in the first place…”62 Inherent in cultural cosmopolitan claims, 
then, is a defence of cultural hybridity. 
 Cultural cosmopolitanism focuses on a cultural hybridity or ‘mongrelisation’. We 
should not conceive of cultures as fixed groups with fixed membership. Rather, on 
Scheffler’s conception, cultural groups should be open to change, which he sees as an 
inevitable process. The central concern of cultural conservatives is the preservation of 
particular cultural identities. However, Scheffler contends that the best way to preserve a 
cultural identity is to resist stagnation and adopt changes. Cultural protectionism, the kind 
of which Appiah is critical, is problematic for several reasons.63 As I devote a 
considerable amount of space in chapters two and six to exploring Appiah’s critique of 
protectionism, I’ll reserve my comments here to other aspects of the issues. Protectionism 
does not work as it forces individuals to adopt an identity that may not resonate with the 
way they understand themselves. That is to suggest that, if it is claimed that a particular 
cultural identity has a set meaning, individuals who do not identify with it may be either 
forced into adopting that aspect into their identity or forgo identifying with that cultural 
group. Hence, Scheffler argues that cultures need to accept change. Cultural identities 
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have to stay relevant and meaningful in people’s lives if they are to be relevant identities. 
Cultural cosmopolitans claim that as opposed to protecting cultures from change we 
should embrace hybridity as an inevitable - and good - process that occurs. With 
globalisation, people from all sorts of cultural backgrounds come into contact and cultural 
learning occurs. New sources of cultural identity emerge over time. For example, in 
Britain, chicken tikka masala is now considered a national dish, at least according to a 
national survey and former foreign minister Robin Cook.64 While it’s still questionable, it 
could be argued that traditional Indian cuisine is now a central part of British (epicurean) 
identity. Cultural cosmopolitans argue that we ought to embrace this change and resist 
cultural protectionism.   
 Finally, Jeremy Waldron’s cultural cosmopolitanism is similar to Scheffler’s – 
individuals need not be immersed in a single culture to develop a rich identity. He calls 
the cosmopolitan life one “…lived in a kaleidoscope of cultures…” and such a life, he 
claims, is both “…possible and fulfilling.” 65 In a similar fashion to both Scheffler and 
Appiah, Waldron claims that the idea of ‘cultural purity’ is an historical anomaly. If we 
were to take a sample of all the world’s cultures, those that have been able to avoid any 
cross-cultural contamination would have done so only by “...historical contingency and 
extraordinary geographical isolation.”66 Waldron’s analysis of cultural cosmopolitanism 
here emerges from his questioning of what it means to be cosmopolitan. In this analysis 
he determines that most people already live a sufficiently cosmopolitan life:  
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A person who grows up in Manhattan, for example, cannot but be aware of a 
diversity of cultures, a diversity of human practices and experiences, indeed a 
diversity of languages clamouring for his attention. They are there on the streets, 
in Greenwich Village or on the Upper West Side. It is another matter whether we 
call this a single culture - ‘New York culture’ - a culture of diversity, or whether 
we say (as I think) that it is just many fragments that happen to be available at a 
given place and time and that that does not amount to the existence of a single 
culture in any socially or philosophically interesting sense of ‘singularity.’67  
 
Although the example used here focuses on Manhattan, the same could be said for life in 
any major urban centre; this is particularly true (though not exclusively) of the 
cosmopolitan cities that attract significant numbers of tourists and immigrants - New 
York, Paris, London, Toronto, San Francisco, Vancouver, and Bombay. This, for Waldron, 
is the case for many. He claims “[I]n this context, to immerse oneself in the traditional 
practices of, say, an aboriginal culture might be a fascinating anthropological experiment, 
but it involves an artificial dislocation from what actually is going on in the world.”68 On 
this reading, submerging oneself in a ‘pure’ culture appears disingenuous – Waldron 
compares it to being at a cultural Disneyland “…and thinking that one’s surroundings 
epitomize what it is for a culture really to exist.”69 Waldron’s cultural cosmopolitan 
stands in direct opposition to the figure of the ‘lone cosmopolitan’ who lives a rootless 
life in isolation.70  
 This form of cultural cosmopolitanism is very similar to Scheffler’s: we ought to 
avoid considering cultural groups as fixed and stagnant. Our cultural identity will draw 
from a variety of intercultural sources to the point where it is very tough to distinguish 
between a single identity and the many cultural sources that compose it. The example of 
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Canadian cultural identity readily comes to mind, as multiculturalism is a central tenet of 
Canadian identity. As opposed to seeing Canadian cultural identity as homogeneous, it is 
a mishmash of many different cultural groups each borrowing from one another and 
blending in different ways.  
 Waldron is also concerned with diversity. His main concern here is a tendency to 
focus on what makes cultural groups distinct and unique, as opposed to looking at how 
we are similar or borrow traditions from one another. He states:  
When children in the United States have Guatemala Day at school, we do not want them 
all to make a special ceremony of wearing Levi jeans and drinking Coca-Cola, even if 
that is what Guatemalans in fact like to wear and drink. In that context, we have reason to 
highlight the differences between culture in Guatemala and Norteamericano culture. But 
the general view that it is distinctiveness that counts may be seriously mistaken if it is 
intended as a description of the consciousness of those who live in the communities in 
question or as a prescription about what respect for another culture ought essentially to 
involve.71  
 
For Waldron, it makes sense to focus on distinctiveness in certain contexts, but in others 
we may be wrongfully ascribing characteristics to a group that we think are representative 
of constitutive of their cultural identity. Moreover, he helpfully illustrates a central 
question: what does respect for another group require? Though I address this issue in the 
final chapter, it is worth mentioning that it likely does not require complete tolerance or 
respect for all practices. 
 Conceiving of cosmopolitanism as a claim about culture allows us to recognize 
the ever-changing nature of cultural identities. Scheffler is likely correct that cultures 
need to change over time in order to stay relevant. It is also likely the case that this is an 
unconscious process that naturally happens as the world around the group changes, new 
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ideas and interpretations are brought in, and a new generation begins to shape the 
direction of the group. Waldron’s claim, however, that all of the cultural resources that 
individuals need are already provided to them is more controversial. Although the idea of 
‘wading in the pool’ of cultural resources brings romantic imagery to mind, it may be 
misconstruing the relationship that individuals have to their group identities. In many 
large metropolitan cities we can describe a sort of cosmopolitan culture existing. In these 
types of cities, it is possible to wade through a variety of groups that all help create a 
unique identity for the city. This type of life may be sufficient for some; however there 
are many groups that are put at some form of risk and their identities are insecure. It is 
much simpler for a Cypriot living in Toronto to express his cultural identity than the same 
individual living in Athens, for example. In both contexts they are expressing a cultural 
identity, but in Toronto they need not worry about backlash or ostracization. It is very 
simple to presume that cultural identities are fluid or one of many different group 
identities when we consider them in secure contexts. However, once we move to a case 
where a cultural identity is insecure, or being actively dismantled, the conversation shifts. 
Throughout the thesis I consider the fluidity of identities against more conservative 
approaches (such as those adopted by Walzer and Taylor). I argue that both views offer 
important insights and can help inform the discussion.  
 While I disagree with Waldron’s position, his acknowledgement of a need to 
recognize an identity is very important. Recognition of the value of a group identity, of 
what that group can offer, of what they believe, and of what is valuable to them is 
necessary once we begin to look at the principles of global justice or how we are going to 
frame political institutions. I argue that through a recognition-based approach (such as 
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that defended by Taylor and discussed by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth) may be able 
to provide us with the resources to engage in effective dialogue. By taking others’ group 
identities seriously, we can develop a cosmopolitan position that is more inclusive and 
avoids becoming imperial or naïve.  
 In sum, cultural cosmopolitanism is a form of cosmopolitan thought that looks at 
the way our cultural identities are cosmopolitan. Cultural cosmopolitans tend to argue 
against claims made by multiculturalists and others who argue for fixed notions of 
cultural identity. Additionally, as Appiah and Waldron demonstrate, cultural 
cosmopolitanism rejects claims for protection or celebration of diversity for diversity’s 
sake. Cultural diversity necessarily exists, but our celebrations should not focus on 
distinctions between groups, except in particular contexts, but should rather be focused 
on what individuals within the group can offer to the human experience and how they can 
conceive of and attain the good life. This is not to say that we should not celebrate other 
cultural groups, but we should avoid ascribing essential characteristics to them that are 
not reflective of their way of life. Cultural cosmopolitanism is also concerned with the 
ability for cultural identities to maintain relevance in our lives. In order to ensure the 
survival of cultural identities, authorities within the group should resist conservatism and 
embrace the type of fluid ‘Heraclitean’ pluralism that Scheffler defends.  
 Cosmopolitanism, I argue, can be described as a claim about morality, politics, or 
culture. I have sought to illustrate the theory as separated into these three branches as a 
way to show what all cosmopolitan claims are describing. I have also tried to show that 
despite this important distinction, there is much overlap between the three types. More 
importantly, the position that I develop throughout the thesis relies on connecting these 
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different claims. While there are positions that are strictly based on claims about morality, 
politics, or culture, I argue that these stances are unpersuasive. Cosmopolitanism, as I 
conceive of it, can only be successful if it accounts for morality, politics, and culture in 
some way. This is not to suggest that every cosmopolitan argument must defend equal 
treatment that is institutionalized under a world state founded on the principles of 
Heraclitean Pluralism. Rather, I argue that some cosmopolitan arguments emphasize 
different aspects. For example, while Seyla Benhabib could be said to be a political 
cosmopolitan, her argument is clearly influenced by a conception of global justice 
derived from a claim about morality.72 Much in the same way, some scholars contend that 
justice-based cosmopolitanism is empty without political commitments attached to it.73 
The positions are, therefore, not mutually exclusive. Again, the claims do not necessarily 
imply one another. There are perfectly coherent and legitimate moral claims, as well as 
cultural and political claims that are all independent of one another; they are nonetheless 
unpersuasive unless they are linked to each other in some way. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this project, I describe cosmopolitanism as a theory that refers to our 
relationship to distant strangers morally, politically, and/or culturally. The position that I 
develop, called rooted cosmopolitanism, emphasizes different aspects of these claims but 
incorporates all three.  
 
1.6 Rooting Cosmopolitanism 
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 So far, in this chapter I have attempted to briefly introduce and classify 
cosmopolitanism as a broad concept. Here I have distinguished between three forms of 
cosmopolitanism - moral, political, and cultural. I have argued that though they are 
separated in the initial discussion, there is much overlap between them. Most of the 
cosmopolitan arguments I address throughout the rest of the project overlap between 
these forms. Nonetheless, it is important to classify and show that cosmopolitanism 
represents a diverse set of ideas and principles. The taxonomy I adopt here should not be 
considered the only way to conceive of cosmopolitanism, but rather the one I adopt for 
the purposes of this project. I use the moral, cultural, and political classification here, as I 
believe it incorporates a large majority of cosmopolitan arguments. Moreover, the three 
forms I use here are a more coherent way of conceiving of cosmopolitanism than some 
alternative notions.74 Other ways of classifying cosmopolitanism, such as Kleingeld’s six 
varieties, and Vertovec and Cohen’s conceptions, unnecessarily subdivide types. By 
classifying cosmopolitanism in terms of moral, cultural, and political forms, I am able to 
thereby highlight key distinctions between the types and demonstrate how they are 
interconnected. Nonetheless, the cosmopolitanism that I defend can be described as 
‘rooted’. This form of cosmopolitanism can account for partiality and partial treatment. 
This raises the question of why we need to account for partiality that I have briefly 
discussed already.  
 Cosmopolitanism has been criticized in the past for being imperial and naïve for 
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ignoring cultural differences and the importance of roots.75 Craig Calhoun has suggested 
that certain types of cosmopolitanism – the types I describe as strong cosmopolitanism - 
leaves us “…lacking the old sources of solidarity without adequate new ones.”76 In other 
words, cosmopolitanism has been decried for bring rootless and for missing something 
essential about the human experience. This rootless form of cosmopolitanism, what Ethan 
Leib terms ‘cosmopolitanism with fangs’, is, understandably, very difficult to accept.77 
Leib claims that it ignores salient differences between groups and leads us away from the 
rich experiences that local attachments offer. A theory of moral obligations that cannot 
account for partiality to family, friends, and perhaps even conationals, will be unable to 
withstand much criticism or garner support. It is worth acknowledging that the nationalist 
and communitarian responses to ‘naïve cosmopolitanism’ have some merit. They contend 
that we have to account for our particular attachments in some way. At the same time, 
however, focusing on the local (or even categorically prioritizing it) over the global is 
problematic. My focus in this project is on Samuel Scheffler’s interpretation of a tension 
in our moral framework, but it is one that Onora O’Neill has described in similar 
language – “Since antiquity justice has been thought of as a political or civic virtue, more 
recently as belonging to a ‘bounded society’, or as a primary task of states…Yet the view 
that justice is intrinsically bounded sits ill with the many claims that it is cosmopolitan, 
owed to all…[this is a] tension between moral cosmopolitanism and institutional anti-
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cosmopolitanism.”78 Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, can be seen as a way to establish a 
position that is substantively cosmopolitan while also sensitive to local attachment. 
Moreover, the rooted cosmopolitanism I describe, as O’Neill highlights, focuses on 
global justice.79 The cosmopolitan position I defend in the sixth chapter is based on a 
conception of global justice. Fulfilment of global justice, however, cannot require that we 
ignore our local duties (which may also be conceived of as duties of justice). Rooted 
cosmopolitanism requires, in Lenard and Moore’s words, that we provide theoretical 
space for both our global and special duties.80 
 Rooted cosmopolitanism can be understood as any of the forms of 
cosmopolitanism discussed above, but my particular concern is with the ability for 
cosmopolitans to fulfil both particular and global obligations. The focus throughout the 
project will be on determining the ways in which cosmopolitanism is rooted and if that 
provides us with a theoretical position that allows us to fulfil both our local and our 
global obligations. Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, is necessarily a form of moderate 
moral cosmopolitanism – one that recognizes that we have global and local moral 
obligations that ought to be fulfilled. Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, can be seen as 
seeking to address a tension between cosmopolitan universalism and particularism. 
Particularism in this project is taken to be represented by claims that our moral 
obligations are rooted in local and particular relationships that we hold. Although I 
attempt to show throughout the project that much of the particularist argument can be 
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incorporated into a cosmopolitan position, cosmopolitanism cannot simply be made to fit 
within the particularist’s perspective, and this is why they are in tension with one another. 
Thus, my goal is to determine the ways in which different forms of cosmopolitanism – be 
they moral, cultural, or political – mediate this tension.   
 Most cosmopolitans would agree that we do have very important local 
obligations, hence the strength of moderate moral cosmopolitanism. However, these 
obligations should not necessarily outweigh or change the strength of our obligations to 
distant others. Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, emerges as a subset of cosmopolitanism 
that seeks a way to address the tension between cosmopolitan universalism and different 
forms of particularism.  
 Much in the same way as there is disagreement on how to understand 
cosmopolitanism, rooted cosmopolitans disagree on what ought to be rooted, what we are 
rooted in, or what rootedness contains. Will Kymlicka and Kathryn Walker highlight the 
internal diversity of the theory in their recent volume Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada 
and the World. On their view, the weakest form of rootedness “…merely argues that 
rooted attachments (to local self-government and cultural diversity) are not inherently 
inconsistent with global responsibilities.”81 This eliminates the possibility, then, of rooted 
cosmopolitanism containing strong moral cosmopolitan claims which may ignore our 
rooted attachments (especially on Mendieta’s reading). Contained in weak rooted 
cosmopolitanism, then, is there is meaningful space for the goals of both particularism 
and cosmopolitanism. Though, in its weakest form we need not say much about the 
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content of either the particularist or cosmopolitan positions, just simply that they overlap 
a moral or cultural space. Kymlicka and Walker then point to strong rooted 
cosmopolitanism, a strong position contends that rooted attachments are necessary to 
fulfil cosmopolitan goals.82 This can be taken to mean several things. First, we can see 
rootedness as providing a cohesive, manageable, and efficient outlet for cosmopolitan 
goals. Second, this can be taken to mean that our rooted attachments – say to our nation-
state – provide the moral source of our cosmopolitan goals. Kymlicka and Walker 
highlight this as an epistemological rootedness: “…particularist attachments are 
epistemologically required even to understand cosmopolitan goals. In this view, we can 
come to understand the moral significance of “the other” only because we have first been 
immersed in our own particular communities and ways of life…”83 The epistemological 
form of strong rootedness is one favoured by thinkers like Michael Walzer84 and Charles 
Taylor,85 which I address later in the project. The third form of strong rooted 
cosmopolitanism that Kymlicka and Walker highlight the ‘moral seedbed’ form of 
rootedness: “…[particularist attachments] may contain within them the seeds of moral 
universalistic commitments, such that we can appeal to people’s sense of rooted 
attachments to help motivate cosmopolitan commitments.”86 Importantly, on this view, 
our cosmopolitan goals are pursued only as they are required by our particularist 
attachments. Following their example, what it means to be a ‘good Canadian’ means 
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being a good global citizen.87 This final version of rootedness is perhaps the most 
controversial.  
 Rooted cosmopolitanism in its weakest form is the most defensible, but it 
becomes problematic once we start to look at the content of our particular obligations 
(derived from our attachments). Weak rootedness presumes, on a basic level, that our 
particular obligations will not override our commitment to cosmopolitan egalitarianism. 
At this point I am assuming that within all forms of cosmopolitanism is a commitment to 
moral equality, but not necessarily equal treatment. According to Toni Erskine 
cosmopolitan equality may simply require that we have an inclusive ‘sphere of moral 
concern’, or that we include all in our moral deliberations.88 This type of 
cosmopolitanism is consistent with our particularist attachments and could be said to be 
rooted if our local attachments do not necessarily (i.e. in themselves) conflict with 
cosmopolitan egalitarianism. Immediately, we should see that nationalism – understood 
as “The ideological counterpart of the nation-state…”89 – might be necessarily in conflict 
with cosmopolitan egalitarianism. Stronger forms of nationalism require that we put our 
national attachments above or prior to our cosmopolitan goals. Even if our nationalism is 
a more defensible one (such as the liberal nationalism of Miller I address in the fourth 
chapter) it will require a priority in allocating our resources that will necessarily impact 
global egalitarianism. Thus, from a cosmopolitan egalitarian perspective, nationalism is 
problematic as it prioritizes our moral concerns or where our resources go. Hence on 
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either reading of equality (as moral concern or as treatment), nationalism is problematic. 
Nationalism could be seen as consistent with cosmopolitan goals if we take on the moral 
seedbed form of rootedness mentioned above. If part of being a good national requires us 
to be good global citizens then it may be viable. However, as Kymlicka and Walker point 
out: “…but can we really say that these strong national identifications and patriotisms 
motivate cosmopolitanism? Does not history tell us that the most serious obstacle to 
cosmopolitanism in the modern world is precisely the moral blinders and national egoism 
associated with nationalism?”90 This suggests that cosmopolitanism can contain space for 
some forms of nationalism, but that cosmopolitanism is not derived from nationalism, as 
I discuss later.  
 Weak rooted cosmopolitanism appears to be a viable theory, but we need to look 
more closely at the content of both particularism and cosmopolitanism. Throughout the 
project I explore several weaker forms of rooted cosmopolitanism that see our rootedness 
within our culture as vital to cosmopolitanism (Appiah) or rootedness within our political 
associations as providing the necessary moral conditions for securing cosmopolitan goals 
(Miller). In exploring the content of these forms of rooted cosmopolitanism I find that 
neither is successful in developing a viable theory that accounts for the strength of both 
particularist attachments and cosmopolitan obligations.  
 The three stronger forms of rootedness are explored throughout the project as 
well. The first strong form of rootedness claims that we express our cosmopolitanism 
locally – our particular affiliations are the efficient outlet for our global obligations. This 
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is also termed the instrumental approach to rooted cosmopolitanism91, and the one 
favoured by Robert Goodin.92  On this account, our particular obligations are fulfilled as 
instruments to fulfilling our global obligations. To give an example, I would fulfil 
obligations to my conational out of a commitment to equality, but the institutional 
apparatuses of the state allow me to efficiently effect change locally. Second, rootedness 
provides us with the ability to understand ourselves and others. On this view, only 
through participation in local cultures can we come to understand and know otherness. 
Moreover, participation in local culture provides us with the ‘thick’ morality that we can 
then abstract from to see our global obligations (‘thin’ moral obligations).93 Finally, the 
third strong form of rootedness sees cosmopolitan goals as inherently part of or motivated 
by our local attachments. In Kymlicka and Walker’s example, Canadian nationalism 
includes a claim about individuals acting as good global citizens. On this reading, part of 
Canadian identity (i.e. what it means to be Canadian) incorporates a claim about being 
cosmopolitan. This variety of rooted cosmopolitanism is beyond my analysis here.  
 In the project I am primarily concerned with assessing rooted cosmopolitanism as 
a theory that can account for the relationship between the global and the particular. In this 
project I attempt to place rootedness within the typology of cosmopolitanism I adopt 
above. This means that I see rootedness as being expressed as cultural rootedness, 
political rootedness, and moral rootedness. These forms of rootedness contain elements 
of the forms distinguished by Kymlicka and Taylor, but I should briefly describe what I 
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mean by rootedness in these senses.  
 This raises the question of what it would mean to be morally, politically, or 
culturally rooted. On my account, moral rooted cosmopolitanism describes the 
relationship between the particularist origins of our moral obligations and their global 
scope. While our original source of moral knowledge and understanding is particular in 
nature, we need to recognize that this does not necessarily limit our moral scope. Cultural 
rooted cosmopolitanism is described as attachment to a cultural identity that then informs 
our global outlook and interactions with others. This form of rooted cosmopolitanism is 
best described by Appiah in chapter three. Admittedly, it is difficult to conceive of 
political rooted cosmopolitanism.  However, we could see it as part of the ‘think globally, 
act locally’ mentality described earlier. Participation within local political institutions is 
done with a cosmopolitan frame of reference. In this case, individuals would advocate for 
cosmopolitan initiatives at more local levels. As discussed throughout the chapter, 
dividing cosmopolitan claims into these three types is useful only in trying to clarify the 
theory. Once we begin to look at specific arguments there is significant overlap between 
the three types. Indeed, I go so far as to argue that we cannot make sense of rooted 
cosmopolitanism unless it incorporates all three elements.  
 In my argument I prioritize moral cosmopolitanism. Given this, it should not be a 
surprise that I conceive of the core problem of rooted cosmopolitanism as a moral one: 
assessing the tension between our global and particular obligations. However, I argue that 
to successfully navigate the tension, political and cultural arguments will be incorporated. 
As such, my main concern is a moral tension, but one that incorporates important claims 
about political institutions and cultural identities. I conclude in chapter six that in order to 
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find a way to make our moral obligations compatible with one another (or at least not 
antithetical), then we may be required to alter our political institutions to provide an 
effective route for fulfilling global obligations alongside particular ones. In determining 
the shape and structure of global institutions, I argue that we can look to the lessons 
offered by cultural cosmopolitans: recognition-based dialogue that can allow us to find 
areas of consensus to develop fair principles of governance that are inclusive.   
 The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. The second chapter addresses the 
seminal work of Samuel Scheffler; through an exploration of his work I lay the 
foundation for the subsequent chapters. Through Scheffler, I develop the benchmark 
against which theories of rooted cosmopolitanism are judged - that is, their ability to 
resolve or otherwise address the tension between global and particular obligations. 
Chapters three through six thematically explore the work of a chosen scholar who has 
attempted to resolve the tension. The arguments presented by others are first explored and 
I follow that with a brief commentary on the ability of each to resolve the tension. In each 
chapter I find that their arguments offer much to a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism, but 
none are entirely convincing. In the final chapter I present the framework for an 
alternative approach to rooted cosmopolitanism. As it would be beyond the scope, as well 
as the spirit, of the project to offer a fully formed theory of rooted cosmopolitanism, I 
limit my comments here to only offering a framework of how we can conceive of rooted 
cosmopolitanism in a way that successfully addresses Scheffler’s tension. Though, it may 
not be a fully resolvable tension under current institutional arrangements, it is something 
that can be realized in the future.  
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Chapter 2 
2. Defining the Tension: Samuel Scheffler’s Boundaries and Allegiances 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I explore Samuel Scheffler’s Boundaries and Allegiances. In this seminal 
work, Scheffler offers a very careful and complex analysis of several key tensions in 
moral thought. I focus on Scheffler in this chapter as he has carefully studied what I take 
to be a fundamental issue in rooted cosmopolitan theory. Moreover, he helps identify the 
core tension that rooted cosmopolitanism must navigate. Thus, I focus on describing what 
I call ‘Scheffler’s tension’ in this chapter. My main goal here is to present Scheffler’s 
work in such a way as to establish the criteria for determining the success of rooted 
cosmopolitanism. He contends that our desire to fulfill global obligations alongside our 
need to cultivate meaningful (and obligation-generating) social relationships leads to a 
tension in our moral thinking. Rooted cosmopolitanism, as I understand it, relies on 
analyzing why these two aspects of moral obligation are in tension and how it can be 
resolved. The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I describe Scheffler’s tension in two 
different ways: as a tension between general and associative duties, and as a tension 
between nationalism and egalitarianism. I then move on to exploring this tension as a 
dilemma for rooted cosmopolitanism and term it ‘Scheffler’s Tension’. Finally, I move to 
addressing several criteria that Scheffler offers us to evaluate a theory of rooted 
cosmopolitanism. This chapter acts as a way to set the terms for exploration and 
evaluation of rooted cosmopolitanism in the subsequent chapters.  
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Though in Scheffler’s work he identifies several other variations of the tension, 
these versions represent themes that emerge throughout the rest of the project. In 
particular, the tension between general and associative duties acts as the centre of most of 
my analysis. In chapters four and five I focus much more closely on the tension between 
nationalism and egalitarianism, but I conceive of it as a particular instance of the general 
vs. associative tension. By focusing on these variants I can both narrow the focus of the 
chapter and avoid repetition, as the central core of each version is the same: the inability 
to simultaneously fulfill universal and particular obligations. In each of these instances of 
the tension Scheffler describes how contemporary philosophy is challenged by ‘common-
sense moral thinking’ when it comes to these issues. For example, some forms of 
nationalism are at odds with a global egalitarianism, but nationalism occupies an 
important space for some, and it can be seen to be a vital force in fostering a healthy 
political atmosphere and vibrant citizenship.94 Thus, as it appears, liberal theory must find 
a way to accommodate the particularist challenge presented here. In the very least, 
cosmopolitanism may need to recognize the legitimacy of these claims.  
 Rooted cosmopolitanism is the central focus of my project and Scheffler’s tension 
raises a very intriguing problem for the theory. If he is correct, then a ‘rooted’ theory of 
cosmopolitanism that attempts to account for particular as well as universal obligations 
may be impossible. For Scheffler, the ends that rooted cosmopolitanism attempts to attain 
may not be possible. There may be a trade-off between global and particular obligations 
in some instances that makes a theory such as rooted cosmopolitanism unattainable.  
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2.2 Defining the Tension 
As mentioned above, Scheffler offers many different examples of how the tension 
manifests itself. In this section of the chapter my aim is to offer some preliminary 
comments on this as well as present the tension in its various forms. Despite the fact that 
my project is directly focused on cosmopolitanism, Scheffler does not limit his discussion 
to cosmopolitanism. Rather, his collection of essays explores a variety of areas of 
political philosophy to show how the tension emerges and must be confronted by 
contemporary philosophers. Moreover, he argues that the tension sets out a very clear 
challenge to cosmopolitan thinkers who attempt to offer a viable account of rooted 
cosmopolitanism.95  Although Scheffler is not only discussing the problem in relation to 
cosmopolitanism, the tension ultimately manifests itself as a central issue of 
contemporary moral thought.96 Further, despite the fact that Scheffler offers no fewer 
than five different versions of the tension I limit my discussion to two of these. I begin by 
exploring the tension between general and associative duties and the tension between 
nationalism and egalitarianism. After offering the tension in these two versions, in the 
next section I move to redefining it as a problem for cosmopolitanism. Ultimately, 
Scheffler seems to concede that there may not be a solution to this problem.97 That is, he 
brings to light the idea that the tension is something that shows the irreconcilability of 
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these ends. Nonetheless, the different manifestations of the tension helps to illuminate 
that there is more at stake here than understanding how we parse moral obligations. 
Scheffler describes the tension as an issue with contemporary understandings of moral 
agency, responsibility, and obligation. However, in this chapter I aim to demonstrate how 
it can be described in terms of general and associative duties on the one hand and in terms 
of nationalism and egalitarianism on the other.  
 
2.2.1 General and Associative Duties 
The first variation of the tension I wish to explore is the tension between general 
and associative duties. It is argued that we see ourselves as holding special duties to 
particular individuals and groups that may come into conflict with our general duties to 
others. In some instances, we may see ourselves as holding special duties that may not 
conflict with our general duties, and in others we may see ourselves as not having general 
duties. This exploration aims to show the intricacies of this tension – to show that this 
tension exists and cannot be dismissed by nationalists or cosmopolitans. Importantly, this 
aspect of the tension can be seen as building on the previous section. Scheffler claims that 
the tension between nationalism and universalism helps illustrate a tension between 
common-sense morality and philosophical reasoning.98 Ultimately, Scheffler argues that 
we may be able to arrive at a non-reductionist view of special (or associative) duties that 
may be compatible with our general duties.  
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General duties can be understood as those duties that we “…have to people as 
such…”99 as opposed to special duties that we have “…only to those particular people 
with whom we have had certain significant sorts of interactions or to whom we stand in 
certain significant sorts of relationships.”100 There are various sorts of special duties – 
contractual, reparative, duties of gratitude, etc.101 – however, my focus (as well as 
Scheffler’s) is one type of special duty: associative duties. He defines associative duties 
as “…[those] duties that the members of significant social groups and the participants in 
close personal relationships are often thought to have toward one another.”102 My focus 
in this work is primarily on associative duties and their ability to generate particular 
obligations. This is not to say that associative duties are without controversy or 
universally accepted. Indeed the idea has been subject to much criticism lately.103 One of 
the largest issues with this theory is that the content or moral fairness of the association is 
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not necessarily called into question.104 On Richard Dagger’s reading, membership in and 
of itself is not sufficient to give rise to obligation.105 Given the scope of this project, it 
would be difficult to present a robust defense of associative obligations here. However, it 
is worth pointing out that the issue of the content of associative obligation that Dagger 
highlights is not necessarily specific to associative obligations. The question of content is 
as applicable to voluntarist accounts of obligation.106 While I am unable to provide a 
specific defence of associative obligations here, it is worth noting that the legitimacy of 
the content of the obligation will be determined in relation to general principles.107 
Focusing specifically on associative obligations, I contend, allows us to consider 
Scheffler’s tension at its strongest – how do we respond when the content of a particular 
(associative) obligation is at odds with a general principle? Answering this question is the 
central focus of the project. I should, however, more specifically define what I mean by 
associative obligation. Following A. John Simmons’ definition, which is helpfully 
summarized by John Horton, associative obligations have five key characteristics: 
“antivoluntarism, the authority of shared moral experience, particularity, the analogy with 
the family, and the normative power of local practice.”108 As my overall concern here is 
with the role of particular obligations, I will not be exploring every aspect of associative 
obligations. To put it more clearly, the authority of shared moral experience and of 
particularity will be focused on much more so than, say, the analogy to the family.  
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There are many associative duties that we can hold, and the content and strength 
of the duty on us will vary depending on the nature of the relationship we have with the 
individual or group. There are obvious examples of associative duties that we can have: 
to our family, friends, coworkers, or classmates; but there is also the possibility of 
associative duties to our nation, clan, race, or ethnic group.109 While most people would 
be quick to recognize our associative duties to the first group (family, friends, or 
coworkers), some would be skeptical of the legitimacy of our duties to the second group 
(nation, clan, or race). The content of such duties is also said to vary considerably, thus it 
is difficult to make generalizable claims about associative duties due to their inherent 
diversity. Nonetheless, I focus on more on the institutionalized associative duties (such as 
citizenship duties) as they represent the more controversial case for cosmopolitans. 
Recognizing and prioritizing duties to family is rather platitudinous, but some 
cosmopolitans rightly question how shared nationality or shared citizenship can 
legitimately generate moral obligations that are stronger than or come prior to general 
duties. In my analysis in chapters four five and six I argue that there is an institutional 
relationship that generates national duties, but that this institutional relationship either 
currently exists or ought to exist in a different form at the global level, which would 
therefore generate similar obligations. I use this as the basis for developing a successful 
resolution to Scheffler’s tension and as a guide for rooted cosmopolitanism.  
What we owe an associate (i.e. the content of an associative duty) will depend on 
the nature of that relationship. That is, we may owe family members something that we 
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would not owe coworkers, or we might owe our conationals something that we would not 
owe teammates. Nonetheless, Scheffler contends that philosophers tend to characterize 
associative duties as “…duties to provide positive benefits for one’s associates…duties 
that go beyond whatever positive duties we may already have toward people in 
general.”110 But, as he claims, this may be an oversimplification of the nature of 
associative duties, as these duties are not exclusively positive in character – individuals 
take on the burden of fulfilling obligations to others who they otherwise may not have to 
consider since they are associates. Additionally, there is the possibility that associative 
duties may override our general duties. Returning briefly to the (problematic) negative 
general vs. positive particular distinction, our positive duties to our associates may cause 
us to lower the threshold at which we would violate or override a negative duty to a 
stranger.111 This means duties owed to an associate may outweigh our general duties.112 
Scheffler contends, then, that one way we can conceive of associative duties is as those 
duties that require us to place the interests of our associates above the interests of others 
(with whom we do not have a significant relationship).113 This is obviously problematic 
for the strong global egalitarian who contends that equality requires equal treatment, but 
it is equally troubling for the moderate cosmopolitans. At some level, moral 
cosmopolitanism requires a robust framework of global duties. Though the content will 
vary between theorists, all moral cosmopolitan positions rely on some formulation of 
global obligations. If nationalist and civic associative duties cause us to override or 
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violate (or otherwise ignore) our general moral duties, then the goals of cosmopolitanism 
are put at risk.  
There are two objections to associative duties (apart from a strict universalist 
objection114): the voluntarist objection and the distributive objection. The voluntarist 
objection claims that obligations are created only in voluntarily entered relationships. “In 
other words, mere participation in a relationship or membership in a group is not 
sufficient to generate any special responsibilities whatsoever.”115 The obligations are 
generated from one’s voluntary act – an explicit acceptance of the relationship, or 
voluntary entry into the group in question, for example.116 Voluntarist accounts of 
obligation tend to be contractual in nature. This is due to the fact that an account of 
obligation, for a voluntarist, must show that an individual agent has freely chosen to 
accept the relationship and created the obligation. The obligation is itself created if, and 
only if, the agent freely accepts the relationship. Another account of obligation would 
contend that the nature of the relationship with an associate is one that generates duties if 
we value the relationship. The obligation is generated by the relationship itself, not one’s 
voluntary participation in the relationship. Associative duties present a problem to 
voluntarists as they unduly constrain individual autonomy – they remove the “consensual 
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act” that establishes obligation.117 Voluntarism is not in itself hostile towards associative 
duties. Rather, voluntarists are concerned with the undue burden that these duties can 
place on individuals who have not voluntarily incurred them.118 Nonetheless, a voluntarist 
can provide a reductionist account of associative duties. A non-reductionist could claim 
that I owe my wife particular things because I value my relationship with her; this would 
be incompatible with voluntarism, however. A voluntarist might contend that I owe 
things to my wife because of the commitment I voluntarily made and the promises I 
freely entered into with marriage – the act of freely marrying my wife, and the signing of 
a pact between two individuals (in this case both symbolically and literally) has generated 
the responsibilities, not the relationship with a particular person in itself.119 
While the voluntarist objection may hold some merit from some perspectives, it 
fails to capture our lived moral experience.120 That is to suggest that some types of 
obligation can be voluntarily incurred. For example, if I join a social club or a union, I 
then gain duties to other members of the group. The voluntarist approach, however, does 
not adequately explain obligations that I have to family, friends, or even conationals. In 
each of these cases I have associative duties that have not necessarily been gained 
voluntarily. Moreover, it would seem as though these types of duties are the ones that 
hold the most strength in our moral framework. We treat our loved ones in a particular 
way simply because they are our loved ones, and, generally speaking, we’d be willing to 
go much farther for a family member or friend than we would for a fellow union member. 
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Therefore, although voluntarism captures part of the associative story, it fails to 
adequately explain our strongest forms of special duties.  
The second objection to associative duties is the distributive objection. Unlike the 
voluntarist objection, which sees these duties as placing undue burdens on the individual, 
the distributive objection sees associative duties with providing undue benefits on in-
group members.121 Associative duties require us to give preference to the interests of 
those with whom we stand a particular relationship, whom I will call ‘in-group’. This 
preference means that we may be failing to fulfill duties to those with whom we do not 
have a relationship, whom I will call ‘out-group’.  In-group members gain (undue) 
benefits on at least two levels. First, they get to enjoy the benefits of group membership – 
the rewards of being able to have fulfilling and meaningful relationships with others. 
Second, they enjoy the benefit of strengthened claims that they can make on other in-
group members. This means, in essence, that their interests will gain preference from 
other in-group members over the interests of out-group members. So, on one account of 
the distributive objection, in-group members receive morally arbitrary benefits that then 
cause out-group members to be unduly burdened.122 This suggests that resources that 
could be distributed to help needier individuals will not go to them, as they will be used 
to benefit in-group members first. Essentially, if persons A and B are in-group members, 
and person C is an out-group member, the interests of person A will be preferred to C by 
B, even if person C presents a greater need. As Scheffler states:  
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…the distributive objection sees associative duties as providing additional 
advantages to people who have already benefited from participation in rewarding 
groups and relationships, and it views this as unjustifiable whenever the provision 
of these additional advantages works to the detriment of people who are 
needier…123  
 
Defenders of associative duties can claim that rewarding relationships themselves give 
rise to duties. Scheffler claims that the prioritization of interests in these types of 
relationships is an implicit precondition for enjoying meaningful social existence.124 
Therefore, individuals cannot hold socially meaningful relationships – the kinds of which 
humans have a strong desire to hold – without generating such duties.  
The problem with this kind of defence of associative duties is that it can be 
reduced to another form of voluntarism. Associative duties (on this account) are morally 
permissible as they come out of relationships that we desire to have with others. We can 
argue from this that these types of duties would be incurred quasi-voluntarily. If 
associative duties are those that we have to people we have meaningful relationships 
with, then they are desirable obligations insofar as they are necessary to maintain 
important relationships. Yet, there are many important associations that we have not 
voluntarily incurred, associations we are born into, for example. We could, however, 
describe the maintenance of these obligations as voluntarist in nature – if we maintain 
that we have an obligation to individuals or groups that we deem important based on a 
meaningful relationship then we are voluntarily maintaining these relationships. On this 
understanding of associative obligation, we maintain the strength of the duty on the basis 
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that the duty generating relationship is desirable. I think this understanding of associative 
duty, however, overly simplifies our relationships and both the benefits and burdens of 
maintaining them.   
To move away from voluntarism we can simply question the effect that 
associative duties have on outsiders. Distributivists claim that the permissibility of our 
associative duties must be constrained by the effects that they have on our duties to out-
group members.125 They argue that these meaningful relationships that in-group members 
have the opportunity to participate in are a luxury. When one claims that these 
relationships confer duties and responsibilities to other in-group members, this is seen as 
giving in-group members an unfair advantage over the (possibly) needier out-group 
members. This, in essence, will not only confer advantage on in-group members, but it 
may also work to reinforce inequalities between in and out-group members. This 
objection points to the fact that there is a tension between the moral egalitarianism that is 
sacred to most formulations of liberalism and the attractiveness of associative duties.126 
I will now briefly consider four other responses to the distributive objection. First, 
It could be argued that the distributive objection misunderstands the way that associative 
duties interact with our general duties. A distributivist may suppose that duties I owe to 
in-group members means that I therefore lose duties to out-group members. In some 
ways this is correct, I have an associative duty to my wife, which requires me to devote 
resources to her that then cannot be applied elsewhere. However, one could respond that 
associative duties do not cause us to drop general duties, but rather give us additional 
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duties. One example of this could be how Pogge attempts to show how our positive local 
duties (particular duties) do not come into conflict with our negative duties (general 
duties) that we owe to everyone. On this line of thought, special responsibilities 
(including those created by association) are only permissible in so far as they do not 
decrease our general (universal) duties.127 This line of reasoning may appear as attractive 
at first, but is ultimately untenable.128 There will be times when our associative duties do 
not dilute our general duties, especially our general negative duties. However, associative 
duties are controversial for the simple reason that they establish a conflict with our 
general duties: the important part of having an associative duty is that I give priority to 
my associate’s interests above the interests of non-associates when the two conflict. To 
put it simply, individuals and groups have finite resources and must prioritize between 
commitments.  
The second response to the distributive objection operates on two levels. First, it 
claims that the objection focuses too much on the positive aspects of in-group 
association, presuming that in-group members will only receive benefits. However, in 
reality if one is taking on more duties, this can represent a substantial burden to an 
individual. According to this response, one is not necessarily gaining advantage by being 
an in-group member; rather one is gaining a share of total responsibility.129 The second 
aspect of this response is the complement to the first – out-group members do not 
necessarily become worse off by being out-group. What this response does, in effect, is 
show how the existence of associative duties does not necessarily confer a net advantage 
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or disadvantage upon in or out-group members. The relationship between associative 
duties and in/out-group members is much more complex and can only be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. The increasing reliance of in-group members on each other also 
means that out-group members are free to pursue their own interests, unhindered by the 
needs of in-group members, with whom they have no association or obligation. However, 
this freedom from in-group interest could hardly be of solace to the world’s worst off.130 
Indeed, the prioritization of in-group members in affluent states (where group 
membership is demarcated by citizenship) significantly worsens the already desperate 
conditions of the world’s poorest. 
The third response to the distributive objection supposes that it is not objecting to 
associative duties as such, but rather to the increasing inequalities that these duties will 
create in already unjust situations.131 This means that if there were no underlying 
distributive injustice, special responsibilities would not be problematic. This may be the 
strongest of all of the responses to the objection. This response, despite its claim to 
defend associative duties, is still vulnerable to cosmopolitan claims of an unjust global 
order.132 Special responsibilities are only justified, in this response, where a just 
distribution already exists. This may require, if Rawls is correct, a just institutional 
arrangement in society. This is, quite obviously, currently not the case in the international 
realm, and therefore this response cannot really offer any compelling vindication for 
associative duties from a cosmopolitan perspective. This is especially the case as 
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“…[associative duties are] unfair if…[they] work to the detriment of people who already 
have less, whether or not their already having less is also unfair.”133 
This leads to the fourth, and final, response to the distributive objection: 
associative duties are a precondition for stable and rewarding social relationships. If we 
are to assume that these types of relationships are desirable then it must also be 
considered that they necessitate these types of duties.134 A distributivist would simply 
reply that there must be constraints placed on the legitimacy of associative duties in three 
ways:  
1. The effect on out-group members constrains the “…capacity of commitments  
 to generate such responsibilities…”  
2. It brings into question the legitimacy of making commitments that necessitate 
 these duties.  
3. It questions the content of the duties.135  
The distributive objection presents a problem for defenders of special 
responsibilities, but defenders of associative duties may have a foothold here. If we 
understand associative duties to be those obligations incurred on the basis of meaningful 
association with others, then the distributive objection may not be as problematic as it 
appears to be. Certainly, objectors are correct when they question the content of an 
associative obligation. We cannot argue that all of our associative obligations are 
legitimate simply because they are based on meaningful association, we have to explore 
the content of the obligation. Though the distributivists are primarily concerned with the 
                                                 
133
 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 92. 
134
 Ibid., 93. 
135
 Ibid. 
  63 
impact that associative duties will have on distributive outcomes, we can also extend our 
concern to obligations what would lead to (or exacerbate) direct harm of out-group 
members. Hence, particularists who wish to defend associative duties (such as the 
theorists explored in the rest of the thesis) need to qualify the content of the duties and 
how they relate to outsiders. Indeed, defining the content of our particular duties in 
relation to our global ones is the central task of rooted cosmopolitanism. As such, we 
need to avoid understanding the relationship as ‘either/or’ and attempt to define it in 
terms of compatibility – in what ways are our particular duties compatible with 
cosmopolitanism? Or, in the inverse, in what ways are cosmopolitan duties compatible 
with particularism?  
Scheffler summarizes the tension between general and associative duties as 
follows. Within liberal society one of the fundamental virtues that we hold is that of 
freedom or autonomy. Associative duties can be seen as placing restraints on our freedom 
that may be perceived as undue. Hence, the voluntarist objection may hold great sway 
within liberal society. On the other hand, liberals hold the value of equality to be of 
central importance, which helps give weight to the distributive objection. Nonetheless, 
associative duties are seen to be centrally important to our social lives, and most people 
generally understand themselves to hold these duties. Most people would make the claim 
that they owe their family members more than they owe strangers. The objections to 
associative duties help to illustrate the tension that we have between general and 
associative duties and that this is beyond a philosophical issue, and a tension within 
common-sense morality. Ultimately, the values of liberty and equality, values essential to 
liberal society, will take us to different positions on the question of responsibility. So far I 
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have described the tension in an abstract form, as one between general and associative 
duties. In the next section I discuss an application of this tension in the context of a 
specific case. 
 
2.2.2. Nationalism and Egalitarianism 
In the second exploration of the tension I briefly look at the tension between 
nationalism and egalitarianism. As expressed above, this tension is fundamental to 
liberalism, and one that must be confronted by contemporary philosophers. This tension 
is taken to represent a specific version of a larger and more fundamental issue in 
contemporary moral thought: the tension between moral universalism and 
particularism.136 In this section I very briefly consider the relationship between liberal 
nationalism and egalitarianism. It is supposed that these are mutually exclusive positions 
in the sense that fulfilling obligations to one requires shirking obligations to the other.  
In liberal society, as mentioned above, there exists a tension between two 
governing values: those of equality and communal solidarity. Communal solidarity is 
expressed through the political obligations that we are often said to hold to our fellow 
citizens. These obligations can be seen to represent one form of associative duty. These 
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obligations are seen to be at odds with a universalist egalitarian perspective.137 Political 
obligations are owed to particular individuals with whom we share a special relationship, 
and not to the world in general. Hence these duties can be classified as associative duties 
in so far as they arise out of a particular association we have with other individuals. Our 
political obligations arise from the institutional arrangement that makes cooperation 
necessary. Further, a trend exists within liberal thought to suppose that this arrangement 
is required to fulfill the requirements of justice. A state organizes individuals and creates 
the institutions needed to fulfill the principles of justice. According to Rawls, the nation 
and the state tend to align and form a state with a common national culture, which helps 
to reinforce principles of justice.138 The existence of these political obligations, which 
(arguably) a state cannot exist without, brings into question the liberal rejection of 
associative duties (i.e. the explicit egalitarianism inherent to liberalism).139 Yet, the 
rejection of associative duties in favor of egalitarianism presents a serious problem to any 
form of liberal nationalism that justifies the (much needed) political obligations that bind 
a state. 
There are two possible ways to make these political obligations compatible with 
liberal egalitarianism. The first is a move I have already made: make them into 
associative duties that can resist the voluntarist objection. Although I presented these 
obligations as associative duties, they need not be described as such. Rather, in describing 
them as associative duties I have already presented a justification for them as well as laid 
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the groundwork for resisting the objections. Alternatively, these duties can be classified 
as special responsibilities owed to co-nationals qua co-national. That would suggest that 
we owe things to our co-nationals on the basis of them being co-nationals. This 
description of political obligation would be hardly convincing to some liberals, as shared 
citizenship can be seen as morally arbitrary. No one chooses where or when they are 
born, it is pure chance that they are born in a particular state. Therefore, why should that 
act of chance impact their moral obligations? Alternatively, one could offer an account of 
political obligations from a virtue-based account. One could suggest that political 
obligations are needed in order to fulfill the requirements of being a good citizen. That is, 
taking on the burdens (and benefits) of citizenship requires that one fulfill these 
obligations. However, instead of offering a non-reductionist account of political 
obligations, we can describe them in the language of associative duties.140 
The second way that we can make these obligations more compatible with liberal 
egalitarianism is to present them as part of a ‘natural duty of justice’, as per Rawls’s and 
Waldron’s accounts. Rawls claims that the duty of natural justice requires us to support – 
thereby fulfilling our political obligations – the just institutions that exist and apply to 
us.
141
 Yet this formulation of political obligation brings about the issue of application: 
how do we justify the application of institutions. Scheffler points to A. John Simmons’ 
account to show how Rawls’s notion is actually susceptible to the voluntarist objection in 
ways that make it non-tenable. Essentially, for Simmons, there are two ways of 
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understanding which institutions apply to us. First, institutions may apply to us by “…my 
birth and growth in a territory within which the institution’s rules are enforced.”142 This 
justification of application suggests that something beyond individual control is morally 
contingent. However, as expressed above, these factors are morally arbitrary as the place 
of someone’s birth is not something that they can be held responsible for, it is pure 
chance. The second justification is stronger in the sense that application relies on my 
having done things.143 This means that the institutions of the state apply to me in so far as 
I have consented to or accepted the benefits of these institutions.144 However, this 
justification is tantamount to a voluntarist account of political obligation.  
Thus, by describing our political obligations as associative duties we may offer 
some more resistance to the objections specified in the previous section. Nationalist 
obligations are deeply held within most accounts of common sense morality. Most 
individuals would assume that they have political obligations to their co-citizens that they 
do not owe to non-citizens. This type of moral particularism is at odds with forms of 
egalitarianism, yet most liberals would accept both.145 The acceptance of both values as 
being inherently liberal does not, however, demonstrate their inherent compatibility or 
incompatibility. This means, then, that we must explore what particularism and 
egalitarianism require. Scheffler points out an important question that will present a 
serious problem for rooted cosmopolitans: “…if all people are of equal value and 
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importance, then what is it about my relation to my associates that makes it not merely 
permissible but obligatory for me to give their interests priority over the interests of other 
people?”146 Even by presenting a satisfactory account of political obligations as 
associative duties, we are still held by the constraining limits they place on our fulfilling 
of general duties, those owed to humanity as such.147 This may lead us to concluding that 
our particular obligations, expressed as associative duties, may always be in tension with 
our deeply held moral egalitarianism.148  
One way that I conceive of resolving this issue is by analyzing these obligations 
as institutionally-bound associative duties. What this means is that obligations to co-
nationals or citizens are generated and prioritized on the basis of an important 
institutional relationship. For example, citizens are bound by a large social institutional 
structure that causes them to be impacted by one another’s decisions. There are various 
ways of understanding the relationship of citizen to state and citizen to citizen, but we can 
see it as creating obligations of association through an institutional relationship. This 
means that any general duties that can be described under this structure (i.e. state-based 
sovereignty at the international level) must rely on a different justification or recognition 
of a similar institutional relationship at the global level. If we can successfully describe 
global obligations as being institutionally-bound as well, then rooted cosmopolitanism 
may be a viable theory. We may be able to describe a theory that adequately accounts for 
both particularism and global duties.  
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2.3 Redefining the Tension and Establishing the Criteria 
 The tension appears to be of particular concern for cosmopolitans who wish to 
avoid being labeled as ‘naïve’ or ‘imperial’. Those labels are typically applied to the 
strong moral positions described in chapter one, but even more moderate positions are 
susceptible if they are unable to account for our particular obligations in a meaningful 
way. Nussbaum’s and Goodin’s positions, for example, do not lend themselves well to 
particularist objections. While both admit room for particular obligations, these duties are 
based on an efficient fulfillment of our global duties. To give an example from 
Nussbaum, she contends that caring for one’s own child is done out of concern for 
children in general. She says: “To take one example, we do not really think that our own 
children are morally more important than other people’s children, even though almost all 
of us who have children would give our own children far more love and care than we give 
other people’s children. It is good for children, on the whole, that things should work out 
this way, and that is why our special care is good rather than selfish.”149 This highlights 
the complexity of describing our particular duties in cosmopolitan terms. Nussbaum is 
likely correct that people do not consider their child to be worth more than other children, 
but her analysis misses something fundamental about our actual moral experience. We do 
not fulfill obligations to our children, spouses, or friends simply because it is the right 
thing to do (although that may factor into it), we act in a certain way towards these people 
because we are in a meaningful relationship with them and this necessitates special 
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treatment. As such, describing our particular duties as efficiently fulfilling general duties 
misses something important about how and why we act.  
 This questioning of Nussbaum’s ‘particularized general duties’ strategy does not, 
however, endorse all particularist claims. Nor am I prioritizing our particular duties above 
our general ones. Rather, I am simply bringing into question the relationship between 
particular and general duties. If our particular duties require independent justification, 
then how can we reconcile them with general principles? This is especially problematic 
once we look at the role of distributive equality in cosmopolitanism. If we are concerned 
with equality at the global level, then how can we justifiably devote an inordinate amount 
of resources to our associates who may not be in as much need as strangers? At the same 
time as a commitment to global equality needs to be reconciled with our particular 
loyalties, we need to recognize that our loyalties need to be reconciled with global 
equality. Hence, I am centrally concerned with describing the content of both sets of 
duties in a way that appeals to both particularists and cosmopolitans. Committing oneself 
to universal equality can place serious limitations on commitments to particularity. 
Likewise, committing oneself to particularist stances seriously limits one’s commitment 
to global responsibilities. Again, this invites the discussion of what both universal 
equality and particularity require of us, which occupies a central space in the rest of this 
work. While Scheffler does not admit that this tension is the result of mutually exclusive 
values, he does concede that any viable cosmopolitanism will require continual 
negotiation between ‘ineliminable distinctions’150  
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 As I conceive of it, these distinctions may be ineliminable under current political 
frameworks. It may not be possible to reconcile our general duties with our particularist 
ones – especially when they are institutionally separated. In many instances our 
particularist duties (here I am mostly referring to nationalist and civic duties) are given 
priority both because we are in an institutionally important relationship with other in-
group members, but also because the out-group members are necessarily excluded. 
Global obligations, then, have to be considered as a different kind of obligation and 
require a different justification and different description of their content. Surely, we 
cannot suggest that what we owe to citizens will be identical to what is owed to humanity 
writ large. At the same time, however, the lack of an identical set of institutions at the 
global level as exist at the state level need not require us to conclude that this is the only 
or even right way to understand international politics. The fact that global and 
particularist obligations are understood as in ineliminable tension should not lead us to 
conclude that the goals of rooted cosmopolitanism are misguided, but it is equally 
possible that something is amiss in the structure of statist and international politics.  
 In the end, Scheffler provides us with a criterion for judging whether or not a 
cosmopolitan position is viable. I use his criteria in the following chapters to determine to 
what degree conceptions of rooted cosmopolitanism are successful. In order to determine 
whether or not rooted cosmopolitanism is successful it must be an account that “…proves 
possible to devise human institutions, practices, and ways of life that take seriously the 
equal worth of persons without undermining people’s capacity to sustain their special 
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loyalties.”151 Quite apparently, the success of rooted cosmopolitanism relies on some very 
real political changes.  
 Successfully navigating the tension will in some ways lead to a reconciliation of 
our ends. What I mean here is not that the tension itself will be resolved and cease to 
exist, rather it will (in the very least) make our ends not inconsistent with one another. It 
will also provide ways, either through moral deliberation or institutional practice, to 
fulfill both sets of duties. The type of rooted cosmopolitanism that I favour has a 
significant institutional element to it that will allow for the governance over international 
obligations without compartmentalizing or necessarily separating our local ones into a 
different sphere. The central problems of cosmopolitan thinking, issues such as poverty 
and the environment, are not national or international, there is an important area that 
overlaps multiple levels of governance. Our ability to adequately address these types of 
issues will, in part, depend upon the political tools at our disposal. Again, this does not 
mean that the tension will dissolve once we have a strong structure of global governance. 
Rather, what I am trying to show is that by engaging with the tension we may be able to 
develop ways to reconcile our ends.  
 It is important to note that although these are the criteria I use to examine the 
following forms of rooted cosmopolitanism, not all of the versions of the theory will 
incorporate all of these aspects. Some are more explicitly focused on culture, and some 
are more explicitly focused on justice. In these cases my focus is on what the authors are 
arguing. Nonetheless, the lack of incorporation of these aspects may mean that their 
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theory is insufficiently supported. Scheffler’s tension shows us the greatest obstacle 
facing cosmopolitan thought: how can we fulfill our global obligations without ignoring 
our particular ones or, the inverse, fulfill our particular obligations without ignoring our 
global ones. Of course, the simple response to this would bring into question the value of 
particular obligations. One could make the claim that we do not need to fulfill our 
particular obligations, thus presenting a very strong form of cosmopolitanism. However, 
Scheffler effectively argues why cosmopolitans need to take these obligations seriously. 
Additionally, he claims (and I think rightly so) that most people’s conceptions of morality 
include both a commitment to equality and a commitment to particular obligations. 
Importantly, most people do not perceive these as mutually exclusive positions. 
Ultimately, any successful account of rooted cosmopolitanism must effectively 
demonstrate how we can resolve the tension, how we can successfully fulfill both sets of 
obligation simultaneously. This may mean that rooted cosmopolitanism requires a 
perpetual cycle of negotiation about the institutions, values, traditions, and meanings in 
life.   
 
 
Chapter 3 
3 Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Rooted Cosmopolitanism 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I assess Kwame Anthony Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism as it 
appears in his Ethics of Identity and Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. I 
focus on Appiah here as he presents an argument for rooted cosmopolitanism. His theory 
is primarily focused on the cultural aspect but it importantly incorporates moral 
cosmopolitanism. Given this, I argue that Appiah's position re-envisions cultural 
cosmopolitanism in a way that may address Scheffler’s tension. Rooted cosmopolitanism, 
for Appiah, is centrally concerned with recognizing the value of different ways of life and 
fostering intercultural dialogue. At the same time, however, he is critical of political 
projects that essentialize culture.152 Appiah seems to take on a similar position to 
Scheffler when he argues that cultures need to change over time in order to survive. 
Nonetheless, he argues that we need to embrace the diversity around us and recognize 
that the way others live their lives is valuable. Rooted cosmopolitanism seems to be, 
above all else, a way for starting intercultural dialogue. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism 
offers a very important starting point in the discussion. However, I argue that he fails to 
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account for important political elements in any substantive way. While establishing that 
the conditions for fruitful debate are necessary, they are far from sufficient. There are 
many points where Appiah and I agree, however I place more of an emphasis on political 
cosmopolitanism. I therefore have two substantive issues with Appiah’s work. First, his 
focus on culture fails to adequately account for the role of political institutions, and 
second he does not address the important role of power in intercultural dialogue. 
Nonetheless, I conclude that this version of rooted cosmopolitanism is helpful, if not fully 
formed. I begin in §3.2 with an overview of Appiah’s position and his rejection of 
Scheffler’s distributive objection, I then move to critically assessing his argument in §3.4 
and §3.5. 
 
3.2 Rooted Cosmopolitanism 
 This section of the chapter focuses on describing Appiah’s position. My focus 
here is on assessing his rooted cosmopolitanism and how Appiah responds to Scheffler’s 
distributive objection outlined in the second chapter. His argument appears to describe 
rooted cosmopolitanism primarily as a cultural form of cosmopolitanism. Appiah’s 
cosmopolitanism is informed by recognition of our cultural roots, which he sees as 
helpfully supporting our global obligations. In describing his position I aim to show that 
he is very much influenced by J.S. Mill and attempts to provide the conditions under 
which rooted cosmopolitanism is possible.  
  Many cosmopolitans are quick to point out that the processes of globalization 
have led a level of interconnectedness that promotes the practical (and possibly 
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inevitable) ends of cosmopolitanism.153 Appiah, however, begins his discussion of 
cosmopolitanism by expressing scepticism with this starting point, claiming that 
interconnectedness does not thereby place us in a single global community.154 More 
importantly, Appiah expresses scepticism about the concept of nationalism, which is oft-
repeated in this literature. Yet, while he is sceptical about nationalism he later recognizes 
its force. Appiah is quick to avoid making any claims in support of political 
cosmopolitanism, arguing that cosmopolitanism is not aiming towards a world-state, 
which he appears to claim is synonymous with the ends of political cosmopolitanism.155 
So, if it is not, as he contends here, a political project, then what is it?156 
 Appiah's cosmopolitanism distinguishes between moral and cultural forms, but he 
sees them as linked in an important way (though political cosmopolitanism is left out of 
the equation):  
But the wishy-washy version of cosmopolitanism I want to defend doesn’t seek to 
destroy patriotism, or separate out “real” from “unreal” loyalties. More important, 
it isn’t exhausted by the appeal to moral universalism. I want, accordingly, to 
resist the sharp distinction that is sometimes made between “moral” and “cultural” 
cosmopolitanism, where the former comprises those principles of moral 
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universalism and impartialism, and the latter comprises the values of the world 
traveler, who takes pleasure in conversation with exotic strangers. The discourse 
of cosmopolitanism will add to our understanding only when it is informed by 
both of these ideals: if we care about others who are not part of our political order 
– others who may have commitments and beliefs that are unlike our own – we 
must have a way to talk to them.157 
 
Here we first begin to understand the uniqueness of his position. As opposed to seeing it 
as a claim about political institutions, or the scope of justice, cosmopolitanism here is 
described more as establishing a global conversation. His cosmopolitanism can also be 
understood as a Millian cosmopolitanism.  
 John Stuart Mill's famed treatise On Liberty appears to serve as an influencing 
text for Appiah. Appiah's cosmopolitanism does not just celebrate difference for the sake 
of difference, rather it 'engages' with difference.158 Moreover, those theorists who argue 
that difference needs to be protected (i.e. Liberal multiculturalists) are engaging in 
'spectator-sport diversity' according to Appiah. This means that they maintain diversity 
where it may not be relevant.159 Rather, diversity should be celebrated as it represents the 
variety of human life – the various ways that people can find meaning and live a good 
life. As opposed to aiming at a single world culture, Appiah's cosmopolitanism 
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effectively engages in intercultural dialogue – we should understand others' ways of life, 
not simply reject them. Or in Millian language we should not attempt to shape people 
after one model:  
If it were only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason enough for not 
attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also require 
different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily 
in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can exist in the same physical, 
atmosphere and climate.160  
 
Cosmopolitanism, for Appiah, then, is an engagement with others in the plurality of 
modes of life.161 Diversity should be respected and valued only because it represents the 
freely chosen ways of life that people lead. Valuing diversity for this reason shows a 
much deeper connection to Mill’s philosophy. Appiah states, in what could just as easily 
be from On Liberty, that diversity should be valued “…because it allows free people the 
best chance to make their own lives…”162 
 As mentioned earlier, Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism makes little mention of 
political cosmopolitanism. In fact, in The Ethics of Identity, he is clearly moving away 
from a political project and towards a more normative one. Appiah argues that 
cosmopolitanism has a task:  
To contemplate cosmopolitanism of this variety is to contemplate the task of 
cosmopolitanism, which is debate and conversation across nations. Within a 
legitimate polity, we can agree that all shall drive on the right; that torture shall be 
forbidden; that carbon emissions shall be restricted...But once we are speaking not 
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within but among polities, we cannot rely upon decrees and injunctions. We must 
rely on the ability to listen and to talk to people whose commitments, beliefs, and 
projects may seem distant from our own.163 
 
 Many political cosmopolitans would be at odds with this statement. It would seem that 
rooted cosmopolitanism for Appiah is primarily a moral and cultural project: engage with 
difference and hope to understand it. However, in other places, he has made clearly 
political statements.164 The relationship between Appiah's morally and culturally-
motivated rooted cosmopolitanism and political cosmopolitanism is more complex than 
first assumed. Indeed, my own position relies on acknowledgement of the importance of 
political and moral and cultural forms of cosmopolitanism. In my explanation of 
Appiah’s failure to consider the importance of political cosmopolitanism, I work to 
emphasize how the different forms are necessarily connected in rooted cosmopolitanism. 
In chapter six I conclude by arguing that rooted cosmopolitanism can be successful only 
insofar as it incorporates aspects of each form. In the next section I will develop a critical 
analysis of Appiah’s position. My aim is to see the ways in which Appiah’s theory can be 
used to account for Scheffler’s tension.  
 
3.3 Project-dependent Goods and the Distributive Objection 
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 In this section of the chapter I explain the role of project-dependent goods and 
Appiah’s rejection of the distributive objection (described in chapter two). In this 
assessment I begin to explore the role of partiality in Appiah’s theory. Appiah's rooted 
cosmopolitanism outlined so far does not show how it can account for partiality. Rooted 
cosmopolitanism requires us to understand others: to understand their culture, their 
practices, their beliefs, and their conception of the good life. However, he is also clearly 
arguing for a moderate moral cosmopolitanism, one that embraces partiality. In this 
section of the chapter I assess his exploration of partiality and show how his theory 
responds to the distributive objection discussed in chapter two. Rooted cosmopolitanism, 
if it is to be successful, must account for partiality in some way. After all, the largest 
roadblock to articulating the theory comes in accounting for global obligations alongside 
our partial ones.  
 Like many other thinkers, Appiah begins his discussion of partiality with the 
assumption that any attack on universalism and equality is antithetical to liberalism, and 
(subsequently) problematic to cosmopolitanism. “Yet though cosmopolitan patriotism 
may be untroubling in practice, liberalism has been mightily troubled by it in theory. Isn’t 
patriotism, or any form of partiality, a defection from moral universalism?”165 
Nonetheless, he appears to be committed to a form of cosmopolitan patriotism, one that 
he believes is consistent with moral universalism and one that can address the distributive 
objection as raised by Scheffler.  
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 For Appiah, partiality (in some form) is part of the lived moral experience, and 
can be consistent with moral universalism. One way to understand this would be to have 
a sort of 'universalist' partialism that is genuine and goes beyond being guided by abstract 
principles. That is to suggest that a universalist justifying partialism asks us to be “... 
responsive to...universal edicts that govern obligations toward those with whom you have 
some particular relation.”166 On this reading, I treat my friend differently than I would 
treat a stranger on the basis that friendship in general requires me to treat friends in a 
particular way.167 Appiah's partialism, however, goes in a different direction: I treat my 
friend differently not on the basis that they have the quality of friend, and friends deserve 
particular treatment qua friends; rather, I treat my friend differently because I hold a 
particular value in the relationship with that particular individual. Or, in Appiah's words: 
“You don't value your wife because you value wives generally, and this one happens to 
be yours.”168 Partialism cannot be universalized in the way that others have tried, at least 
according to Appiah.  
 He is distinguishing between partialism as it appears to be and partialism as we 
actually experience it. Appiah demonstrates this with comparative example that explains 
this important distinction that will (ultimately) come to be a used as a rejection of 
Scheffler's distributive objection:  
Consider, by way of contrast, the motorist who, at the four-way stop sign by State 
and Main, cedes the right of way to a white Buick that arrived at the intersection 
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first. Here, the motorist is following the general rules of the road, and this 
particular car just happens to have arrived first at this particular intersection. 
Actual existing partiality admits of no happens to. Broadly speaking, then, the 
problem with universalizing accounts of partiality is simply that they seem remote 
from the attitude and emotion – the evaluative affect, let's say – of someone with 
special responsibilities.169  
 
In the example of the motorist we have someone who is clearly following a universal 
edict that is partialized in the situation. That is, he yields the way to the Buick on the 
basis that the Buick happened to arrive first. Partial treatment is arrived at for no other 
reason than ‘the happens to’ justification. On the other hand he considers partialism as it 
exists in our daily lives. We are partial to our family, friends, colleagues, etc. In each of 
these instances our partiality comes not from following a universal obligation to treat 
particular people in certain ways, but rather from the fact that these people hold a 
particular relationship to us that we see as valuable. This is similar to the way that 
Scheffler defends partiality in a non-reductionist manner. In this way, then, most attempts 
to universalize partialism fail, as they do not fully account for the way that we care about 
others. The source of our particular obligations comes not from the existence of a 
particular type of relationship, but rather from the existence of the relationship that we 
hold with a particular person. At the same time, however, Appiah contends that we can 
universalize partiality in another way: we can admire partiality in others and abhor its 
absence - “We can admire loyalty that we don't share; the notion of “honor among 
thieves” can make sense to someone who isn't a thief. We do hold the relationships 
people have with their spouses to be valuable, and applaud Penelope's faithfulness to 
Ulysses. But none of this is why, in the end, you value your relationship with your 
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spouse.”170 Again, the reason I value my spouse is not because I value spouses generally, 
but because of the relationship that I have cultivated with her over time, and the meaning 
and significance that I draw from that particular relationship. This account of partiality 
also includes an implicit recognition of it as a valuable trait. As discussed in chapter two, 
partial treatment is necessary if we value social relationships. What we consider 
‘significant’ relationships with others all generate special responsibilities that demand 
partial or preferential treatment.  
 This is a very important distinction between types of goods that we have or desire. 
There are some goods that can be considered transferrable and subject to distribution, and 
there are other goods that are not distributable or transferrable. Wealth, for example, is a 
good that can be transferred among people. When one is wealthy they do not care about 
which million dollars they have.171 Particularist goods, on the other hand, are non-
transferrable in the sense that we value our particular friend, and a substitute will not 
suffice.172 “When it comes to your spouse, by contrast, you will accept no substitutes. 
And once we are concerned with particularist goods – or, for that matter, with what I'll be 
calling project-dependent values – Scheffler's “distributive objection” starts to lose its 
force; these are things that, by their nature, cannot be distributed.”173 Partialism is 
justified in the sense that it is required to live valuable human lives with others. We desire 
to have significant relationships with others that fill our lives with meaning and purpose. 
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However, this still seems to be at odds with the liberal and cosmopolitan requirement of 
moral equality. How can we ensure equality if we are treating people differently?  
 Appiah again provides a helpful distinction, this time between personal and 
political ideals. According to Appiah, the ideal of moral equality is a political ideal, 
which he claims is what social justice requires: “Social justice may require impartiality- 
or even-handedness, or fairness, or (under some construction) “neutrality.” But social 
justice is not an attribute of individuals. An individual can no more be required to be 
impartial among his fellow creatures that he can be obligated to administer his own 
currency system.”174 Equality requires that we all be treated fairly in the political sphere - 
when we appear in public no one group or individual is favoured over another in such a 
way as to put another at a disadvantage. Moreover, equality – in this sense – is 
guaranteed by the institutions of the state. Ensuring social justice is the job of the state, 
not required by individuals. This means that on the personal level we are not required to 
treat everyone equally. We can treat particular others differently than we treat strangers, 
provided that we give everyone what is due as a fellow human.175 Equal treatment in the 
public sphere is at least guided by a moral minimum. What this minimum is is up for 
debate, as Appiah says. What we are obliged to do for others could be determined by the 
dictates of 'fairness', 'even-handedness', or 'a harm principle'. This does not mean, 
however, that we have to treat everyone identically. It simply means that we cannot 
violate a person's fundamental rights given to them by their shared humanity. This relates 
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back to the distinction Pogge makes between negative global obligations and positive 
particular ones. Our particular obligations can be discharged so long as they do not 
impact our negative global ones. Appiah, however, appears to defend a more nuanced 
account of the issue that does not provide a strict (and misleading) demarcation between 
negative and positive duties. Appiah’s defense of partiality recognizes that partial 
treatment is justified when practiced under a framework of social justice. That is, we are 
justified in treating our significant others differently than strangers so long as we provide 
strangers with a base-level of consideration. What we owe strangers is determined by the 
requirements of social justice, which can vary between contexts.  
 Appiah’s justification of partiality is similar to a Rawlsian understanding of just 
social conduct. Partiality and differentiated treatment are justified once we have secured 
and fulfilled the requirements of social justice at a public level. Once we have a well-
ordered society framed around justice as fairness (in the liberal example), then partial 
treatment between individuals is appropriate. This, once again, brings rise to the issue of 
the content of partial treatment. For Appiah, and presumably Rawls, partial treatment is 
only justified as long as it does not violate the precepts of social justice. Strangers are due 
a basic consideration (determined by the principles of social justice in a given context) 
and beyond that we are free to treat them however we so choose. We can then dedicate 
more resources to particular individuals, but we are still beholden to the wider principles 
of social justice to help guide what can be considered valid partial treatment. The validity 
of the content of partial treatment can be determined by the requirements of social justice: 
does treating significant individual ‘A’ violate the rights of stranger ‘B’? Partiality, then, 
can be justified in this two-staged approach: first we guarantee social justice, and then we 
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allow partial treatment. Although the focus so far has been on treatment within a society, 
this argument can be extrapolated to the international and global level.  
 In chapter one I briefly explored Pogge’s ‘negative/positive’ schema of 
accommodation that is worth further consideration here. Though the thesis appears 
attractive and somewhat intuitive, it misconstrues our obligations by presenting them in a 
strict negative or positive setting. On Pogge’s reading, we have positive obligations that 
can be owed to significant others (i.e. the differentiated treatment generated by partiality), 
but these obligations cannot override or violate our negative general obligations. For 
example, I may want to do anything I can to assist my family, but I may not violate the 
fundamental negative rights of strangers in assisting them. The issue with this analysis 
comes when we look at what Pogge considers to be the fundamental negative obligations, 
and as I discussed in chapter one, it quickly becomes clear that our negative obligations 
will necessarily incorporate positive duties as well (e.g. the duty to not impose unjust 
economic institutions relies on an active change in the global economy). This does not 
mean, however, that we have to reject this two-staged approach to partiality. In fact, by 
describing partiality in this way we can make better sense of rooted cosmopolitanism. 
Partial treatment is only justified once the basic principles of global justice have been 
secured. This leads to a very important discussion of the requirements of global justice 
that is beyond the scope of this chapter, but discussed in detail in chapter six. 
Nonetheless, Appiah’s approach to partiality helpfully demonstrates that global justice 
and partial treatment are not necessarily antithetical or dichotomous. Importantly, this 
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may mean that rooted cosmopolitanism can account for the most difficult form of partial 
treatment: preferential treatment to conationals.176  
 In sum, partiality can be incorporated into a cosmopolitan framework, according 
to Appiah. In some senses, he could argue that partiality is required for rooted 
cosmopolitanism. Partiality is, after all, what roots cosmopolitanism. Appiah addresses 
Scheffler's distributive objection by showing how there are certain goods that cannot be 
distributed (at least not under the schema that Scheffler is imagining). Project-dependent 
goods cannot be distributed: we cannot give the friendless friends; other goods, such as 
money, can be distributed. Appiah further addresses Schefflerian concerns by showing 
how the liberal requirement of 'equality' does not require equal treatment and isn't really a 
rejection of the partiality that he has been discussing.  
 Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism focuses mostly on individual freedom. We, as 
rational autonomous agents, have the ability to decide our identity for ourselves. 
Moreover, we should respect the decisions of others who are living their freely chosen 
lives. Appiah's forceful objections to multiculturalism can be understood in this light. 
Further we can understand the wholly Millian character of his rooted cosmopolitanism. 
The focus here is (mostly) on cultural cosmopolitanism, and hence we could see Appiah's 
theory as an ethic of cosmopolitanism rather than a cosmopolitan project (which would be 
much more politically driven). With that in mind, in the next section I move to look more 
closely at what I perceive to be some of the limitations of this theory.  
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3.4 Limitations of Rooted Cosmopolitanism 
 In this section of the chapter my aim is to address several key limitations of 
Appiah's theory. First, I argue that his focus is too narrow and fails to articulate the role 
of political cosmopolitanism. Second, I claim that Appiah's use of Mill, while 
commendable, misses some central issues surrounding individual identity (such as power 
relations in multi-national and multi-ethnic states). Finally, I reassess his response to 
Scheffler's distributive objection to show how even though some goods may not be able 
to be distributed, they will have distributive implications that impact both social and 
global justice. These three limitations will first be studied independently of one another 
followed by a brief conclusion wherein I show how each of these relates to one another. 
In the end, I conclude that Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism does not fully address the 
issues raised by Scheffler that I outline in chapter two, but still offers a brilliant entryway 
into reconciling cosmopolitanism with particularism through his defense of partiality.  
 
3.4.1 Incorporating Political Cosmopolitanism into Rooted Cosmopolitanism 
 As shown above, Appiah's focus is clearly on cultural cosmopolitanism. He goes 
as far as to say that the task of cosmopolitanism is not political – at least in reference to 
rights, duties, and institutions – but cultural.177 In many ways Appiah is correct that 
establishing intercultural dialogue is necessary, and (for the reasons he outlines) we 
should have respect for others' cultures and projects. However, there is a very important 
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element of cosmopolitanism that Appiah leaves out that impacts his argument 
nonetheless. Even if we are to suppose that his project is entirely culturally based, there 
will still be political elements involved, as I discuss below. Foremost among these is the 
fact that due to massive wealth inequalities many (arguably most) are unable to live what 
they consider to be a good life – they do not have the tools or the resources available to 
them to develop and pursue their life projects. Any form of cosmopolitanism, if it is to be 
viable, must address this issue in some form or another. Here, I argue that Appiah's 
rooted cosmopolitanism implies one form of rights-based political cosmopolitanism that 
needs to be articulated. 
 He is correct that individuals should be free to pursue the good life as they 
conceive of it. This means that we should respect and celebrate the varieties of life paths 
that exist in the world. However, this appears to imply that individuals have the ability to 
pursue the good life.178 In many of the world's more affluent states, governed by 
functioning institutional bodies, these resources are readily available. Individuals have 
the ability to cultivate a wide variety of projects and goals that help shape their identity. 
However for many others this is simply not possible. They live, by no fault of their own, 
in states that are defunct, corrupt, or beholden to exploitative institutions. The limited 
resources that they have available to them are spent ensuring survival.  
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 Some political cosmopolitans hold that more affluent states and individuals have a 
duty to change this situation. Now, without getting too much into the specific content of 
what we owe others, it is worth discussing how acknowledgement of this duty should 
drastically impact Appiah's claims. Although many cosmopolitans would agree that we 
owe something to others, it is not quite clear what that is. Some philosophers are content 
with saying we should avoid harming distant strangers, while others say we need to 
actively engage in changing the situation.  
 It is clear that Appiah defends a set of negative duties, he does claim that “...there 
are certain obstacles to a good life that ought not to be imposed upon them: needless pain, 
unwarranted contempt, the mutilation of their bodies. To recognize that everybody is 
entitled, where possible, to have their basic needs met, to exercise certain human 
capacities, and to be protected from certain harms, is not yet to say how all these things 
are to be assured...”179 This is congruent to acknowledgment of a global negative duty – 
we have a duty not to impose pain and harm on others. However, these negative duties, of 
ensuring ‘basic needs’, ‘human capacities’, and protection from ‘certain harms’, imply a 
basic political cosmopolitanism. There would need to be some institutional protections to 
guarantee harm avoidance and to adjudicate claims that arise. Moreover, in guaranteeing 
these negative rights we would need to actively change the global order as it currently 
exists.  
 Political cosmopolitanism tends to be concerned with international institutions 
and global governance. Although it is clear that Appiah's argument at least implies a very 
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weak political cosmopolitanism (i.e. implicitly acknowledging the existence of rights 
across borders), he does not incorporate any stronger institutional argument. Yet, the 
rights-based account that he implicitly accepts would need to be reinforced by a well-
ordered set of international institutions. Nonetheless, in some places it would seem as 
though he rejects this type of political cosmopolitanism.180 I take this to be one of the 
main shortcomings of his argument.  
 As discussed above, Appiah accepts a weak rights-based account of political 
cosmopolitanism, but he is oddly quiet on what is required when a political order exists in 
which individuals are being actively harmed, or in which their state (which he concedes is 
the optimal framework for guaranteeing individual rights181) is egregiously harming 
others. In other words, the current international order continually violates individual 
rights; this is done both by traditional political actors (e.g. states) as well as non-
traditional actors (e.g. transnational corporations). Understandably, Appiah's main 
concern in defending a form of cosmopolitanism is ensuring that it is consistent with 
obligations to associates. Yet, in focusing primarily on this, he misses the fact that 
individuals are unable to form even these most basic associations, which enliven their 
lives, due to the institutional order that exists. To put it more plainly, by narrowing his 
focus solely to cultural cosmopolitanism, Appiah's rooted theory ignores the strength of 
what we owe others. He states: “Any plausible answer to the question of what we owe to 
others will have to take account of many values; no sensible story of our obligations to 
strangers can ignore the diversity of the things that matter in human life. Cosmopolitans, 
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more than anyone else, know this.”182 It is curious why his cosmopolitanism fails to 
account for the basic resources that are required to sustain the variety of things that matter 
in human life, despite acknowledging them. One should have the ability to pursue the 
variety of things that could matter, secure from unjust laws, with the knowledge that they 
have access to clean water and basic housing that allows them to develop and fulfill their 
projects – to live their freely chosen mode, in other words. While he is certainly correct 
that we should accept and celebrate the responsibility we all have to cultivate our home 
culture and nation, he should recognize that many individuals do not have this ability, 
stemming (in part) from the fact that an unjust institutional arrangement exists.183  
 There is a very clear influence of Mill in Appiah’s work. His theory is very 
concerned with individuality and autonomy, as highlighted here:  
A politics that respects individuality, tries to give people as much control over 
their own lives as is consistent with ensuring that they do not derail the lives of 
others – cosmopolitanism, as I conceive it, pays individuality that respect. The 
citizen of the world wants, as we all do, to make her own life. She wants to do it, 
as many do not, enriched by the experiences of people who are not at all like 
herself. But she also wants others to be free to make their own lives by their own 
lights...184  
 
All of this is tantamount to a cosmopolitanized version of Mill. Indeed, he describes his 
cosmopolitanism as a globalized version of the harm principle.185 I think utilizing Mill 
here is a useful way of conceiving of cosmopolitanism, however it needs to be taken 
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further. There appears to be an underlying assumption that individuals will have access to 
the necessary resources to cultivate these rich identities, determine their unique 
conception of the good life, and have the ability to pursue it. However, in reality, this is 
not always the case. Many of the world's poorest have, through no fault of their own, 
been born into a situation in which they devote an inordinate amount of resources to 
survival. If Appiah's 'Millian cosmopolitanism' is to be actualized to any substantive 
degree then it must also offer inroads to the protections of basic human rights. Though 
this is something that is in Appiah’s argument, the role and strength of international 
governing institutions is not fully addressed.  
 Ultimately I believe Appiah to be correct on why diversity matters, and that his 
account of rooted cosmopolitanism is starting from the right premise. However, I think he 
does not go far enough, or take account of what is required for individuals to lead their 
lives. I am not advocating a single world government, but I am arguing that we need to 
adjust the global institutional order to ensure that everyone has the ability to develop and 
pursue these goals. I do not think it necessary to offer comment on the specifics of a just 
institutional order here, as my aim is merely to show a shortcoming in Appiah's 
argument. There are many possible institutional arrangements that could be established, 
each with their own advantages and failings.186 For example, some scholars take currently 
existing institutions and modify them to secure global justice,187 while others look at the 
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possibilities of establishing new institutions that would be free from history.188 Despite 
the variety of approaches, in many of these arguments institutional cosmopolitanism is 
used to reinforce moral cosmopolitanism or ensure cosmopolitan justice.  If Appiah's 
central claim is that individuals should be free to choose what is valuable to them and to 
be able to pursue their own goals, then there is some onus on affluent states. We should 
provide people with the basic resources needed to secure these goods, what they then do 
with their lives is up to them. Or, in the very least, we should not be actively taking away 
the needed resources, or propping up Potemkin regimes that support our foreign policy 
aims. Affluent states cannot be held accountable for the decisions individuals make once 
a proper institutional order exists. However, they can be held responsible for perpetuating 
an unjust institutional order. At the very least we should ensure that the institutional 
arrangement we support is not actively harming the fundamental interests of others. This 
requires a positive political cosmopolitanism that I see as absent from Appiah’s work. 
 Although I spend more time discussing political cosmopolitanism later, I should 
say that rooted cosmopolitanism – if it is to be successful – must account for both our 
special duties (which we acknowledge are part of the core of our moral framework) and 
our obligations to distant others. Appiah does not necessarily ignore what we owe others, 
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but he does not say enough on it, or acknowledge what is required of us to ensure that 
individuals can live a free, autonomous, and meaningful life. Further, his claim that 
project-dependent goods cannot be distributed like other resources, while correct, fails to 
account for the fact that our project-dependent goods are not independent of distributable 
resources, as discussed below.  
 
3.4.2 'Millian Cosmopolitanism' and the Power Dynamics of Interculturality 
 Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism is clearly influenced by Mill; he does not shy 
away from acknowledging this.189 The influence of Mill in his work is not necessarily a 
negative thing; in fact Mill offers great insight to both liberalism and cosmopolitanism. 
The notion that other cultures matter because they matter to people in those cultures is 
extraordinarily poignant. However, the invocation of Mill leaves Appiah silent on the 
power dynamics that exist between cultural groups that make intercultural dialogue much 
more difficult than it first appears to be. For this reason, I believe that the second 
limitation of Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism can be accounted for by offering a simple 
adjustment to his theory. Simply put, individuals of different cultures are not engaging in 
debate on a level playing field, and we must account for this.  
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 In an ideal form Appiah (and subsequently Mill) are right to suppose that we need 
to open up dialogue. However, intercultural dialogue is rarely (if ever) done at an equal 
level. Cultural groups are marred by history, by past relations, ideas about other groups, 
politically reinforced stereotypes, etc. that govern contemporary relations. This goes 
beyond racist ideas and extremist beliefs. External perceptions of who one is will have a 
great impact on how one deals with members of other groups. Charles Taylor, for 
example, goes so far as to suggest that without proper respect of who one is, the 
individual cannot have dignity in the public sphere.190 Nussbaum makes an argument for 
cosmopolitan education that could impact these perceptions and help institute a true 
politics of recognition, but Appiah dismisses it almost entirely. Nonetheless, I argue that 
incorporating cosmopolitan education into rooted cosmopolitanism could help account 
for this issue. Finally, Appiah's argument offers an avenue for engagement with Will 
Kymlicka's thesis (i.e. individuals need to have cultural resources protected to ensure they 
can form their own identity without overwhelming negative influence from the majority 
culture).  
 Intercultural dialogue is needed, however we have to recognize that the mutual 
respect and solidarity we hope to foster does not just occur. In order to actually facilitate 
a situation in which mutual respect between groups occurs, we need to engage in a 
critical analysis of our perceptions of others and what we perceive their perception of us 
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to be. It is clear that Appiah's goal – of valuing the variety of human life for what it is – is 
a desirable one, but it is not clear how we can achieve this goal.  
 Taylor and the 'recognition theorists' have much to offer to Appiah's rooted 
cosmopolitanism. Individuals do not simply 'choose' their identity, Appiah would agree 
with this much, rather our identities are negotiated with others.191 Discovering 'who I am' 
in any meaningful sense must be done with others, it is a dialogical process that happens 
over time.192 Moreover, our sources of identity – those factors external to us which we 
identify as – are not received in themselves or 'as they are'. Discovering who we are, and 
(subsequently) presenting ourselves to the world as members of particular groups is a 
very political act fraught with contextualized meaning, and done in community. As well, 
when someone is received as a member of a group, they are immediately imprinted with 
what it means to be a member of that group. Now, in many instances this can be a non-
political act, but again we have to remember that the degree to which aspects of one's 
identity matter will vary across contexts. This is especially true for sources of identity 
that we take to be non-political in our context.  
 For example, identifying as a supporter of the Toronto Blue Jays baseball club – 
though has meaning in a particular context, and implies various other aspects about my 
identity – is hardly political. Identifying as this club's supporter will not have a 
substantially negative effect on how others perceive me in most contexts, or necessarily 
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imply how I am treated by others.193 This is much different than identifying as a Celtic 
Football Club or Rangers Football Club supporter in Glasgow. Although in both 
examples one is identifying as a sports fan and a supporter of a particular team, in the 
Scottish example, one's identity as a Rangers or Celtic supporter has great political 
meaning, and will determine how one is received in particular contexts.194 The sectarian 
connection to the Glasgow rivalry is a deep-seeded aspect of Scottish history and larger 
Scottish identity. All of this to say that what may seem as non-political sources of identity 
at first can be filled with political meaning.  
 Once we understand that individual identities are political by nature, then we can 
see the importance of recognition. Taylor argues, through Hegel, that we have a human 
need to be recognized as valuable.195 Appiah would likely agree with this and this seems 
to support his central thesis: we need to engage with others and respect them for who they 
are. The problem with this, however, is that 'who they are' is not something that is simply 
understood. Who someone is, what he or she identifies as, is something that is worked out 
internally and externally. It would seem as though Appiah is calling for a politics of 
recognition with his rooted cosmopolitanism. We should engage with others and see them 
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as valuable, we should recognize them as valuable people who have a conception of the 
good life.  
 There are many points of congruence between Appiah and Taylor. However, it is 
not clear whether or not Appiah recognizes the overtly political aspects of recognition. 
Individuals of particular groups are received with pre-formed notions of what 
membership in that group means. It is clear that he hesitates to endorse it on the grounds 
that it could essentialize, or reify, cultural identities in such a way as to create monolithic 
wholes that are not representative of a group or individual identity in a meaningful 
way.196 Recognition, it is argued, is necessary to avoid misrecognition of the individual. 
As recognition is a vital psychological and emotional need, misrecognition can have a 
serious impact on one's perception of self-worth and dignity. Taylor states: “...the 
projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, 
to the extent that the image is internalized.”197 The harm of misrecognition can be seen at 
both an individual level and at the cultural level.198 The problem of misrecognition is 
particularly apparent in multinational states. In Canada, for example, Aboriginal people 
are subject to state-based policies and imagery that continually depict a group that must 
be reliant on settler society. Intercultural dialogue in Canada occurs within the context of 
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a history of relations between the nations, it does not just occur on an equal level. One 
group enters the dialogue in a dominant position and the other in a subordinate 
position.199 
 Appiah's goal with rooted cosmopolitanism is very similar to Taylor's with the 
politics of recognition. Both argue that we must recognize the legitimacy of others' 
conceptions of the good; it is an acknowledgement of difference. Appiah's rooted 
cosmopolitanism, though, does not explicitly explore the very political nature of 
intercultural dialogue. Who I am, although it needs to be worked out autonomously, 
cannot be separated from my identity as perceived by others. In many cases what others 
take me to be will not be neutral, it will be informed by history, prejudicial opinion, and 
state-based policy. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism could be supported by incorporating 
an analysis of recognition or an acknowledgement of the complex (and very political) 
process of intercultural dialogue. Ensuring mutual recognition could be fostered in a 
scenario where we are self-reflective about our own cultural background, and other 
sources of identity.200 
 In light of this, Appiah's conclusion of Nussbaum's call for cosmopolitan 
education seems to be a bit rash. At the very least, we should consider her claims a bit 
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more seriously before dismissing them outright. Appiah states: “Again, I think this is a 
commendable ideal; but it would be a mistake to think that harmony among peoples 
could thereby be achieved. Proximity, spiritual or otherwise, is as conducive to 
antagonism as it is to amity.”201 Is Nussbaum really claiming this, however? It's not clear 
that she presumes that cosmopolitan education would create harmony among peoples. 
What is clear, however, is that her prescription for education teaches the student to 
recognize her particular loyalties to associates, but to also recognize “...humanity 
wherever she encounters it, undeterred by traits that are strange to her...”202 Cosmopolitan 
education appears to inculcate a self-reflective attitude that can help avoid the fallacy that 
one's way of life is the 'neutral and natural' way of life.203  
 Nussbaum's cosmopolitan education programme offers four main arguments to 
justify modifying education's central aim to make it focused on cosmopolitan goals. First, 
she argues that through cosmopolitan education we can learn more about ourselves.204 By 
learning more about others and other ways of life we can come to see the unique nature of 
the way we live our lives. She uses the example of child rearing and parenting to show 
that the 'nuclear family' is not the most pervasive approach for raising children. There are 
many other acceptable ways that children are raised throughout the world. By looking 
comparatively at the way we do things as opposed to other cultures, we can see the 
similarities and differences that we share with others around the world. This could be 
particularly helpful for fostering intercultural dialogue.  
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 Second, cosmopolitan education could help solve global problems.205 There are 
many problems facing the world today that are not isolated to a particular state or nation 
– pollution and climate change, economic challenges, etc. Nussbaum argues that in order 
to solve these issues “...we need not only knowledge of the geography and ecology of 
other nations – something that would already entail much revision in our [American] 
curricula – but also a great deal about the people with whom we shall be talking, so that 
in talking with them we may be capable of respecting their traditions and 
commitments.”206 By learning about other peoples we can come to acknowledge that 
solutions that seem viable to us would be abhorrent to others. Moreover, with a problem 
such as pollution and climate change, by exploring how others approach the issue we may 
find something that points to problems with the way we live (e.g. the commodification of 
nature).  
 Third, cosmopolitan education can reveal to us that our global obligations are real, 
and that they currently go unrecognized.207 Our education system already stresses the 
value of equality and universal values. However, we need to explore the fact that our way 
of life cannot be universalized. Nussbaum states, speaking of the American context: “If 
we really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain 
inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception requires us 
to do with and for the rest of the world.”208 Here she argues that partiality is allowed, but 
that it comes from a cosmopolitan origin. That is to say, we can treat our children special 
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but not because they are our children, but because this type of treatment is good for 
children.209 
 Finally, cosmopolitan education can allow us to make a consistent argument for 
the respect of cultures.210 Most liberal forms of education include a notion of respect for 
others and for other cultures. However, Nussbaum contends that this attitude seems to be 
only reflected within a nation and as soon as someone lives beyond our state they move 
beyond our scope of concern:  
But why should these values, which instruct us to join hands across boundaries of 
ethnicity and class and gender and race, lose steam when they get to the borders 
of the nation? By conceding that a morally arbitrary boundary such as the 
boundary of the nation has a deep and formative role in our deliberations, we 
seem to be depriving ourselves of any principled way of arguing to citizens that 
they should in fact join hands across these other barriers.211  
 
Inculcating the idea that all peoples are worthy of respect can help keep us from moving 
from a patriotic education that slips into jingoism.212 
 Now, Nussbaum's arguments for cosmopolitan education do not necessarily imply 
harmony between groups. Certainly, even with the most cosmopolitan education there 
will still be situations in which the individual is forced to make judgments that negatively 
impact others. By learning about traditions around the world we can come to respect and 
revere them and the people who practice them. We can also then offer principled reasons 
why some traditions should not be practiced. Central to these would be traditions that 
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violate fundamental human rights.213 Nonetheless, cosmopolitan education can help us to 
become more self-reflective and avoid assuming that our way of life is the only way of 
life, or the natural way of life. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism calls for this type of 
behaviour and thought process. Although Nussbaum's defence of partiality is weak at 
best, her argument cannot be outright ignored. At the very least, if Appiah is going to 
deny her claims then he should offer some alternative. Fostering good intercultural 
dialogue will require some self-reflection on ourselves, but current education policies are 
aimed at nation-building projects and making good citizens.214 Nussbaum's claim does 
not remove this aspect entirely; she argues that we need to shift focus to make world 
citizenship the central focus of education. While it could be argued that world citizenship 
should not be the central focus of education, it is hard to argue that we should not include 
it in any capacity, especially given the compelling claims she makes.  
 Although Nussbaum’s calls for cosmopolitanized education may not be the ideal 
solution, but it would at least offer a tangible way to engage with power relations 
between cultures. My focus on Nussbaum is a bit of a digress, but to reiterate my central 
point here, Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism needs to account for the ways in which 
intercultural dialogue is unequal in society. This is especially the case for many 
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marginalized groups. Fostering strong cosmopolitan dialogue is definitely the right 
approach, but we need to incorporate some form of self-reflection as well as a way to 
equalize between groups before this is possible. If the goal is to change attitudes and 
beliefs about others, then Appiah needs to offer some sort of prescription as to how that 
can occur. 
 
3.4.3 Reconsidering the Distributive Objection 
 Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism attempts to respond to Scheffler's distributive 
objection. Recall from the previous chapter that Scheffler's distributive objection presents 
a serious problem for cosmopolitans who care about partiality. If we, as cosmopolitans, 
care about universal equality and economic justice, then how can we justify partiality? 
Providing a successful response to this objection is crucial for any account of rooted 
cosmopolitanism. Appiah presents a response to Scheffler's objection, but his response is 
not adequate. In the following section, I show how Appiah's response works, and how, 
ultimately, his response fails to address the central concerns of Scheffler's objection. 
Appiah is correct that we need to differentiate between types of goods: between those that 
can and those that cannot be distributed. However, he does not recognize that even those 
goods that cannot be distributed will be impacted by (or have some correlational effect) 
with those that can be. In the end, I remain sceptical as to whether or not the distributive 
objection is something that can be 'solved' or if it's just something that needs to be 
continually balanced and negotiated over time.  
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 In The Ethics of Identity Appiah is rightly concerned about Scheffler's distributive 
objection. He argues that the objection is not as forceful as it appears to be. This is 
because we need to differentiate between the types of goods at play. For a distributivist, 
partiality and partial treatment will always be in tension with our core value of equality. 
Scheffler claims that in-group members will receive undue benefits by being in-group 
members, while out-group members will not receive these advantages.215 In the end, the 
distributive objection worries that those who are needier will not receive the resources 
they need due to the fact that they are out-group members. Scheffler states: “…the 
distributive objection sees associative duties as providing additional advantages to people 
who have already benefited from participation in rewarding groups and relationships, and 
it views this as unjustifiable whenever the provision of these additional advantages works 
to the detriment of people who are needier…”216 In response to this, Appiah argues that 
we need to distinguish what goods are being distributed. 
 There are certain goods that can be distributed, which I will call distributable 
goods for the purposes of this argument, and those that cannot, which I will refer to as 
project-dependent goods (to borrow Appiah's terminology). Distributable goods that are 
subject to distribution – things like money, natural resources, and other material goods – 
are things that we do not necessarily care if we have any particular version of, so long as 
we have it. Appiah uses the example of money: “ You may not mind whether you have 
this million dollars or that million dollars...”217 In the end, all that matters to you is that 
you have wealth, but it doesn't matter what serial number is on the money you have. The 
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perceived good of wealth is separated from the actual material object; we care about the 
abstract idea of wealth, and what it can do for us. Hence, it makes sense that the material 
good, money, can be distributed. Material goods like money are subject to distribution as 
they are not ends in themselves – they allow us to pursue other goods. Project-dependent 
goods, however, cannot be distributed in the same way. The example that Appiah uses to 
demonstrate that these types of goods are not distributable is friendship: “...you value 
your friend not as a token of the type friend but as the particular person with whom you 
have a highly particularized relationship. A radical egalitarian might give his money to 
the poor, but he can't give his friends to the friendless. Particularist goods, even when 
they exemplify a good that is objective or universal, have this peculiar characteristic of 
being, so to speak, nontransferable.”218 Appiah then moves to arguing that the source of 
our particular treatment is these project-dependent goods.  
 Partiality is not at odds with moral equality (the kind distributivists are concerned 
with) because the source of our partial treatment is not susceptible to distribution. 
Moreover, Appiah argues that 'moral equality' does not require equal treatment between 
individuals in the public sphere; rather it requires that citizens are treated equally by the 
state.219 This means that moral equality is not necessarily antithetical to partiality when 
we understand it He further claims that we should be sceptical of a claim like the 
distributive objection as it is at odds with conventional moral norms.220 
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 Appiah is correct that our project-dependent goods cannot be distributed in the 
same way distributable goods can. However, this may not be the beginning of a solution. 
At the core of the distributive objection is scepticism about our partial treatment of others 
(i.e. in-group vs. out-group). Economic justice and material equality are valuable goals 
pursued by many cosmopolitans, and as I've argued above, some form of redistribution 
may be required in order to fulfill the goals that Appiah outlines in his rooted 
cosmopolitanism. However, that's not really the issue here. My concern here is to show 
how our project-dependent goods are related to the distribution of material resources. 
Appiah's response to the distributive objection presents an important distinction between 
the types of goods – and ultimately the source of our partial treatment – but this does not 
effectively answer the distributive objection.  
 Appiah is correct that some of our partial treatment is not susceptible to 
distribution – I treat my wife the way I do because she is my wife, not because there is a 
universal edict of what it requires to be a good spouse.221 Further, we cannot distribute 
these types of goods in the same way that we can distribute material goods. In his words, 
I cannot give my friends to the friendless. These relationships that I cultivate with 
particular others will inevitably give rise to partial treatment. Nonetheless, my devotion 
of resources to my associates will also have an impact on others throughout the world. 
The fact that I devote a substantial amount of resources to my associates means that I 
cannot devote a similar level of resources to distant others, with whom I share no real 
                                                 
221
 While he presents this as a response to the distributive objection, it can also be seen as a successful 
response to Nussbaum's justification of partial treatment. She argues that partiality is acceptable as it is 
the best way to fulfill our global duties – you confer advantages on your own child as it is good for 
children everywhere. Appiah effectively demonstrates that this thinking does not correspond to the way 
we actually justify our treatment.  
  109 
bond (apart from, perhaps, a weak sense of shared humanity). So while I may not be able 
to give friends to the friendless, I certainly can give resources to the friendless that they 
otherwise would not have, especially since my associates may present a less pressing 
need. In this way, partial treatment will dilute our ability to fulfill any duties we may 
have to humanity writ large.222 At the same time, however, the nature of my relationship 
to my associates, and the value that I place in that relationship, will give rise to duties and 
partial treatment. Hence the real force of the distributive objection: we may not be able to 
(nor required to, necessarily) give a principled justification of partial treatment to 
associates, but this type of treatment resonates with conventional moral thinking and is 
part of living a valuable human existence. The distributive objection is not something that 
can be addressed in a simple or succinct manner. 
  Additionally, Appiah's response may provide an adequate justification for partial 
treatment to some associates, but it is a long way away from justifying similarly partial 
treatment to co-nationals or co-citizens. Some scholars have offered justifications of this 
type of treatment – shared citizenship is a schema of reciprocity or coercion forces us into 
this association. However it is still hard to claim that I should treat someone differently 
simply because they reside in a similar geographic area as me. The forces of nationalism 
become weaker still in a context such as Canada. The Canadian state occupies nearly 10 
million square kilometers of area, has no less than three distinct national cultures, two 
national languages, at least four distinct 'regions', and a very diluted sense of national 
identity. Apart from being governed by the same central government, it is very hard to 
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say, as someone from Southern Ontario, that I share anything with people from Victoria, 
British Columbia, Halifax, Nova Scotia, or Iqaluit, Nunavut. Apart from being governed 
by the same federal government in Ottawa, what do I really share with these people that I 
don't share with someone from upper state New York, whose lifestyle and living 
conditions are probably much more similar to mine? There are definitely justifications for 
nationalism, but Appiah's response to the distributive objection does not present a 
convincing one. Appiah was not necessarily trying to justify nationalism, in fact he seems 
to be similarly sceptical of the strength of the concept, but responding to the distributive 
objection requires an analysis of nationalism. After all, the biggest hurdle facing global 
economic justice is not the fact that I spend resources on my family and friends, but its 
the devotion of an inordinate amount of resources to national projects by the state as 
opposed to shifting resources to needier projects around the world.  
 Justifying partial treatment is something that all rooted cosmopolitans will take 
great pains to do. However, the central virtues of rooted cosmopolitanism – those of 
universalism and partiality – may be essentially at odds with one another. Appiah and 
Scheffler are correct to argue that arguments for partial treatment and universal equality 
are at odds with our conventional moral thinking. It makes sense, in an intuitive way, that 
I would treat my associates differently than I would strangers, but this does not provide a 
principled reason why this is the case. Nonetheless, I may not be required to provide a 
principled reason as to why I treat my associates better than strangers, other than the fact 
that they are my associates and I value the relationship (which will give rise to particular 
duties to them). The more troubling task for partialists is to demonstrate that co-nationals 
are associates in the same way that my friends are giving rise to a similar set of special 
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duties. It's only a historical accident that I was born into this territory why should that 
determine how I treat others who weren't born here? The role of nationalism and 
partialism occupies a central space in the following chapters. 
 Appiah's treatment of the distributive objection helpfully distinguishes between 
types of goods that we have and that some goods cannot be distributed. However, he does 
not recognize the impact that our partial treatment will inevitably have on our possible 
distribution of material goods. Nor does his response present an adequate response to the 
larger problem presented by partial treatment, that being nationalism. Rooted 
cosmopolitans must engage with Scheffler's distributive objection, but this does not 
require them to present a resolution to it. It may not be 'resolvable', but it is something 
that will always present an issue to cosmopolitanism. The fact that this principled 
objection is at odds with conventional moral thinking does not mean it should be 
disregarded, but rather that should direct us to critically assessing our conventional 
thinking. Partialism can be justified by rooted cosmopolitans at some level, but it is still 
very difficult to justify partial treatment to co-nationals, at least in the way that Appiah 
justifies treatment to close associates.  
 
3.5 Conclusion: Rooted Cosmopolitanism and Scheffler’s Tension 
 Appiah’s version of cosmopolitanism begins to offer a path to successfully 
navigate Scheffler’s tension. He presents a theory that attempts to root cosmopolitanism 
in intercultural dialogue. That is, he sees the value of cultural diversity and of bringing 
‘cultural lessons’ to a global dialogue. While I have reservations about particular aspects 
  112 
of his theory, he nonetheless offers a compelling account of the role of cultural identity in 
establishing global dialogue – between individuals, states, groups, etc. This type of 
culturally oriented dialogue will be vital when we are attempting to discover principles of 
global justice that are sensitive to context, or when we are speaking of what global 
equality requires. Thus, we could state that Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism is necessary 
but insufficient for responding to Scheffler’s tension. His theory highlights the 
importance of culture in identity formation, and moreover places emphasis on the role of 
intercultural dialogue.  
 The theory fails, however, to properly account for the necessary role of political 
institutions. More specifically, his theory begins to address political cosmopolitanism, but 
does not offer anything substantive about the role of distributive institutions. Although I 
focus on distribution in chapter five, it is worth noting here that if we are to ensure that 
individuals have the ability to cultivate cultural identities in a meaningful way, they will 
require basic resources. Thus, this form of rooted cosmopolitanism requires distributive 
apparatuses that can help ensure that basic needs are met. Appiah’s discussion alludes to 
the role of political institutions, but does not fully address the issue.  
 In this chapter I assessed Appiah's account of rooted cosmopolitanism. Appiah 
shifts the focus of cosmopolitanism away from political institutions towards cultures. By 
doing so he presents a compelling account of cosmopolitanism that is consistent with 
partial treatment. Rooted cosmopolitanism, in this sense, attempts to determine how the 
partial treatment that we hold so valuable in our lives can be consistent with a 
commitment to cosmopolitan egalitarianism. As opposed to other forms of 
cosmopolitanism considered here, Appiah is not overly concerned with international 
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institutions, or a defense of state sovereignty. Rather, his cosmopolitanism represents a 
method of establishing global dialogue. We should value and respect the diversity of 
ways of living (the variety of people's conceptions of the good life) because those ways 
of life are valuable to them. While Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism avoids explicitly 
discussing the political repercussions, he provides us with a way of engaging with 
strangers and caring about them.  
 In testing Appiah’s thesis against the tension, it was found that his rooted 
cosmopolitanism presents a strong initial account of balancing partiality and 
universalism, but it is deficient in three ways. First, by focusing solely on the cultural 
goals, Appiah does not address the equally important political goals of cosmopolitanism. 
Although his argument implies a basic 'rights-based account', there is no room for a 
substantively political cosmopolitanism here. He relegates the task of cosmopolitanism to 
inculcating respectful intercultural dialogue, but does not explore the ways in which 
institutional change, resource transfer, and other political ends need to be met before this 
can be possible. One will be unable to value the freely chosen good life that someone is 
pursuing if all of his or her resources are devoted to survival. Second, his focus on 
cultural cosmopolitanism ignores the political nature of intercultural dialogue, and the 
inequalities that exist between groups. Individuals are not received by others as they are; 
who they are and who they present themselves to be (i.e. who they identify as) is fraught 
with political implications. Establishing respectful intercultural dialogue will require 
changing peoples' attitudes and beliefs about other groups. Two possible ways to 
establish this could be through Nussbaum's cosmopolitan education or Kymlicka's 
account of group-based rights. Appiah dismisses both of these arguments, but they are 
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worth considering and possibly including in an account of rooted cosmopolitanism. 
Identities are not just obtained and presented to others, ‘who we are’ is established by a 
complex relationship between who I, as an autonomous individual want to be, and who 
society thinks I am. As individuals we desire recognition of worth. Taylor's politics of 
recognition demonstrates the need for being recognized for who I am as a member of 
various groups. This much Appiah recognizes.223 Finally, Appiah attempts to address the 
distributive objection. Scheffler's distributive objection is something that is at the core of 
any account of rooted cosmopolitanism. A rooted cosmopolitan will need to effectively 
justify partial treatment while maintaining universal commitments. Appiah successfully 
demonstrates how we can justify treatment to our close associates – family, friends, and 
the like. However, he is unable to justify partial treatment to co-nationals, and exclusion 
of foreigners simply because they exist beyond my borders.  
 In the end, I think Appiah provides an important starting point for a theory of 
rooted cosmopolitanism. His theory, while deficient in certain areas, nonetheless 
establishes several valuable features of a rooted cosmopolitanism. We should value 
diversity not for its own sake, but because it represents the variety of ways of life that 
people find valuable. Moreover, we need to foster healthy and respectful intercultural 
dialogue. We need to be able to converse across borders in a way that both respects the 
ways of life around the world, and can present principled reasons for certain ends when 
they come into conflict. Respecting others' culture does not require us to value their ends 
in themselves. Rather, we value the ends in an abstract way: the ends are valuable to 
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people in the way that our ends are valuable to us. This does not require us, however, to 
accept all ends that come into conflict with ours. Any objection to particular ways of life 
cannot be made from a cultural perspective; we must offer a self-reflective principled 
account of why a certain practice is wrong.  
Appiah’s account demonstrates that rooted cosmopolitanism is not an end-game 
theory. It represents a starting point for intercultural dialogue and political action. The 
values that come into tension for rooted cosmopolitans – universalism and partiality – are 
ones that may always be in conflict. However, we can keep this in mind and renegotiate a 
balance between them in different contexts. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism gives us 
some of these tools, and a place to begin building. His insights into the relationship 
between cultural identity, obligation, and our ability to see the world, help to form the 
foundation for rooted cosmopolitanism, but they do not offer enough on their own. 
Appiah’s theory, on its own, is unable to eliminate Scheffler’s tension, but it does provide 
a theoretical starting point. In the next chapter I aim to explore another theory that offers 
a different account of the tension.  
 
Chapter 4 
4 David Miller and Cosmopolitan Nationalism 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I explore the challenge that nationalism presents to 
cosmopolitanism. Nationalism can be seen as a challenge to cosmopolitanism as it sets 
limits on the scope of our obligations. More importantly, the nationalist challenge 
prioritizes some national obligations above global ones. Nationalists, such as David 
Miller, also tend to limit obligations of justice to the domestic (i.e. national) sphere, thus 
limiting the strength and content of our global duties. The limitations that nationalism 
necessarily places on moral and political obligations are problematic, but they may not be 
antithetical to the goals of rooted cosmopolitanism. That is, a strengthened understanding 
of our national obligations may be compatible (in some way) with cosmopolitanism. 
Given my preoccupation with partiality, nationalism may even be required in a theory of 
rooted cosmopolitanism. National partiality is one of the more complicated forms of 
partiality, as it requires justifying partial treatment to strangers. Unlike defending 
partiality to family, friends, or other direct associates, national partiality requires that we 
justify preferential treatment to individuals who we may never interact with directly. The 
national relationship is, nonetheless, an important one worth considering. This partiality, 
however, needs to be balanced against our global obligations. Though some forms of 
nationalism require a rejection of global obligations, others – such as the ones explored 
here – present a minimalist cosmopolitanism. My goal, then, is to explore nationalist 
arguments to see in what ways nationalist partiality interacts with cosmopolitanism. I 
contend that the minimalist cosmopolitanism of David Miller offers an interesting 
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approach, but misconceives both our national and global obligations. Moreover, I contend 
that nationalism can be justifiable but it cannot require a blanket prioritization over our 
global obligations. I argue that we should not necessarily conceive of nationalist and 
global obligations as operating in separate moral spheres, they are importantly related and 
there is significant overlap between the two.  
 In the larger picture, I see the problem of nationalism as representing one case of 
the general tension between particularism and universalism that I have been exploring in 
the thesis. In this chapter I focus on the work of David Miller – a prominent scholar and 
ardent defender of liberal nationalism. I highlight Miller here as he has recently produced 
work that sets limits on global obligations and defends national responsibility. 
Additionally, his work on nationalism is comprehensive and worth studying in this 
project. Rooted cosmopolitanism needs to reconcile partiality with cosmopolitan 
obligations and national partiality appears to represent the most complex and troubling 
case. Miller’s work is of the upmost importance here as his nationalist position is framed 
around a rejection of (what he terms) ‘strong cosmopolitanism’.224 In this project, 
however, I aim to defend a version of cosmopolitanism that is compatible with partiality. 
As such, I conclude that Miller’s version of nationalism is problematic in the way that it 
prioritizes national obligations over global ones and how it separates our sets of 
obligations into two distinct spheres.  
The nationalism Miller defends - moderate liberal nationalism225 - appears to be 
problematic for cosmopolitans. Nationalists, like Miller, argue that it is needed to foster 
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solidarity, to encourage national projects, sustain the welfare state, and for a variety of 
other reasons. Some forms of cosmopolitanism are untenable, according to nationalists, 
as they disregard the moral and political salience of shared nationality. Here I challenge 
this notion by critically examining Miller’s work. Miller contends that the idea of 
national responsibility (i.e. that nations can, and ought to, be held responsible for their 
situation) diminishes the strength of cosmopolitanism. I argue against this and work to 
show that Miller’s conception of national responsibility is misconstrued. Further, his 
minimalist cosmopolitanism appears to imply much stronger support for global 
obligations than he admits. A version of rooted cosmopolitanism that takes nationalism 
seriously can be developed, but it would require a stronger version of both moral and 
political cosmopolitanism than Miller is willing to defend. Ultimately I argue that 
Miller’s nationalism fails to present a convincing argument for national responsibility 
framed against global obligations. Though his minimalist cosmopolitanism, if 
strengthened, may present a feasible approach to rooted cosmopolitanism, Miller does not 
acknowledge the degree of change that is required for the global minimum to be fulfilled. 
In the end I conclude that the minimalist position fails to recognize the strength of our 
global obligations, and it implies a much stronger version of cosmopolitanism than Miller 
describes. I begin the chapter with a brief exposition on the concept of nationality (as it 
emerges in his work) before moving on to addressing his minimalist position. 
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4.2 On Nationality 
 David Miller has written extensively on the concept of nationality and presents a 
very intriguing defense of it. This part of the chapter engages with Miller’s nationalism as 
presented in his earlier works, Citizenship and National Identity and On Nationality. In 
both of these works he argues that shared nationality provides a strong basis for national 
political institutions and a sense of solidarity that helps identify our obligations to 
compatriots.226 Although it is controversial, Miller argues that nationalism is a force that 
is needed and could solve one of the most “...pressing needs of the modern world, 
namely, how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are large and 
anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the kind of community that 
relies on kinship or face-to-face interaction.”227 This sense of solidarity is required, Miller 
argues, as a way to ensure that the large-scale political projects of the state can 
legitimately obtain the necessary resources to be fulfilled.  
 Miller claims that there are five criteria that set nationality apart from other forms 
of personal identity.228 They are: shared belief and mutual commitment; historical 
continuity; nationality as an active identity; connection to a place; and a common public 
culture. It is important that I briefly explore these criteria as a way to show how 
nationality is distinct from other forms of group identity.  
 Miller’s first criterion of national identity is that members have a shared belief. 
Typically this shared belief is that they constitute a community with shared 
characteristics. Some of these shared characteristics can then go on to further define the 
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nation (e.g. history, territory, etc.). For Miller, every nation must contain members who 
believe that they are part of a national group. Second, a national identity embodies 
historical continuity.229 By this Miller means that nations exist as historical communities 
- they exist through time. Members can draw on a shared history that can then be 
reinterpreted over time. The historical aspect of national identity also forms nationality 
into an ethical identity.230 Third, national identity acts as an active identity for individuals 
and the group. Nations, Miller argues, are groups that come together and act politically - 
political decisions are made, policy routes pursued. In many instances national action is 
not undertaken by individuals but by representative proxies (such as statesmen or national 
athletes).231 Fourth, nations are geographically defined.232 This claim implies two ways in 
which nations can be connected to a geographical location: they can either occupy a 
particular place throughout history, or nations can be tied to a particular place that holds 
historical significance (e.g. a ‘homeland’ that they have been expelled from). The 
difference here is that the location holding significance may not be the place where the 
nation currently resides, or for immigrants in a multiethnic society it could hold 
significance. In both cases location can help foster solidarity. This is especially true in the 
second case, where immigrants utilize the idea of a homeland to be distinct from the 
national community. Finally, nations share a common public culture. The shared culture 
here is not necessarily monolithic.233 Rather, the public culture merely offers a governing 
set of rules or “...understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life 
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together.”234 In this way we can see the shared public culture as similar to an idea of 
social mores.235 This final aspect of national identity incorporates the ‘substance’ of 
nationality. Here we have the traditions, beliefs, customs, rituals, language, religions, and 
other characteristics that make the nation what it is.   
 All of these factors taken together are what Miller claims distinguish nationality 
from other forms of group identity. To recap, nationality (1) has a shared belief in its 
existence, (2) exists historically and (presumably) into the future, (3) is an active identity, 
(4) is connected to a geographical location, and (5) has a shared public culture or national 
character. Exploring nationality and national identity is much more complex than just 
associating it with five characteristics, and Miller would agree with this claim. With 
national identity understood I now turn to exploring the relationship between nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism. 
 
4.3 National Identity and Cosmopolitanism 
 In this second part of the chapter I explore the way in which Miller claims that 
nationalism presents a serious problem for cosmopolitans. As described in chapter two, 
there may be a conflict between the goals of cosmopolitan egalitarianism and nationalist 
particularism. Here I focus on Miller’s specific variety of nationalism and how he 
attempts to describe a minimalist cosmopolitan stance that is based on recognition of the 
strength of nationalism.  
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 Miller takes the relative strength of our national identities to propose an argument 
against strong cosmopolitanism:  
Many have responded [to the effects of strong ethno-nationalism] by seeking to 
extirpate the idea of nationhood entirely, replacing it with the kind of 
internationalist humanism…perhaps best symbolized by the invention of Esperanto. 
These attempts seem to me misguided, for two main reasons. The first is simply 
that the majority of people are too deeply attached to their inherited national 
identities to make their obliteration an intelligible goal...The second reason for not 
taking [this type of] cosmopolitanism…to heart is that nationality has served and 
continues to serve a number of important purposes...236 
 
 I want to briefly consider the ways in which these two claims in support for national 
identity hold up to scrutiny. My claim here is that there are defensible forms of national 
identity, but these do not necessarily override the goals of cosmopolitanism (nor are they 
necessarily antithetical to cosmopolitanism). First I present an overview of Miller’s 
claims in his National Responsibility and Global Justice and then I show how Miller’s 
‘minimalist cosmopolitan’ position is ultimately unsatisfactory. In the end, Miller’s 
claims against anything more than a very weak form of cosmopolitanism rests on a notion 
of national responsibility that does not take full account of the complex ways in which 
nations and the international system impact domestic affairs.  
 Like many others, Miller begins his analysis by determining what moral 
cosmopolitanism requires of us as an ethical doctrine. Here he offers the useful 
distinction between weak and strong moral positions, and begins to spell out what each of 
these requires.237 Miller seems to be at odds with stronger formulations of 
cosmopolitanism, ones in particular that are “...developed in opposition to a form of 
nationalism that holds that we owe more to our fellow nationals than we owe to human 
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beings in general merely by virtue of the fact that we share with them the various cultural 
and other features that make up a national identity.”238 Many cosmopolitans would admit 
that certain relationships give rise to special responsibilities that can come into conflict 
with our ethical egalitarianism, but at the same time express scepticism that shared 
nationality can give rise to these types of special responsibilities. More importantly, 
cosmopolitans would question that we owe more to nationals on the basis of shared 
nationality.  
 In the preceding chapter, I offered an account of the way in which cosmopolitans 
can account for partiality in general; here my focus is on a particular instance of 
partiality. Miller’s goal is to show that shared nationality is not an irrelevant relationship. 
That is, special responsibilities, framed in terms of national obligations, cannot be 
ignored. Moreover, Miller may be prioritizing national obligations above global ones. 
Cosmopolitans, he claims, tend to consider national identity as a ‘morally arbitrary’ 
feature that does not warrant ethical consideration, this means that individuals “...are 
owed equal treatment as a matter of justice no matter which society they belong to.”239 
Miller shows that we must consider what it means for a national identity to be morally 
arbitrary. In one way, national identities are morally arbitrary in the sense that they are 
arbitrarily obtained - we do not express agency in determining in which nation we are 
going to be members. The exception to this would be immigrants who express some 
choice in joining a nation, but they would also be born into a nation that they have 
emigrated from. However, in a second way, ‘morally arbitrary’ implies a claim about 
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moral treatment: “...it is a morally irrelevant characteristic, something we are bound to 
ignore when deciding how to act towards them.”240 As should be apparent at this point, 
Miller works to show that this is not the case. Nations, for Miller, are morally relevant in 
the sense that they constitute a group that can generate special responsibilities. If he is 
correct, then cosmopolitanism must work to reconcile a commitment to global obligations 
with differential treatment based on shared nationality. Cosmopolitanism, then, must 
account for the difference in treatment between in-group and out-group members. This 
gives rise, once again, to the distributive problem outlined in chapter two.  
 Although not all cosmopolitan obligations can be discussed in terms of 
distributive justice, there is certainly a distributive element to cosmopolitanism. 
Nationalists, then, must show how we can justifiably assign distributive priority to fellow 
nationals. If Miller can successfully demonstrate that shared nationality is morally salient, 
then cosmopolitans are tasked with determining how this impacts out-group members.  
 To show that nations can create special responsibilities Miller helpfully 
establishes three conditions. First, national identity and solidarity must be seen as 
intrinsically valuable; second, special duties must be integral to the idea of nationhood; 
finally, injustice cannot be integral to national attachments (“...in the way it is, for 
instance, to membership in a racist group.”).241 For Miller, national identity fulfills these 
three conditions.  
 First, although national identity can be seen as providing instrumental value in the 
way that individuals gain benefit from participation (i.e. reciprocity), Miller contends that 
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the instrumental value we get from participation in a national group is secondary to the 
intrinsic value of national affiliation.242 Second, he argues that special duties are integral 
to nationhood. As outlined above, nations are active communities making political 
decisions that affect the lives of their members. The third condition is slightly more 
problematic as it would seem at first that nationhood (and the special duties that go along 
with it) necessarily would perpetuate global injustices (in that resources that could be 
devoted to foreigners will not be, thereby exacerbating global poverty, for example). 
Miller takes aim at Scheffler’s distributive objection and turns it around stating: “If our 
global responsibilities are to be understood in some other, non-comparative, way - for 
instance, as I suggested above, as an obligation to ensure that people everywhere have 
access to a minimum set of resources - then there is no inherent injustice involved in 
recognizing greater responsibilities to compatriots. Both sets of responsibilities can in 
principle be discharged at once.”243 Therefore, for Miller, a nation constitutes a group that 
can generate special responsibilities, but he argues that these responsibilities may not 
come into conflict with a weak cosmopolitanism that he later describes.244 However, this 
requires us to bring the question of whether or not this formulation of special 
responsibilities is plausible (i.e. that we can fulfill both our special duties to compatriots 
and our duties to humanity at large). I argue that Miller’s conception of national 
responsibility misconstrues the strength and sources of our global obligations. Moreover, 
I argue that his theory of national responsibility is implausible as it establishes criteria in 
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which individuals are associated with a group that they may not have a reasonable way to 
influence decisions. 
 As I argued in the second and third chapters, while we may conceive of special 
responsibilities as only adding to our overall share of responsibility, they will (almost 
necessarily) dilute what we can realistically do for humanity in general. These duties will 
not always come into conflict, but in many cases they will. Miller recognizes this: “So a 
plausible split-level ethics that makes room for both global responsibilities and for special 
responsibilities to compatriots is going to have a more complex structure than either the 
strict priority proposal or the weighting proposal.”245 The strict priority proposal asserts 
that we give priority to one set of responsibilities and then move on to the second group, 
and the weighting proposal argues that we weight the relative value of both 
responsibilities (a context-specific approach). Miller maintains, however, that his 
approach is still plausible and that a global minimum is all that is required as a matter of 
justice. However, we are left wondering how are we to prioritize our obligations, and how 
can we effectively fulfill our global obligations. This is especially apparent once we 
recognize our finite ability to fulfill obligations – we have a set amount of resources (both 
material and immaterial) that we can utilize to fulfill obligations to others. This theory, 
then, relies on the existence of a global moral minimum to ensure that basic 
(cosmopolitan) needs are being met. This minimalist approach may be compatible with 
the type of nationalism being supported here, but we still need to qualify what the 
minimum is and what it would require. I argue in the next section that this minimalist 
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cosmopolitanism fails to account for the significant changes to the current global 
structure.  
 Nonetheless, there is a certain attractiveness of the nationalist thesis that links the 
strength of national obligations to our ability to make effective change locally. At the 
national level there exists an extensive institutional structure (in addition to the shared 
public culture described in §4.2) that makes it possible for individuals to participate and 
fulfill obligations to compatriots. Described in this way, then, strengthening 
cosmopolitanism may require an analysis of the institutional structure that exists (or 
ought to exist) that allows us to effectively fulfill global obligations. This institutionalist 
argument is the focus of chapter six. My focus in this chapter is on dismantling Miller’s 
argument to identify the reasons why national responsibility (as conceived by Miller) is 
both implausible and undesirable. More importantly, I attempt to identify the reasons why 
his minimalist cosmopolitanism / liberal nationalist positions is incompatible with rooted 
cosmopolitanism. This does not mean that I conclude that nationalism is itself 
incompatible with rooted cosmopolitanism. Rather, I argue that prioritizing a particular 
group is actually required by rooted cosmopolitanism (i.e. it is the partiality that makes 
this form of cosmopolitanism ‘rooted’). However, when we prioritize co-nationals it must 
be done in such a way that avoids negatively impacting our global duties.  Miller opts for 
a minimalist cosmopolitan strategy that is compatible with the current international 
arrangement, but I disagree with this conclusion. Moreover, I argue that his minimalist 
position implies a much stronger cosmopolitan claim than he appears to support. Before 
addressing his minimalist approach I first consider his defense of national responsibility 
that justifies minimalist cosmopolitanism. 
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4.4 Considering National Responsibility 
 So far I have only briefly have I addressed the role of cosmopolitanism in Miller’s 
philosophy. As I stated at the outset of this chapter, my goal here is twofold: first, I want 
to explore the concept of nationality; and second, I want to assess Miller’s conception of 
national responsibility as it relates to his cosmopolitanism (i.e. what I take to be his 
version of a rooted cosmopolitanism). In the end, the goal of this project considered more 
broadly is to analyze the ways in which cosmopolitan obligations and particular 
obligations interact. Arguably, obligations to compatriots present the greatest obstacle to 
cosmopolitan obligations. National identity is, in the end, a group identity that we may 
see as generating special responsibilities that can limit what we owe to others. After we 
come to terms with the existence of complex national identities and nationalism, it is 
prudent to explore national responsibility. Primarily for my purposes here, if nations can 
be seen as responsible for their actions then outside actors may not be responsible or 
obliged to aid as a matter of justice. In the inverse, if nations can be considered 
responsible for internal actions, then individuals would be right to prioritize co-nationals, 
as they would be linked in an important ethical chain of responsibility. Miller presents a 
very intriguing argument in favour of national responsibility. However, I argue that 
nations are responsible in some ways, but this may not necessarily change the strength of 
our global obligations to non-nationals. Moreover, establishing national responsibility 
requires assessing the extraordinarily complex context in which interactions between 
nations occur. As such, I conclude that we cannot assign collective responsibility to 
nations.  
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 Miller claims that nations can be held responsible for their actions. My aim here is 
not to address issues of collective responsibility, but specifically explore the way in 
which Miller claims that nations are responsible. As such, I take collective responsibility 
to be a given.246 He states: “[My aim in this chapter is] to show that national 
responsibility, as a species of collective responsibility, makes (ethical) sense, and 
therefore that the people who make up a nation may sometimes properly be held liable for 
what their nation has done.”247 Miller’s argument for national responsibility proceeds in 
three steps:  
 1. He justifies the notion of collective responsibility. 
 2. He shows that the argument for collective responsibility can logically be 
 extended to nations. 
 3. He claims that this argument for national responsibility can extend across 
time.248  
 
I will take the justification of collective responsibility in general as given in an attempt to 
avoid tangential exegesis. My focus, then, is on assessing whether or not collective 
responsibility can be assigned to nations, which would then delimit the scope of 
legitimate cosmopolitan duties. Again, if nations are responsible for internal affairs, then 
outsiders are not obliged to aid or assist, and nationals would be obligated to prioritize 
co-nationals. 
 
 4.4.1 Nations as Collectives 
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 Miller develops his argument for national responsibility on two models of 
collective responsibility. The first, the like-minded group model, relies on a group having 
a shared set of goals, principles, or ideals that can be expressed. The second, the 
cooperative practice model, relies on democratic decision processes that allow for 
individuals in the group to express their voice.249 In what follows my aim is to show how 
we cannot hold nations responsible in the way that Miller suggests.  
The second task in Miller’s national responsibility argument is to show that either 
model of collective responsibility can be extended to nations. Here I assess the nation as 
representing a like-minded group and then a group operating under the collective practice 
model. Miller claims that nations can meet both conditions, thereby extending collective 
responsibility to nations. However, I disagree with this position and show why we cannot 
simply extend either of the two models to create an across-the-board model of national 
responsibility. I do not necessarily offer a strict distinction between the models of 
responsibility here, as a nation could be seen as representative of one or both. I argue that 
assigning responsibility to nations is implausible and problematically shifts the focus 
away from cosmopolitan obligation. 
 Recall from §4.2 that Miller offers five criteria of a national identity. He invokes 
these to show how a nation operates as a like-minded group. He states: “Since members 
share both a common identity and a public culture - the first two features [of nationality] 
noted above - there is a prima facie reason to regard them as meeting this condition.”250 
Quite obviously, then, this argument rests on the precondition of an existing shared 
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public culture and common identity. Miller does not naïvely suppose that nations are 
monolithic; he acknowledges that there is diversity in opinion and that not all nationals 
will hold the same beliefs as everyone else. However, he says that consensus is not 
required: “What is necessary to the existence of a nation is that the beliefs and attitudes in 
question should be generally held (and believed by those who hold them to be correct), 
not that they be held by every single member.”251 Additionally, we need to ensure that 
nations are acting on these shared beliefs. That is to say, the political arm of the nation 
embodies the beliefs and values of the nation. This will require, more or less, the 
existence of either a tenable form of self-government or democratic decision-making 
processes. In the first instance, self-governance is required as it ensures that nations are 
‘governed from within’. What Miller means by this is that self-governance ensures that 
nations have the ability to govern themselves, this allows for the beliefs and values to 
guide policy.252 Hence, for Miller, the like-minded group model applies to nations that 
meet the above conditions. Every individual may not make political decisions, nor will 
everyone hold every single belief of the nation, but the decisions and policies pursued 
represent national policies and the nation is thereby responsible for their outcome.  
 In the second case, Miller claims that democratically self-governed nations can 
also represent the collective practice model: “Here the policies pursued by the state can 
reasonably be seen as policies for whose effects the citizen body as a whole is 
collectively responsible, given that they have authorized the government to act on their 
behalf in a free election...”253 In democratic nations, according to Miller, the processes 
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exist that allow for individuals to either help frame decisions or authorize representatives 
to make these decisions. Therefore, all that is required to show that nations can be 
collectively responsible is that we can demonstrate that nations are self-governing (in 
some fashion) and that the nation has the core features of national identity outlined in part 
one, particularly shared beliefs and values.  
 Miller then moves to assessing more complex cases. He questions, for example, 
the case for national responsibility with autocratic rule. In these cases he argues that 
national responsibility can still apply if we take account of two considerations. First, the 
ruling elite may embody the beliefs and values of the nation, as would be the case in a 
benevolent dictatorship, or any other ‘decent hierarchical society’.254 In this case, national 
responsibility still applies as the policies pursued by the state represent national aims. 
Second, Miller contends that the nation could be seen as collectively responsible when 
the subjects “... have a duty to resist it in the event that it begins to act in ways that are 
manifestly wrong, whether the wrongness takes the form of injustice to outsiders or 
simply of policies that are seriously damaging to the common interests of the nation 
itself.”255 So, despite the fact that the policies pursued by the nation, in these cases, may 
not represent the shared values of the nation nor have the processes in place for 
individuals to determine policy, he still considers the nation responsible.  
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Miller claims that nations can represent a cooperative practice so long as they 
fulfill two conditions: “First, as indicated earlier, nations are communities whose 
members see themselves as having obligations of mutual aid that are more extensive than 
the aid they owe to human beings generally...Second, nations provide their members with 
a number of public goods, foremost among which is protection of the national culture 
itself.”256 Miller’s second condition will lead to national responsibility so long as public 
goods are distributed fairly throughout society. What this may require, then, is that the 
preconditions for social justice - whatever they may be - be fulfilled before we can speak 
of national responsibility. If individuals in different subgroups within a nation are not 
allocated a fair amount of resources or public goods then they cannot be incorporated into 
a model of national responsibility. Further, if public goods are not fairly distributed 
throughout society, it is likely that the processes to affect change will either be closed off 
entirely, or individuals within disadvantaged groups will be unable to access them 
without undue burden. The limitations on national responsibility that I have been 
discussing are implied by Miller’s argument, but he explicitly states: “... where nations 
are subject to external or autocratic rule, it is usually difficult to identify acts undertaken 
by individual members or by the state as genuinely national acts, and so it becomes 
inappropriate to spread responsibility for those acts throughout the population in 
question.”257 His focus on democratic processes is not surprising, given his support for 
deliberative democracy exhibited elsewhere.258 Nonetheless, he concludes that it makes 
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sense to hold nations collectively responsible if they meet the conditions outlined above, 
and acceptance of national responsibility does not necessarily determine what global 
justice requires.259 
 Given this interpretation of Miller’s argument, I argue that the conditions that he 
sets out for collective responsibility cannot be simply extended to nations. This suggests 
that nations do not act in the same way that either like-minded groups or cooperative 
practice groups do. It may be possible, however, to see the state as acting in such a way. 
That is to say, in most cases it is the state not the nation that is pursuing policy. Miller 
may be correct that in some cases the state represents national ideals, but this is not 
necessarily always the case. Moreover, the state is not simply the embodiment of a 
nation, national ideals, or a shared public culture. State policies will be influenced by 
these factors but they will not necessarily embody them. If the nation could be seen as a 
key actor in international politics, then Miller’s argument may have some credence. 
However, the ultimate authority to act rests with the state, not with the nation. This 
repudiation of his notion of national responsibility does not reject the idea of collective 
responsibility in general. Rather I argue that we need to have higher conditions for 
collective national responsibility, this is especially true to ensure that innocent individuals 
are not indicted with a collective.260 
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 4.4.2 Nations vs. States 
 Miller sets out a very complex argument for holding nations responsible for their 
decisions.261 However, I do not believe that it is appropriate to hold a nation responsible, 
at least in the way Miller argues. In contemporary international politics states must be 
held responsible for their actions. States are the only ones who can legitimately enact 
policy and pursue policy routes. Importantly, states are not merely embodiments of a 
nation or shared national identity. Yes, policies may reflect something that is distinct 
about a nation (e.g. the Canadian state will pursue distinctly ‘Canadian’ policy paths), but 
this does not necessarily mean that the state embodies a national ideal. However, I argue 
that responsibility must be assigned to states on two grounds: 1. The state is uniquely 
empowered as the sole legitimate political actor in the international sphere, and 2. Even if 
I conceded many points to Miller, pragmatically speaking the state must be held 
responsible - we can easily identify actors and direct causal links to assign responsibility 
for injustice. In this way, I argue that assigning responsibility to a nation has the potential 
to assign responsibility to many innocent individuals. Holding a state responsible holds 
much more normative and pragmatic appeal. It also allows us to focus our discussion on 
forms of nationalism (or partialism) that are compatible with cosmopolitanism. 
 First, I argue that we need to further explore the relationship between states and 
nations. Miller distinguishes state and national responsibility in three ways:  
 1. State responsibility muddles the role of individuals within the collective, thus  
 making collective responsibility more disparate.262  
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 2. Nations and states do not always converge.  
 3. It might make pragmatic sense to hold a nation responsible for a state that no 
 longer  exists.263  
 
It is therefore important to separate the nation from the state, despite the preference of 
many scholars to use the term ‘nation state’. Pierik, for example, sees Miller’s distinction 
of the nation and state as a fundamental problem with his theory: “...the underlying 
problem in Miller’s argument seems to be his insistence on separating nations from states 
and on distinguishing national responsibility from state responsibility. In discussions on 
global justice...the notion of state and nation are inherently and inseparably 
intermingled.”264 Nonetheless, I think it is necessary to offer some distinction between a 
nation and a state, especially considering the fact that a nation, as Miller describes it, is 
rarely synonymous with a state. Though Pierik is correct that they are related, we still 
need to distinguish the two to ensure we are assigning responsibility properly. If we can 
successfully separate the nation (as a collective of nationals) from the state (as a policy-
making institution) then we may be able to ensure that innocent individuals are not 
indicted when their state makes poor policy choices. Unlike Pierik, I think that by 
separating nation from state (at least in discussions of responsibility) we can have more 
fruitful discussions about global justice and other cosmopolitan tasks. This distinction, I 
argue, does not detract from discussions of cosmopolitanism; rather it works to reinforce 
them.  
 The state, if we are to take a liberal understanding, acts as an arbiter between 
internal interests that come into conflict. A nation, I argue, is not nearly as encompassing 
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as Miller asserts it to be in his On Nationality. A state can be composed of many different 
nations and people from different nations. These different nationalities enter into the 
political sphere and must adopt a civic nationality. Thus we must distinguish between 
nationality traditionally understood and ‘civic nationality’. What I mean by nationality 
traditionally understood is how most people would use the term ‘nation’ or ‘nationality’, 
and this includes Miller’s usage. This type of nationality encompasses all of the features 
outlined by Miller that I explored in the first part of this chapter (e.g. shared history, 
territory, rituals, etc.). Civic nationality is the nationality that individuals embody as 
citizens of a particular state. This can be seen as akin to Ignatieff’s civicism or Habermas’ 
constitutional patriotism.265 Individuals adopt, or buy in to, a public culture where 
conflicting nationalities can exist.266 Certainly a state’s policies will be reflective of the 
dominant national group, but this does not necessarily mean that they embody the 
nation’s shared beliefs or values. This process of nation-based policy is inevitable, a state 
must have an operating language (for example) for pragmatic purposes, not simply 
because it is the national language. It makes sense that a state would operate in the 
dominant nation’s language - a majority of citizens of the state speak that language. There 
will be, then, some overlap between a dominant nation and the institutions of the state. 
Moreover, to help develop solidarity and a sense of belonging, the state may participate 
in a variety of nation-building projects that help further solidify a national identity. 
However, the state is still a representative of peoples of many nations (in Miller’s sense), 
and state policy is not just the embodiment of the dominant nation.  
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 To give an example, when we say ‘I am Canadian’ we can be speaking of either a 
Canadian nation in Miller’s sense, or that I am a citizen of Canada. These have different 
meanings and different implications for an argument for national responsibility. In one 
case, if we are active participants in Canadian nationalism, we may be said to be 
responsible for the direction of the national identity (which assumes an authorship 
ability), in the other we are citizens under the collective institutions of the Canadian state. 
If I am a citizen of Canada I am subject to Canadian laws, but I may also reject Canadian 
nationalism. Although Miller would likely agree that active rejection would allow me to 
separate myself from the responsible collective of Canadians, I argue that even passive 
rejection or non-participation is sufficient. Nonetheless, my active or non-participation in 
Canadian nationalism is entirely separate from my obligation to other Canadians to 
follow the laws and conduct myself in a particular way. I am, importantly, responsible for 
my actions as a Canadian to the Canadian state and to other Canadians. I am not, 
however, responsible for the actions of the Canadian nation (unless I am an active 
participant).  
 Additionally, we must factor into account that under the traditional notion of 
statehood and sovereignty, the state is the only political actor with the legitimate 
authority to act. To use Weber’s famous definition of a state: “…we have to say that a 
state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory.”267 The state is the only actor that we assign the 
right to enact policy and is the only one with that ability.268 Thus, we must hold states to 
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be responsible for injustices (be they contemporary or in the past) in the way that Miller 
assigns responsibility to nations. Although this may seem as though I am splitting hairs 
between nations and states, this distinction has serious implications once we move 
beyond arguments of state or national responsibility into a claim for a stronger version of 
cosmopolitanism.  
 Secondly, even if we were to suppose that many of Miller’s points were correct, 
pragmatically we have to assign responsibility to the state. Even if Miller’s supposition 
that collective responsibility can be assigned to nations is correct, states are the ones that 
must ultimately accept responsibility and rectify injustice. This is due, in large part, to the 
fact that the state (in this case as the embodiment of a nation) can be identified as an actor 
and be implicated in a causal chain. 
 In some cases it is easy to establish a clear causal chain of events that can show a 
particular nation is responsible for an outcome. The 1994 Rwanda genocide provides an 
example of this - Hutu civilians were incited to systematically destroy any and all Tutsi in 
Rwanda.269 Although there were many propaganda efforts involved, responsibility could 
be assigned to the Hutu as a nation for the outcome of events in 1994. However, many 
other cases do not provide a clear causal chain of events. As Miller argues, it is very 
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difficult to explore the causal links with historic injustice. Additionally, we cannot simply 
claim that, ceteris paribus, if nation A did not exploit nation B, then nation B would 
achieve the same results as nation A did with resource X. Imperial states, for example, 
exploited African nations for particular resources that then went to the benefit of the 
European states. However, we cannot claim that without the intervention of imperialist 
states, these African nations would have achieved the same results with these resources. 
Technology was limited and the Europeans had a market established whereby resources 
obtained a particular value that then could be converted into benefits for the state. What is 
then owed is still contestable, but nonetheless it is clear that (for example) the Belgian 
state owes something to one of their former colonies, not the Walloon or Flemish people 
(assuming that we can demonstrate that Belgium gained from exploitation of their 
colonies). 
 Pragmatically speaking it can be very difficult to show either a valid or invalid 
title to a nation, simply due to innumerable factors involved in determining responsibility. 
It makes more sense to assign responsibility to a state when it can be clearly shown that 
policies enacted by the state (as the only legitimate actor in international politics) led to 
outcome X. Moreover the state is the only actor with the resources available in almost all 
cases of redress that are necessary for rectifying injustice (the exception to this would be 
in cases of offering apology).270 Miller’s analysis of national redress and historical 
responsibility oversimplifies a very complex process. Pogge describes this type of 
argument as ‘explanatory nationalism’271 – attributing poverty and injustice to domestic 
(national) forces. This type of argument wrongly oversimplifies the processes of 
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interaction that take place, and it establishes too strict of a distinction between internal 
and external forces. 
 I believe that on one level, Miller’s claim is correct. That is, given condition A we 
can reasonably assign responsibility to group X. However, what I believe he fails to do is 
appropriately assign responsibility to nations. I argue this primarily because (1) nations 
do not meet the conditions he outlined, and (2) nations are not (ultimately) legitimate 
actors - states are. Additionally, Miller fails to show that nations and states are 
synonymous, which would bypass my second criticism. Finally, his claims of historic 
national responsibility are coherent, in so far as when condition A is met, responsibility 
can be assigned. But once again, I argue that responsibility in these cases should not be 
assigned to nations but must be assigned to states.  
 What does Miller’s argument imply for rooted cosmopolitanism, then? Primarily, 
if Miller is correct that nation’s should be held responsible for their actions, then 
outsiders are not responsible (as a matter of justice) for what happens inside a nation. In 
the final section of this chapter I argue against Miller’s minimalist cosmopolitanism and 
show why even a state-based model of responsibility is inadequate.  
 
4.5 National Responsibility and Cosmopolitanism Broadly Considered 
 In this section of the chapter I explore the relationship between national 
responsibility (as outlined in §4.4) and cosmopolitanism. Quite apparently, if nations are 
to be held responsible for their actions, then cosmopolitan duties will be limited. This 
suggests that outsiders ought not be considered responsible for others if we can 
demonstrate internal (national) responsibility. I contend that Miller’s assignment of 
responsibility to nations misconstrues the international sphere of interaction. Thus, the 
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section begins by describing Miller’s minimalist cosmopolitanism – which he arrives at 
through a defense of national responsibility – and concludes with a rejection of his 
argument. I argue that the minimalist position depends upon a misunderstanding of 
responsibility, but even if I were to accept his national responsibility argument I believe 
that it implies a much stronger version of political and moral cosmopolitanism than he 
admits. 
 Miller argues against anything more than a weak cosmopolitanism, which should 
not be surprising given his comments on national responsibility. Against Thomas Pogge’s 
claim that affluent states are responsible for the poverty of others because of an unjust 
international order, Miller claims:  
Pogge, as I have said, does not deny that the immediate cause of poverty in a 
particular society may be a defective set of economic and political institutions, or 
that the reason why some societies have institutions that are inimical to growth, 
while others have managed to develop institutions that allow them to escape from 
serious poverty over a generation or two, may lie deep in the history and culture of 
the societies in question. But he continues to attribute responsibility for poverty to 
rich societies by claiming, as already noted, that if the global environment were 
different, these natural factors would produce different results.272  
 
For Miller, then, societies must be held liable for the poor economic policies they pursue, 
and he goes to great lengths to show that the international order is not as fundamentally 
unjust as Pogge supposes it is.273 Miller rightly points out that “The question we should 
be asking about the global order, then, is whether it provides reasonable opportunities for 
societies to lift themselves out of poverty, or whether it places obstacles in their path that 
are quite difficult to overcome, requiring an extraordinary economic performance on the 
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part of a developing society.”274 For Miller, the international order does offer this, but this 
does not alleviate us of any and all cosmopolitan responsibility (as a matter of justice). 
For Miller, we still have a duty of justice to ensure a global minimum standard.275 
Anything we do beyond this minimum is done as a matter of humanitarian assistance.276 
Miller contends that we may, nonetheless, have responsibilities to the world’s poor in one 
of two ways. 
 First, a rich society is responsible to a poor one either because “... the past actions 
and policies of A have contributed to the present deprivation of P, and A therefore owes P 
material redress for the effects of those actions and policies, or merely because A is 
connected to P by virtue of their history of causal interactions, thereby giving A a special 
reason to respond to P’s present plight.”277 In other words, members of A have a 
responsibility to P if a link between the actions of A and the plight of P can be 
demonstrated. Second, Miller argues that affluent states have the responsibility to offer 
fair terms of cooperation to govern the relations with other states. As he says: “Given 
that, through economic globalization and in other ways, societies unavoidably have 
significant impacts on each others’ prospects, the rules governing these interactions must 
be fair to both sides. This is demonstrably not the case at present. Many societies are 
vulnerable to exploitation and other forms of injustice by powerful states, corporations 
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and other agencies.”278 Thus, states have to offer fair terms of cooperation so as not to 
exploit vulnerable nations or make them susceptible to poor/unfair economic agreements 
that could have serious and long-lasting implications on the outcome of state P. 
Additionally, Miller argues that in certain cases remedial responsibility may still be 
owed, even after the first two responsibilities have been discharged. There still may be 
cases where a state is impacted by outside events that no one bears outcome 
responsibility for, such as a natural disaster.279 Therefore, in cases where outcome 
responsibility can be assigned to external actors, the first two responsibilities must be 
discharged, and when outcome responsibility cannot be assigned to external actors but the 
outcome is determined by external events nonetheless, remedial responsibility comes into 
effect. 
 Miller contends that in cases where a society’s plight is due to internal 
circumstances, either due to exploitation by a subgroup or due to cultural factors, another 
form of responsibility must be explored. In the first case, where a subgroup exploits the 
population and puts a significant amount of people in a vulnerable position, responsibility 
first lies with that subgroup. However, in many cases the subgroup that is dominating a 
population may not fulfill their responsibility, thus it falls to the next group - which could 
be international actors.280 Miller is rightly cautious here when he talks about what type of 
aid should be given in these circumstances, due to the various unintended consequences 
that could arise. The international community may, nonetheless, incur some responsibility 
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in these circumstances.281 In the second case, where cultural factors lead to chronic 
poverty, the international community has a responsibility to intervene, ensure a global 
minimum standard is achieved and ‘gently’ persuade the society to adopt different 
practices.282 Above and beyond these cases, outside actors should not be considered 
responsible (as a matter of justice) for the plight of the world’s poor.  
 Nonetheless, Miller contends that we do have duties of justice to non-nationals. 
Robert van der Veen helpfully summarizes Miler’s four types of duties of global justice. 
He states that these duties, which are linked to the global minimum principle can be 
distinguished as:  
1. “The negative duty to refrain from infringing basic rights by our own actions...”  
2. “The positive duty to secure the basic rights of the people who we are 
responsible for...”  
3. “The positive duty to prevent rights-violations by other parties...”  
4. “The positive duty to secure the basic rights of people when others have failed 
in their responsibility...”283  
 
These four duties of global justice are those that are implied by the global minimum 
principle that Miller endorses. I argue that, even though this list is very minimal it 
nonetheless implies a much stronger cosmopolitanism than Miller seems willing to admit.  
 Miller is sceptical of claims that affluent states are responsible for the plight of the 
world’s poor above and beyond this as it reflects, he claims, an inability to appropriately 
assign collective responsibility:  
That is, [Pogge] does not allow people who are going about their daily business and 
are uninvolved in politics to distance themselves from the policies their 
governments may pursue; he assumes that everyone in these societies is included in 
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national responsibility for the harm they have inflicted on poor people in other 
countries, and can therefore be required to contribute to transfers to compensate for 
that harm. But why should the idea of collective responsibility apply in this case but 
not to people living in poor countries for the harms caused by their own institutions 
and practices?284 
 
In other words, if affluent states can be held accountable for the plight of the world’s 
poor, then why can’t we hold poor states accountable for their own poverty? My goal is 
to briefly address this question, and in my response I begin to show why a global 
minimum (like the one favoured by Miller) requires a much stronger version of 
cosmopolitanism than the one he defends. 
 As Miller rightly shows, the causes of chronic poverty are diverse and complex. It 
is near impossible to attempt to determine a simple causal path between a set of actions 
and poverty within any given state. It would appear, then, preposterous to assign 
responsibility to the world’s affluent societies - despite the fact that they are the one’s 
best suited to offer assistance. He does admit that affluent states should be held 
responsible for outcomes to which they can be causally linked. Anything beyond this, he 
argues, affluent states cannot be held responsible for. However, I disagree with Miller on 
this conclusion. My argument against Miller advances in two phases: 1. Poverty is 
systematic, structural, and ultimately complex. 2. Even if we grant Miller’s argument for 
a global minimum, acknowledgement of a stronger version of cosmopolitanism is 
required to fulfill his goals.  
 Chronic and extreme poverty, the kind experienced by the world’s poorest cannot 
be attributed to a single set of variables. The current plight of the Congolese, for example, 
cannot simply be assigned to historic exploitation by Belgium, or by the power vacuum 
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created when the Belgians left, or by imposition of unfair economic agreements by 
international actors, or by poor economic policies pursued by the Congolese government. 
We cannot assign sole responsibility to any one of these factors, but rather must look at 
the problem as part of a larger systemic issue. As Miller himself claims:  
But poverty in the developing world...is chronic; it has long-term structural causes; 
a life saved today may be lost for a different reason next year...The underlying 
point is that improving the lot of the world’s poor is a macro-level problem; it 
involves changing the general conditions under which they live - their domestic 
economic and political regimes, for instance, as well as the international context 
within which those domestic institutions operate.285  
 
If we are going to look at assigning responsibility we need to look at both historic 
relations that may have impacted the outcome of a poor state, as well as current economic 
policies pursued by that state (and the possible connection between the former and the 
latter), as well as the larger international order in which this poverty exists. In almost 
every case, we would find that the plight of a poor society is not simply due to poor 
economic policies pursued by their government, but due to a very complex process. 
Additionally, even in the rare case where poor policy routes could be seen as the sole 
factor, we would need to assess the context in which those policy routes are being 
pursued. It is likely that this analysis would reveal deeper structural problems or external 
influence that leads them to pursue these policies.  
 In saying this, I am not making the claim that affluent states need to bear all of the 
responsibility for the plight of the world’s poor. Rather, some of the responsibility can be 
assigned there, but we also need to look at the context of interaction in which this poverty 
exists. More than likely, what is required is larger systemic change. This may take the 
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form of international governance to ensure fair economic agreements between societies, 
or place restrictions on non-governmental actors who have the ability to exploit 
vulnerable populations (i.e. trans-national corporations), or some other form of structural 
change at the international level, both of which Miller argues are required. Affluent states 
are nonetheless responsible for supporting a system that is fundamentally unjust. As it is, 
many of the world’s poorest states do not have nearly the same opportunities for 
economic advancement as affluent states do. Again, the cause of this is multivariate and 
complex, but we could begin to show a connection between historically unjust economic 
relations between states and current economic plight. Moreover, affluent states are the 
ones that are best suited to fulfill the requirements of justice here. The idea is that we can 
take one of Miller’s principles to suppose a stronger cosmopolitan claim, or put another 
way, Miller’s argument for minimalist cosmopolitanism requires significantly more than 
he seems to think. If affluent states must - as a matter of justice - ensure fair terms of 
economic cooperation, then institutional and structural change is required at the 
international level. 
Another way I can show that Miller’s argument implies a stronger 
cosmopolitanism is by showing how his principle readily extends a large amount of 
responsibility to affluent states. If we were somehow able to show that the economic 
plight of state A is due to the policies of state A - in its entirety - then we could assume 
that state A is entirely responsible for their outcome. However, ought implies can, and the 
world’s poorest states may not be properly equipped, as they are, to fight poverty at 
home. Responsibility then, according to Miller’s argument, would shift to ‘the next in 
line’. Responsibility shifts to those best suited to discharge what is due. In circumstances 
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where a state is pursuing detrimental policies and sustaining gross poverty within their 
borders, Miller’s argument implies that the responsibility to alleviate the situation shifts 
to the next group who can properly discharge it. In these cases, affluent states or an 
international body may be best suited. Alleviating poverty to such a degree as to fulfill 
Miller’s global minimum will require substantial structural change, which would impact 
the overall structure of sovereign statehood.286  
 Moreover, Miller needs to offer more productive ways of addressing global 
poverty. No doubt he, along with most everyone else, agrees that something needs to be 
done, but he does not offer much in the way of a useful strategy of addressing global 
poverty. Veit Bader argues that Miller’s assessment of global poverty is problematic on 
two levels. First, he claims that Miller offers no real practical attempt to solve global 
poverty, despite his commitment to the problem.287 Secondly, Bader argues that Miller 
does not give a split-level theory a fair shake. Although we need to assess problems at the 
traditional state level, Bader correctly argues that we need to look at sub-state, trans-
national, supra-state, and other non-traditional political actors to see what roles they 
currently have in sustaining or alleviating global poverty, and how that role can be 
augmented to help further alleviate poverty.288 In the end it seems almost 
counterproductive for him to claim that there is a dire need to alleviate global poverty 
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without considering the viability of a global institutional solution.289 This is especially the 
case when we consider the potential that global institutions have to offer, as Margaret 
Moore points out.290 
 Finally, even if we were to suppose that everything Miller has argued is correct - 
that nations are collectively responsible, that all that is owed as a matter of justice is 
ensuring a global minimum, and that affluent states are not responsible for the plight of 
the world’s poor as cosmopolitans like Pogge insist they are - he does not offer us an 
avenue for adequately ensuring the global minimum. That is, ensuring fulfillment of a 
global minimum requires substantial institutional and structural change, which will have 
an impact on state sovereignty, and will require significantly more from affluent states 
than Miller contends. I agree with Miller that we need to ensure that basic rights are being 
protected and that all individuals have the minimum requirements of a good life 
guaranteed to them.291 This is needed, I argue, to ensure that individuals have the ability 
to then pursue whatever life paths they desire. However, achieving this global minimum 
is still going to require significantly more than Miller seems to support. Furthermore, 
ensuring that the world’s poorest have a basic minimum guaranteed to them assigns 
greater responsibility to affluent states - as those best suited to discharge the 
responsibility - than Miller claims.  
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 Putting aside discussions of the causal links between affluent states’ behaviour 
and the plight of the world’s poorest, I want to briefly explore the idea of a global 
minimum. Miller sets out a list of basic human rights that should be guaranteed in order 
for individuals to have the basic resources to live a good life. He argues that a list of 
human rights can be used to fulfill the global minimum as they meet two criteria. First, a 
list of basic human rights can explain why “...rights-violations can impose relatively 
demanding obligations on third parties who are not themselves responsible for the 
violations.”292 Second, basic human rights have a universal appeal and cannot be disputed 
over questions of value.293 Miller contends, however, that we must keep this to a basic list 
of human rights so as to avoid failing to meet either of these criteria.294 He is wary of 
giving a concrete list of what is needed so as to avoid discussions of value and ethical 
justification, but his basis for supporting human rights remains groundless until he 
provides that ethical justification.295 Despite the fact that we would likely disagree on the 
basis of human rights, for the purposes of argument we will look at a very basic list of 
rights - those rights that need to be secured for an individual to live a ‘decent life’.296 This 
basic list of rights could include access to clean water, food, basic shelter, and basic 
education. Presumably one could begin to extend this list further to include rights needed 
to live a decent life, however that is not needed for my purposes. Although this list is very 
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basic, and a list that Miller would likely agree with, we need to assess what would be 
required to ensure their protection. 
 In addition to the substantial impositions on state sovereignty that would be 
required, we must acknowledge that this places greater responsibility on affluent states to 
meet the global minimum. First, state sovereignty would need to be limited to ensure that 
resources could be directed to the proper channels - i.e. towards fulfilling the global 
minimum. Second, this requires placing responsibility on affluent states that have already 
ensured that these basic rights are fulfilled within their borders. Again we can arrive at 
this conclusion in two ways, either affluent states take on a greater share of responsibility 
as they are the ones best suited to discharge said responsibility, or they acquire the 
responsibility after other states have failed to fulfill the global minimum within their own 
borders. Both of these conditions, I believe, are consistent with Miller’s argument. 
However we also need to recognize that ensuring the fulfillment of the global minimum 
requires significantly more than Miller presents throughout his National Responsibility 
and Global Justice. Granting the claim that states are responsible for happenings within 
their own borders (within reason), but that we also need to ensure that a global minimum 
is fulfilled will require serious structural change, and (likely) intervention in many states 
that currently are not fulfilling their basic responsibilities to their citizens. If we were to 
leave the international order as it is, responsibility shifts once again to affluent states to 
intervene in failing states to secure those basic rights. However, ensuring that a global 
minimum is consistently fulfilled would require having an international authority in place 
to enforce the minimum. This is based on the assumption that states will do what they can 
unless there is an authority in place to coerce them otherwise. Again, this would require - 
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as a matter of justice - that states cede some sovereignty to the international arena and 
lead towards a restructuring of the international order. 
 My claim here does not rest on the notion of a fundamentally unjust international 
order. Rather, my argument merely builds on what Miller’s argument implies:  
 1. If we assume that all people everywhere are due a global minimum as a matter 
 of justice.  
 2. If we assume that that global minimum is currently not being met by a great 
 number of states.  
 (then) 
  3. The responsibility shifts to those best suited to discharge it (i.e. affluent  
 states)  
 (And)  
 4. Ensuring consistency in fulfilling the global minimum will require proper 
 international governance.  
 
In sum, Miller’s argument implies a much stronger version of political cosmopolitanism 
than he presents. Much in the same way that I argue in chapter one that Pogge’s 
‘moderate cosmopolitanism’ implies positive duties, Miller’s ‘minimalist’ 
cosmopolitanism implies a claim about outsider responsibility and involvement that he 
seems hesitant to support. At the same time, I believe that Miller is correct when he 
argues that it is wrong to presume that the world’s poor are not active agents. As Moore 
explains Miller’s point: “...an acceptable theory of global justice has to strike the right 
balance between two aspects of the human condition: between regarding people as needy 
and vulnerable creatures who may not be able to live decently without the help of others, 
and regarding them as responsible agents who should be allowed to enjoy the benefits, 
but also bear the costs of their choices and actions.”297 Far too often cosmopolitans base 
arguments on the notion that the world’s poor are simply victims requiring our help and 
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assistance, Miller and I would likely agree on this point. However, in the case of the 
world’s poorest we need to recognize the extreme and abject poverty that they are 
subjected to.298 Attaining the global minimum could be all that is required by 
cosmopolitans, but much more action is needed if that minimum is going to be fulfilled. 
Even a global minimum, like Miller’s, implies a fairly strong version of cosmopolitanism 
(relative to the weak and strong distinction set out by Miller). 
 Scheffler’s tension shows to us the conflict in our moral thinking. Miller’s 
argument attempts to sort this conflict by favouring our local duties, while minimizing 
our global ones. In doing so he attempts to provide a way in which we can consistently 
fulfill both sets of obligations. However, I have attempted to show throughout the chapter 
that Miller attempts to minimize our global obligations, but actually implies a stronger 
form of cosmopolitanism. It would appear that this form of cosmopolitanism is one that is 
weaker than the ‘strong cosmopolitanism’ described in chapter one (i.e. equality requires 
equal treatment), but sufficiently stronger than the moderate position offered by Pogge. 
While he elaborates criteria for fulfilling local obligations, he is unable to successfully 
respond to the demands of distant strangers. His minimalist position, I have attempted to 
show, is reliant upon a well-ordered international sphere – one that looks significantly 
different from what we currently have. Indeed, his allusion to the distributive function of 
international institutions gives strength to those who argue for global justice.  In the end, I 
argue that Miller is unable to satisfactorily respond to the tension without looking at the 
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larger structural change that is necessary to fulfill his own criteria (as elaborated by van 
der Veer).  
 
4.6 Nationalism and Rooted Cosmopolitanism 
 The focus of this chapter is on the relationship between moral cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism, and in this final section I hope to explore the implications that Miller’s 
nationalism has on rooted cosmopolitanism. At a very basic level, the requirements of 
nationalism seem to be antithetical to the goals of cosmopolitanism. I have worked to 
show that this is not necessarily the case, and in the next chapters I address this 
relationship further. Some forms of nationalism can be compatible with cosmopolitanism. 
Further, the nation can act as an important source of roots in rooted cosmopolitanism. 
This form of cosmopolitanism would be reflective of both moral and cultural claims – we 
can understand much of our moral framework and identity as being rooted in the nation. 
The form of nationalism advocated by Miller has great potential to become a theory of 
rooted cosmopolitanism. He rightly understands the importance of the nation in several 
ways.  
 As a basis of our identity, the nation can help establish a sense of solidarity that 
then allows for the execution of vast political projects. The sense of solidarity exhibited at 
a national level is one that cannot be easily recreated. Miller also demonstrates that our 
relationship to conationals is not morally arbitrary in an important way. We have 
legitimate obligations to conationals that differ from our obligations to outsiders. Miller’s 
position is, however, a very minimalist cosmopolitan one, that we can see as emphasizing 
our roots over our global obligations. His priority is on fulfilling obligations more locally. 
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His theory is, nonetheless, consistent with the claims that Pogge makes about our global 
negative duties.  
 If we were to reach Miller’s ideal world – one framed around autonomous nations 
who all provide basic human rights for their citizens and are responsible for their actions 
– then much structural change needs to occur. Interestingly enough, the moral ground for 
this structural change may depend on a rejection of national responsibility. In a similar 
vein, if Pogge intends to guarantee the right of non-interference (for example) then the 
global marketplace will require significant change. The success of this change, however, 
may depend on international institutions of governance that are able to govern interaction 
between nations to ensure that basic human rights are met or that the negative rights are 
protected. In both cases we have a fairly non-controversial and minimal position that 
upon closer scrutiny requires much more. Miller wishes to avoid defending any form of 
cosmopolitanism that questions national responsibility, but as I have shown his argument 
may require it. I believe this helpfully demonstrates the strength of Scheffler’s tension. 
Despite his best efforts to resolve it by focusing more on particularism without entirely 
rejecting global obligations, Miller cannot avoid the claims of cosmopolitans.  
 Nationalist partiality is justified under the framework that Miller advances. 
Assuming a global minimum was in place and effectively governed, then we would be 
right to place priority on co-nationals. Although I disagree that a moral minimum is 
sufficient, it can act as a plausible basis for rooted cosmopolitanism. This requires that 
basic needs would be met across the globe and that we were still in an important 
institutional relationship with co-nationals that did not exist outside of the nation or state. 
Unfortunately, the moral minimum requires substantial change that would then place 
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individuals in an institutional relationship with distant strangers akin to the one currently 
exhibited at the national and state level. The minimalist position, therefore, appears to be 
defeatist in nature. If it were put in place, then it would be sufficient and would eliminate 
the need for discussions of global justice. However, I argue that to achieve Miller’s 
minimum we would need to place ourselves in an important institutional relationship that 
would simultaneously establish important relations of justice. The minimalist position is 
plausible, but it does not eliminate the need for discussions of global justice. I discuss this 
position at length in the sixth chapter here. 
 Miller’s nationalism leaves us unable to address some serious issues of global 
justice. While he advocates a global moral minimum, we are left unable to achieve that 
minimum under the model of national responsibility he presents. Rooted 
cosmopolitanism, if it is to be successful, may incorporate a fairly extensive schema of 
redistribution, one that seems to run contrary to Miller’s claims. What this discussion 
helps to demonstrate, then, is that rooted cosmopolitanism needs to address both where 
we start our deliberations and where they end. Moreover, Miller’s position highlights that 
the theory is about responsibility (moral cosmopolitanism) and identity (cultural 
cosmopolitanism), fulfilling both aspects of the discussion will require an analysis of 
political institutions. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 My goal in this chapter has been to assess the principle of nationality and its 
potential to limit cosmopolitan goals. In the first part I explored Miller’s principle of 
national identity to determine how it is a unique source of identity that can generate 
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obligations that will impact our global obligations. In the second part I assessed his 
claims of national responsibility and their impact on our global responsibility. Although 
Miller presents a compelling argument for national responsibility, it is ultimately 
unsuccessful. First, I argued that collective responsibility cannot be shifted to nations in 
the way he supposes. Instead of holding nations collectively responsible, I argue that we 
should hold states responsible. Second, I argued that although Miller is correct in 
supporting a global minimum, he does not recognize what this implies for international 
politics. Ensuring a global minimum is going to be fulfilled requires limitations on state 
sovereignty and that affluent states take on a greater share of responsibility. In essence, 
although I argue that his argument for national responsibility is unable to stand up to 
scrutiny, I agree with Miller on many points. However, I argue that his commitment to a 
global minimum implies a much stronger cosmopolitanism than he seems willing to 
accept. This suggests that his minimalist position would imply a position that is 
sufficiently stronger than weak cosmopolitanism, but resists the equal treatment issue of 
strong moral positions. My aim in this chapter has been to show that even if Miller’s 
argument is correct it implies a stronger cosmopolitanism than he appears to defend. 
Nonetheless, as I will show in later chapters an acceptance of national responsibility does 
not necessarily require a repudiation of global distributive justice or global 
egalitarianism, as Miller insists that it does.299 Thus, Miller’s form of ‘rooted 
cosmopolitanism’ could be seen as being too rooted – it emphasizes our local obligations 
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in such a way as to limit our global ones. I argue that this misconstrues the relationship 
between local and global and wrongfully places limits on the scope of our obligations. 
  
Chapter 5 
5 Kok-Chor Tan’s Global Egalitarianism and Rootedness 
5.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I continue the analysis from the preceding chapter. In particular, I 
address a response to Miller’s anti-cosmopolitan claims by presenting an argument for 
global egalitarianism. Since the larger theme of the thesis is rooted cosmopolitanism, the 
goal in this chapter is to assess the compatibility of global egalitarianism with the 
fulfillment of particular obligations. From a cosmopolitan perspective, the global 
egalitarian thesis is attractive, but it must be tested to see if it allows us to fulfill our 
particular obligations. A surface analysis of the theory may lead one to conclude that it is 
incompatible with our particular projects, or that it must necessarily conflict with 
nationalism (for example). However, through an analysis of the work of Kok-Chor Tan it 
will be shown that this may not be the case. The chapter focuses on Tan for two reasons: 
first, his argument presents an appropriate contrast to Miller’s anti-global justice position 
discussed in the previous chapter; second, the global luck egalitarian position can reveal 
more about the content of equality at a global level, and thereby further our discussion on 
the requirements of global justice. Once we begin to describe the content of justice at a 
global level we can then test its compatibility with particular obligations.  
 Here, I begin by describing Tan’s global egalitarian position. I describe how his 
luck egalitarianism is reconciled with support for particular obligations. Importantly, Tan 
focuses on the existing background structure of interaction to demonstrate what global 
justice requires. I then look at two specific arguments for particularity that emerge in 
Tan’s analysis: the instrumental and institutional arguments. The instrumental argument, 
also discussed in chapter one, claims that particular obligations are legitimate insofar as 
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they are conceived as an efficient way to fulfill global obligations, and the institutional 
argument grounds particular obligations in institutional participation. In the third section I 
question the appropriateness of global distributive justice as part of global egalitarianism. 
The chapter ends with a reflection on what Tan’s theory can offer to rooted 
cosmopolitanism, but, at the same time, how his focus on global obligations cannot be 
fully reconciled with particularist objections to cosmopolitanism (especially ones that 
Miller raises).  
 
5.2 Tan’s Global Luck Egalitarianism & Partiality 
 In this section of the chapter my goal is to explore the work of Tan in relation to 
global egalitarianism. He argues that an endorsement of egalitarianism is implicit in 
cosmopolitan claims, but that does not necessarily conflict with our special obligations. 
Hence, for Tan an egalitarian cosmopolitanism can be a rooted cosmopolitanism. 
Importantly he sees luck egalitarianism as compatible with partiality on a liberal 
nationalist and patriot reading of partiality. Thus, I will begin by briefly describing Tan’s 
luck egalitarian position, how he globalizes it, and then moves to the two forms of 
partiality that he sees as compatible with (if not required by) cosmopolitan egalitarianism 
(i.e. liberal nationalism and patriotism). A majority of the analysis is focused on Tan’s 
Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism, but 
incorporates some of his other work. In the section that follows (i.e. 5.3) I critically assess 
Tan’s thesis and his ability to resolve Scheffler’s tension. 
 Tan’s global justice is a variant of luck egalitarianism. He argues that global 
egalitarianism is required by, and best suited to fulfill, the goals of cosmopolitan justice. 
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Importantly, he considers distributive justice to be a core of global justice, and that 
“…distributive principles are not to be constrained or limited by state or national 
boundaries.”300 Additionally, he conceives of cosmopolitan justice as focused on both the 
individual and institutions.301 Thus, the locus of concern is going to be both with ensuring 
some sort of equality between individuals (fulfilling Pogge’s requirements), as well as an 
institutional concern for distributional equality.  
 Luck egalitarianism suggests that individuals should not be burdened or adversely 
affected by unchosen conditions.302 Tan argues that there is a direct analogue from a 
liberal argument for domestic egalitarianism to global egalitarianism:  
As we do not say, in the domestic case, that every individual failure is due entirely 
to poor individual choice, likewise we cannot say that every national failure is due 
to a nation’s failure to take full responsibility for its self-determination. To do so is 
to assume falsely, that the global background context is beyond rebuke, and that the 
results of decisions made within that context are thus fairly and freely made.303  
 
Luck egalitarianism appears to have a logical shift from domestic justice to international 
justice. While the focus of most luck egalitarian arguments is on domestic interaction, 
Tan persuasively shows that contingencies of luck do not end at the national borders and 
we should thereby extend our deliberations on luck and justice into the global sphere.  
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 The question gets raised, then, what does global equality require? In his argument, 
global equality does not specifically refer to equality in “...actual holdings per capita for 
each nation...”, but more of equality with respect to the international institutional 
structure, or what he calls the ‘international order’ or ‘institutional scheme’.304 The focus 
is more on the rules and background context of interaction. He contends that this context 
is what determines the distributive outcome.305 Global justice, on this reading, must 
correct for the structural inequalities and vulnerabilities that exist that put some nations 
and individuals in a detrimental position based on an exploitative relationship. He is able 
to effectively demonstrate that this principle of global egalitarianism is one that liberal 
nationalists should implicitly endorse. 
  
 5.2.1 Cosmopolitanism and Liberal Nationalism 
 Tan is concerned with the potential conflict liberals face – a conflict I have 
described in chapter two. He argues that if implicit to liberalism is a claim about 
nationality and a claim about cosmopolitanism then there is a conflict: “The cosmopolitan 
liberal confronted by this challenge [of liberal nationalism] has two possible options by 
way of defending cosmopolitanism. One is by denying the doctrine of liberal 
nationalism...Another option open to cosmopolitans, however, does not deny liberal 
nationalism, but instead rejects the alleged incompatibility between cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism.”306 Tan falls on the latter side of this argument and rejects the apparent 
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incompatibility.307 Rejecting the conflict requires that he define both the goals and 
content of global justice as well as the limits of liberal nationalism.308 In this sense, then, 
it would appear as though we may find a resolution to Scheffler’s tension within Tan’s 
work. The resolution of the tension here will rely on his ability to define the content of 
global justice as being inherently compatible with liberal nationalism. Alternatively, the 
task can be seen as setting the goals of global justice as inherent within liberal 
nationalism. 
 There are two reasons why liberal nationalism can present a conflict to 
cosmopolitanism. First, liberal nationalism presents a claim for nationalized institutions 
(institutions that reflect the shared identity of a people) that cosmopolitans may argue 
should be superseded by global institutions. Second, the cultural content of liberal 
nationalism (i.e. the shared values thesis) appears to conflict with the cosmopolitan claim 
for neutrality in regards to cultural attachments.309 Briefly stated, our social and political 
institutions, the domestic institutions that have a profound impact on our day-to-day lives, 
are representative of a particular nation. Despite my clear scepticism of the value of this 
claim in the previous chapter, here I will present a stronger defense of the idea. A 
society’s institutions are representative of their shared identity. To take a Taylorian 
approach, a society’s institutions are representative of the shared meanings held within 
that society. Although I explore this idea much further in the second section here, it is 
worth noting at this point that a particular society’s institutions hold significance in 
relation to a nation’s cultural identity. Tan’s second claim, that our obligations to 
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conationals inherently conflict with our cosmopolitan obligations, is one that both 
nationalists and cosmopolitans can argue is false. As shown in the previous chapters it 
may be possible for individuals to fulfill their particular obligations while still fulfilling 
cosmopolitan goals. This does not, however, remove any scepticism from cosmopolitans 
about the weight and ethical significance of our particular attachments.310 Liberal 
nationalists have claimed that the only weight cosmopolitans can give to particular 
attachments is an instrumental one. For example, they could claim that cosmopolitans 
only value our local attachments as the best means to fulfill our cosmopolitan duties: 
Children the world over need to be cared for, I happen to be the parent of a particular 
child, therefore my efforts are best aimed at caring for this particular child due to the 
circumstances that allow me to most efficiently affect their life as opposed to a distant 
child. In this argument, caring for the child is not done out of a recognition in the value of 
the relationship in itself, but the value and obligation are just instances of a cosmopolitan 
argument that children around the world require care.311 Cosmopolitanism, then, is 
understood to be in conflict with liberal nationalism on these two grounds. Tan’s goal is 
to show how the theory can account for these claims from nationalists. In the end, he 
argues that the tension between cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism can be resolved, 
potentially presenting a resolution to Scheffler’s tension.312 Interestingly enough, 
although not surprisingly, Tan remains sceptical of claims for self-determination and 
national responsibility that would ignore the vulnerability of weaker nations.313 
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 Liberal nationalists contend that self-determination is one of the core values of 
nationalism.314 That is to say, nations should be self-determining in so far as possible for 
several reasons. Kymlicka, for example, contends that self-determination ensures that a 
nation’s cultural context is secure, thus allowing for the space for individuals to cultivate 
meaningful life choices.315 Others, like Miller, for example argue that self-determination 
helps generate the shared values and sense of belonging required for social justice. 
Importantly, the value of self-determination is seen as universal. It is not just valuable for 
a particular nation to be self-determining, but that all nations be self-determining.316 This 
value is applicable to all forms of nationhood, and is seen as one of the cornerstones of a 
shared nationality.317 As Tan states: “In as far as liberals do take the values of autonomy, 
justice, and democracy to be universal ideals, liberal nationalists have to affirm the 
universality of self-determination. The universality of self-determination stems from the 
universal values that liberal nationalists see self-determination to promote.”318 He 
advances this claim that self-determination is universal from the premise of egalitarian 
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liberalism which he argues is inherently universalist in nature.319 Supporting self-
determination means that liberal nationalists must support self-determination for all 
nations, not just their own. Notwithstanding the implications for multicultural and 
multinational states, national self-determination, according to Tan, is being undermined 
by the international order in which some nations are made vulnerable to the decisions and 
policies of others.320 Weaker nations may be more susceptible into accepting exploitative 
economic agreements, or may be more greatly impacted by the policy paths of stronger 
nations. Global egalitarianism, then, must work to correct this. Tan outlines two major 
preconditions for universal self-determination. First are the political and legal 
preconditions: “These include institutionalizing decolonization, prohibitions against 
unwarranted interference, the right to territorial and communal integrity and so on.”321 In 
essence, if the goal is to have nations be self-determining, then we must have the legal 
and political protections in place that create the right sphere for this to occur. Second are 
the economic preconditions. Tan argues that economic redistribution may be required to 
ensure self-determination. He states:  
Thus, given the different ways economic deprivation can adversely affect a nation’s 
realization of self-determination (i.e., its ability to express and sustain its culture in 
a particular political sphere), it is imperative that liberal nationalists take a special 
interest in meeting people’s basic material needs. That is, to take self-determination 
seriously entails a genuine commitment to ensure that all nations enjoy the material 
conditions necessary for the exercise of national self-determination.322  
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At this point one could conclude that if national self-determination is taken to be the core 
value which liberal nationalists look to attain, then all that may be required is a re-tooling 
of international institutions (for example, by strengthening the United Nations we could 
achieve the politico-legal preconditions necessary), and instituting something akin to a 
duty of humanitarian assistance to ensure basic material needs are met. If this were the 
case then Miller’s minimalist cosmopolitanism may be all that is required.323 By this 
argument, once nations are given the proper conditions in which to cultivate self-
determination then our global duties have been met. However, Tan is quick to point out 
that the conditions for self-determination are necessary conditions but not sufficient 
conditions for fulfilling cosmopolitan justice.324 A structural power imbalance may still 
remain even after we have corrected for national self-determination. He states: “A nation 
that is able to meet its basic needs and is entitled to self-determination as a legal and 
political right, but that is poor compared to others, may still not be able to fully exercise 
this right in a situation of social and economic inequality. This is because wealth is, to a 
large extent, a relative factor rather than an absolute one in a shared economic space; the 
richer some are, the weaker the purchasing power of others, thus resulting in the different 
vulnerabilities of each with respect to the other.”325 Importantly, we must recognize the 
way in which power differentials impact independence and autonomy. As explained 
above, poorer nations may be more susceptible to entering into exploitative economic 
relationships that put them in a position of dependence and set them on a long-term path 
of poverty.  
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 Tan’s argument, nonetheless, does not require us to ensure self-determination 
without any influence from external factors. Rather, his point “...is that some countries 
are more vulnerable to global market forces than others because of differences in power 
relations, and hence are unequally situated with respect to other countries as a result.”326 
In the end, cosmopolitan equality commits us to a background context in which self-
determination can be meaningfully exercised by all. Although it may not sound like 
much, commitment to this requires substantial changes in the international order and 
would place great limitations on the practices and policies of some of the stronger 
nations, though this would be done justly.  
  
 5.2.2 Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism 
 The second aspect of egalitarianism that Tan is concerned with is how 
cosmopolitanism can be reconciled with special concern for conationals. Tan states: “As I 
am defending it, cosmopolitan justice holds that distributive principles ought to transcend 
membership or citizenship. Yet, patriotic partiality, which entails that some individuals 
are entitled to special concern because they happen to be compatriots, appears to 
contradict this cosmopolitan impartialist ideal.”327 His goal here, then, is to show how 
this is not the case. 
 Tan begins this by explaining the assumptions behind this anti-cosmopolitan 
argument. He states that there are two main assumptions at play:  
1. “...that patriotism as conventionally understood must be accounted for by the 
cosmopolitan view...”;  
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2. “...that commonsense morality would require that we forgo cosmopolitanism in 
the event that cosmopolitanism is incompatible with patriotism conventionally 
understood.”328  
 
Quite apparently then, the success of Tan’s argument relies on his ability to show that 
patriotism is not desirable. Patriotism as it is conventionally understood, for Tan, appears 
to be an unconstrained patriotism.329 He states: “So arguing that cosmopolitan morality is 
a failed doctrine, because it does not succeed in accommodating conventional compatriot 
partiality in a world characterized by gross inequalities between countries, misses the 
motivation behind a cosmopolitan defense of moral partiality. While cosmopolitanism 
must allow space for patriotism, it need not be expected to allow space for the entire 
range of conventional patriotism.”330 For Tan, then, it appears as though patriotic 
partiality is acceptable in so far as it does not conflict with or constrain cosmopolitan 
justice.331  
 The defense of patriotic partiality is often assumed to be a part of commonsense 
morality, and defines compatriot obligations as compatible with shared citizenship. 
However, Tan importantly shows that this thought should be reconsidered: “That which 
may appear to be a feature of commonsense morality may be on closer examination 
discovered to be objectionable or at least dispensable without violating our notions of the 
kinds of values that are integral to any meaningful human life.”332 Essentially, 
cosmopolitan justice must place some constraints on the conditions under which patriotic 
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partiality can be legitimately pursued. Tan contends that this does not necessarily reduce 
the worth of patriotic concerns.333 Importantly he works to place the role of domestic 
partiality within the larger sphere of justice: “Justice ought to constrain and (re)shape 
our institutions; not the other way around. To say that we have to begin our theorizing 
about justice from currently accepted institutional arrangements and practices as they are 
as if these are given or inevitable, and that our conception of justice has to accommodate 
this existing reality, is to misconstrue the role and point of justice.”334 Cosmopolitan 
impartiality is not claiming that all individuals must be treated impartially and that we 
cannot exercise partiality to others despite enjoying a meaningful relationship with them. 
Rather, it requires that partiality be constrained by principles of global justice. Patriotic 
ties that require us to violate principles of global justice are not desirable, and may run 
against our liberal egalitarian ideals. Tan again returns to giving an analogue to the 
domestic sphere: “And as people may opt to pursue and realize special ends and 
associative ties within the rules of a just institutional setting, so may individuals pursue 
particular ends and ties, including the commitment of patriotism, within the forms of a 
just global institutional arrangement.”335 Tan appears to show that there can be space for 
partiality and special obligations, but that they must not come into conflict with the 
principles of global justice. It remains to be seen how effective this argument is to liberal 
nationalists who contend that justice is only relevant within a particular society, not 
something that occurs globally. Again it is important to show that liberal nationalists do 
not argue that vulnerable others should be left to their own devices. Rather, some of these 
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theorists commit themselves to extensive cosmopolitan projects, but that these are not 
projects of cosmopolitan justice. Theorists like Miller, for example, argue that a global 
minimum is required, and that would reflect a very great positive change to the 
international order (and may commit him to much more than he argues for), but this still 
does not require a defense of, nor support for the claim of, global justice. Rather, these 
can be understood to be principles of global humanitarianism required by morality but not 
a matter of justice. Tan effectively shows that global justice is a coherent ideal towards 
which we must strive, and that domestic justice may rely on securing global justice. 
Nonetheless, he maintains that as part of a theory of global egalitarianism we must have 
global impartiality, but that this impartiality does not necessarily impact our associative 
obligations. 
 To briefly summarize his position, luck egalitarianism implies support for global 
equality. Cosmopolitan justice can be reconciled with partiality in at least two ways. 
First, we can reconcile cosmopolitan justice with liberal nationalism by demonstrating 
how liberal nationalists implicitly endorse universal self-determination; and second, we 
can see cosmopolitan justice as compatible with patriotic partiality, so long as the 
requirements of patriotism do not undermine global duties. Thus, we need not see special 
duties as constraining or limiting cosmopolitan duties.336  
 Tan’s argument for global egalitarianism attempts to show that cosmopolitanism 
need not come into conflict with special concerns, nationalism, or patriotism. Rather, he 
argues that our various special obligations can be practiced and legitimately fulfilled 
under the conditions of a just global order. For Tan, a just global order requires 
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egalitarianism. By egalitarianism he is not concerned with equal and impartial treatment 
between individuals, but rather equality in the international sphere in terms of ability to 
effectively participate within institutions as well as having a just and egalitarian structure 
by which nations can be self-determining. In sum, egalitarianism does not require equal 
treatment of all by all, but rather the existence of a just international order. It will require 
redistribution and a reexamination of current practices and the structure of the 
international order.  
 
5.3 Questioning the Ability to Effectively Distribute Across Borders 
 Tan’s argument for global egalitarianism effectively incorporates an institutional 
approach to cosmopolitan justice. He is not only concerned with the equal moral worth of 
all individuals, but aims to show that we must focus on the background institutional 
context under which people live. The principles of cosmopolitan justice can only be 
effectively fulfilled once we take aim at international institutions, and potentially 
establish stronger global governance - either through formal governing institutions or 
through more informal paths. However, global egalitarianism cannot simply be analogous 
to domestic distributive egalitarianism. In fact, many may contend that we may have 
duties to distant others, and that we can even term these cosmopolitan duties, but that 
they do not require distribution of goods. Thus we must further explore what we mean by 
global egalitarianism: exactly what is susceptible to distribution under this framework?  
A rejection of global egalitarianism can take on several forms, but I will only 
focus on one version of it here: the shared values thesis. This argument claims that the 
value and meaning behind goods is context-specific, that it would be incoherent to 
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distribute goods globally as they do not have shared meanings, and that it could represent 
an imposition on others.337 In other words, the value of goods can only be fully 
understood within a particular social context and that does not extend to the international 
sphere, it ends at one’s cultural context. In some ways this argument could be seen to 
trump claims for global distribution. However, I work to show that this may be 
compatible with Tan’s argument. His distributive scheme does not necessarily require 
distribution of culturally relevant goods in a way that is insensitive to context specific 
value and meaning. In fact, his argument for global egalitarianism can help create the 
conditions whereby different cultural and/or national groups are not as susceptible to the 
imposition of others. Global egalitarianism, then, may imply the establishment of 
conditions of opportunity whereby groups can cultivate socially-relevant goods. In this 
section I draw on the work of Charles Taylor and Amartya Sen.  
 Value and meaning of particular goods is rooted within our cultural contexts. That 
is to suggest, the ways in which we learn about goods, come to understand the meaning 
and significance of them, and apply them in a valuable and meaningful way in our lives is 
contextually driven. Charles Taylor, in his seminal essay “Interpretation and the Sciences 
of Man” explains the notion of ‘meaning’. He argues that there are three conditions of the 
concept:  
1. “Meaning is for a subject: it is not the meaning of the situation in vacuo, but its 
meaning for a subject, a specific subject, a group of subjects or perhaps what its 
meaning is for the human subject as such...”;  
2. “Meaning is of something; that is, we can distinguish between a given element 
- situation, action, or whatever - and its meaning...”;  
3. “...things only have meaning in a field, that is, in relation to the meanings of 
other things. This means that there is no such thing as a single, unrelated 
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meaningful event; and it means that changes in the other meanings in the field can 
involve changes in the given element. Meanings can’t be identified except in 
relation to others...”338  
 
To put this in slightly clearer words, and to bring it back to the subject at hand: we, as 
interpreting beings, can only determine the meaning of particular goods within the 
context in which we live. By context here we are talking about the socio-cultural 
environment in which we live: the language we speak, the economic class we are 
members of, the region we live in, and importantly, our national group. Goods attain 
different meanings in different contexts. All this to say that many goods, including those 
that are susceptible to (and perhaps required by) distributive justice, hold context-specific 
meaning.339 Moreover, as the emphasized section suggests, the meaning of a particular 
good can only be fully understood in relation to other goods. This discussion of meanings 
applies beyond material goods, however. Understanding the meaning and the value of 
most things that we can experience (both material and immaterial) requires interpretation 
of its meaning. All of our understandings of meaning are embedded within this 
conceptual framework.  
 If we are to presume that goods need to be distributed across borders then we 
must also recognize the contextually bound meaning that those goods will hold. That is to 
suggest that goods hold different values across borders. The problem of shared values 
cannot be ignored in a discussion of global distributive justice. Indeed, this problem leads 
some (such as Nagel) to conclude that it is incoherent to speak of distribution at a global 
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level: “The world as a whole contains cultural and national communities representing 
such radically diverse values that no conception of a legitimate political order can be 
constructed under which they could all live…”340 It would appear as though the mere 
existence of cultural and national communities provides an impenetrable roadblock for 
distributive justice. Nagel concludes that “So long as the world is as divided it now 
is…the situation will not change.”341 Under the current international institutional order, 
he may be correct. 
Similarly, Miller argues342 against global equality of opportunity, he claims 
essentially that we must consider the meaning of the idea in other contexts:  
It is essentially the problem of saying what equality of opportunity means in a 
culturally plural world in which different societies will construct goods in different 
ways and also rank them in different ways. The metric problem arises not just 
because it is hard to determine how much educational opportunity an average child 
has in society A, but because the meaning of education, and the way in which it 
relates to, or contrasts with, other goods will vary from place to place. We can only 
make judgments with any confidence in extreme cases; and in those cases, what 
seems at first sight to be a concern about inequality may well turn out on closer 
inspection to be a concern about absolute poverty or deprivation, a concern which 
suggests quite a different general understanding of global justice.343  
 
Ensuring distributional equality seems to be easy in theory, but once we begin the work 
of actually distributing goods (here principled in the notion of fair equality of 
opportunity), we quickly run into the problem of valuation across borders. Goods that are 
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subject to distribution are social goods, which are dependent “…upon the way they are 
conceived by the members of [a] particular society.”344 
 In addition to the ‘metric problem’, as Miller aptly puts it, we also have the issue 
of the pure incoherence of some goods to some societies. It is clear that different groups 
relate to goods in different ways, but what we also must acknowledge is that the way that 
some cultural groups interact with, or use, some goods is fundamentally at odds with the 
way in which other groups relate to that good. Margaret Moore helpfully demonstrates 
this through the example of natural resources.345 In one context, natural resources are 
understood as (i.e. they hold the meaning of) things that are to be extracted and used for 
our benefit, but other groups hold a much different relation with natural resources.346 
Hence, she concludes that something like a natural resource tax fundamentally imposes a 
particular way of relating with goods on subjected groups.347  
 Thus, it appears as though Tan’s argument fails to properly consider the role of 
plural meanings. In fact, Tan himself seems to ignore the salience of cultural membership 
and its relationship to valuation of goods: “...cosmopolitanism about justice holds that the 
baseline distribution of material goods and resources among individuals should be 
decided independently of the national and state boundaries within which individuals 
happen to be.”348 However, at least part of his argument can be quickly made to be 
compatible with the shared values thesis. Tan argues that national self-determination is 
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valuable, and it is valuable primarily for this reason: it provides us with the context 
necessary for making meaningful choices in our lives. His global egalitarianism simply 
requires that all nations have an equal ability to cultivate the space for shared values and 
providing a context of choice. This requires that we correct for power imbalances in the 
international arena. This does not necessarily lead to imposition or distribution of 
culturally embedded goods. This would merely lead to weaker nations being removed 
from a position of subjugation. Perhaps the most uncontroversial way (although it will 
not appeal to theorists such as Tan) would be to institutionalize this in a schema of 
negative rights. Pogge’s support for negative rights, however, does not fully encapsulate 
what global justice requires, as I explained in chapter one. 
 Endorsing this ideal would substantially help the living situation of many of those 
in abject poverty. However, it also grants significant space to groups to provide 
justifications for actions that violate fundamental principles of cosmopolitan justice 
defended in the name of ‘cultural practices’. This type of argument has been presented 
many times, and yet it remains to persuade cosmopolitans. Lee Kwan Yew, for example, 
famously promotes the idea of “Western” and “Asian” values to show that the idea of 
human rights is incoherent in some Asian countries, and fundamentally dichotomous to 
their conceptions of duty and obligation. As Amartya Sen states: “What can we take to be 
the values of so vast a region, with such diversity? There is no quintessential values that 
apply to this immensely large and heterogeneous population, that differentiate Asians as a 
group from people in the rest of the world.”349 He then goes on to show that many 
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purported ‘Western’ or ‘European’ values and ideas actually developed in the East as 
well.350 In other words, as much as we are different, and as much as we hold different 
meanings for and values of particular goods, there are many shared meanings that 
transcend context. Sen’s contribution with the capabilities approach can help shift our 
focus away from the potential problems of the hermeneutic circle inherent to the shared 
values thesis.351  
 By focusing on capabilities, as opposed to strict distribution of holdings per se, 
we have the ability to see to what degree individuals and groups have can pursue goals 
that they determine as valuable. Sen states:  
For example, seeing opportunity in terms of capability allows us to distinguish 
appropriately between (i) whether a person is actually able to do things she would 
value doing, and (ii) whether she possesses the means or instruments or permissions 
to pursue what she would like to do (her actual ability to do that pursuing may 
depend on many contingent circumstances). By shifting attention, in particular, 
towards the former, the capability-based approach resists an overconcentration on 
means (such as incomes and primary goods) that Human Rights and Capabilities 
can be found in some theories of justice (e.g. in the Rawlsian Difference 
Principle).352  
 
In addition to providing a culturally sensitive metric for judging equality, focusing on 
capabilities can also ensure that groups are given the appropriate autonomy, while still 
securing fundamental human rights. 
 At this point it should be clear that there is a complex relationship between global 
and particular duties. Inasmuch as national groups ought to be given independence for 
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developing and cultivating cultural goods, there is a serious worry that individual rights 
can be sacrificed in the name of cultural good. For this reason, some have concluded that 
multiculturalism, as a domestic practice, ought to be abandoned.353 On the other hand, 
however, we have legitimate reasons to value our special relationships that generate 
particular obligations. This may give weight to the enduring nature of Scheffler’s tension. 
The strength of this conflict could lead one to reject global distribution or reject special 
duties outright.  
 However, the shared values thesis need not require us to conclude that distribution 
across borders is impossible (or will necessitate imperialism). Rather, the thesis may 
provide a better way forward. If we are to take seriously Tan’s focus on the background 
context of institutions, which I think we should, then we can see the focus on institutions 
as leading to the conditions of meaningful distribution. Again, we have shifted away from 
the distribution of material goods to the distribution of capabilities. This will, at some 
level, imply the distribution of actual goods. Principles of global justice focused on 
egalitarian distribution will be aimed at overseeing the appropriate distribution of 
material goods as they relate to the capabilities of particular individuals and groups. Thus, 
when two groups contest ownership over a set of resources, for example, we can appeal 
to the just distribution of capabilities. This requires complex analysis over the meaning 
and value of the resources for the groups. If global distributive justice is to be achieved, it 
will rely on the existence of the sort of institutional backdrop that Tan describes. The 
creation of these institutions, and agreement upon principles of justice rely on 
                                                 
353
 Barry, Culture and Inequality; Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999); Susan Moller Okin, “Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences”, in 
Global Ethics: Seminal Essays, ed.. Thomas Pogge and Keith Horton, 233-258, (St. Paul: Paragon 
House, 2008).  
  181 
intercultural dialogue. By focusing on dialogue we may be able to arrive at a fusion of 
ideals whereby we can move closer to objective criteria for global justice. 
 This dialogue, I believe, is what is firmly embedded in the spirit of Appiah’s work 
in his Ethics of Identity, explored in chapter three. This spirit, I argue, is necessary to a 
successful rooted cosmopolitanism - we ought to engage in dialogue with others in a self-
reflective way that attempts to understand them on their terms. In this way, we can 
establish more effective political policies as well as fulfill the goals of cultural 
cosmopolitanism. Although it seems like a roundabout way of approaching 
cosmopolitanism, I contend that the hermeneutic project is inseparable from rooted 
cosmopolitanism. It provides the conditions for us to have dialogue that while respecting 
the other for who they are and understanding the histories and contexts in which dialogue 
occurs, still allows us to arrive at objective criteria for the distribution of goods.  
 Tan’s global egalitarianism, while approaching from the right spirit, fails to 
consider the role of cross-cultural dialogue in establishing cosmopolitan goals. However, 
we only need to extend his argument for national self-determination to see that ensuring 
self-determination equally for all would require dialogue of this sort. The goal for Tan is 
to protect self-determination for all so that every group has the ability to cultivate 
national projects without gross imposition or unfair advantage to one particular group. 
Theoretically speaking, if this were established then dialogue between groups would have 
to occur in this way. Thus, by modifying the institutional approach to focus more on 
establishing conditions of equal capabilities. Luck egalitarianism and the capability 
approach are not necessarily incompatible, and Tan’s focus on the background structure 
of interaction may be a useful point of convergence between the two ideas. This means 
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Tan’s argument may provide an adequate response to Scheffler’s tension. On this 
reading, particular and global obligations are made consistent with each other under a just 
institutional framework.  
 
5.4 Tan’s Non-Instrumental Approach to Particular Obligations 
 In this final section of the chapter I explore a greater flaw in Tan’s work. I argue 
that he is unable to provide a non-reductionist argument for the worth of particular 
obligations. His justification of partiality depends on a prioritization of global obligations 
in such a way that liberal nationalists and other partialists would reject. His emphasis of 
the background context of interaction is very helpful and has a significant impact on the 
direction of rooted cosmopolitan arguments. Additionally, he is correct that focusing on 
establishing a just international order should take priority in the most extreme cases, but 
Tan is unable to respond to cases where comparison is much closer.  
  An instrumental approach to particular obligations does not constrain our global 
obligations but further reinforces them. Instrumentalists, like Goodin, contend that special 
obligations are “...assigned merely as an administrative device for discharging our 
general duties more efficiently.”354 Particular obligations then, the ones we hold to our 
fellow citizens, as well as family and friends, are just the most efficient way to discharge 
our general duties. Nussbaum makes a similar claim based on efficiency.355 Both of these 
instrumental approaches maintain the primacy of global obligations: our global 
obligations are presumed to be legitimate and particular obligations are legitimate in so 
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far as they are derived from our global ones. Goodin explicitly states that particular 
obligations ought to be derived from our general (i.e. global) ones.356 However, the goal 
for rooted cosmopolitanism is to reconcile the tension that Scheffler outlines; that is, to 
present a justification for particular and global obligations without reducing one type of 
obligation to the other. 
 In establishing that there is a tension between particular and global obligations, 
Scheffler is presuming independent derivations of both sets. That is to say, approaching 
the tension, if we are to assume it is a genuine tension (which is questionable to some)357, 
requires us to derive both particular and universal obligations in a non-reductionist 
manner. Lenard and Moore effectively describe the tension and the goal of rooted 
cosmopolitanism in other words: “...cosmopolitanism and special duties are not in fact 
antithetical but deeply connected; that any plausible theory must articulate both the 
importance of our connections to others as well as our fundamental moral equality; and 
the most interesting questions surround precisely how to strike a balance between the 
two.”358 Although I discussed problems with the instrumentalist argument in chapters one 
and two, it is worth saying here that by describing particular obligations as ‘efficiently’ 
fulfilling global duties we fail to capture an important aspect of our moral consciousness. 
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That is, when we fulfill obligations to those with whom we stand in a meaningful 
relationship, we tend to do so because we value that person, not because we see it as an 
effective way of ensuring global equality. To reiterate an example referred to earlier, I do 
things for my wife not because wives deserve a type of treatment, or that treating wives in 
a certain way in general is good for humanity and this one happens to be my wife. Rather, 
I treat her in a particular way because I value her and the relationship that I have with her. 
Quite apparently then, the instrumental approach fails to properly reconcile the tension. 
 In Tan’s approach he also misunderstands the claims of liberal nationalists in 
determining the worth of particular obligations. As a luck egalitarian, Tan’s goal is to rule 
out any morally arbitrary factor in having a salient impact on one’s life. He states:  
...if we begin from an egalitarian conception of liberalism and want to marry that 
understanding of liberalism to nationalism, then the nationalism we get has to be an 
egalitarian nationalism. And as egalitarian liberalism begins from the basic idea 
that there are no principled differences between individuals on the basis of 
contingencies, or what Rawls has called factors that are “arbitrary from a moral 
point of view” (Rawls 1971, p. 15), so too must egalitarian liberal nationalism 
discount morally arbitrary facts about persons when it comes to determining their 
just global entitlements. And one arbitrary factor here would be people’s national 
membership.359 
 
 For liberal nationalists, however, national membership is not morally arbitrary in an 
important way. Indeed, principles of global justice ought to be reflective of our national 
attachments in some way. In the very least, considerations of just distribution should 
reflect the nationally and culturally bound meaning of particular goods. 
 Liberal nationalists, such as Kymlicka for example, argue that our national 
membership is morally salient in an important way. Kymlicka argues that our national 
attachments are what give us the ‘context for choice’. That is, by being able to participate 
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within a range of cultural institutions we are given the ability to develop and exercise our 
autonomy.360 As Lenard and Moore state: “...the point that liberal nationalists have made 
is that national groups are neither morally arbitrary nor morally irrelevant: they provide a 
framework in which autonomy is exercised; they protect people’s cultural options, both 
by protecting the options themselves and by giving meaning to those options...”361 In this 
way, then, we can see that our national attachments hold some moral salience. This does 
not necessarily mean that they outweigh, should be considered prior to, or even negate 
our global obligations. Rather, this means that cosmopolitans need to consider the role 
they play in our lives.  
 Tan’s position requires further clarification at this point to demonstrate the way in 
which he effectively reduces the worth of particular obligations. As shown in the first 
section here, he believes that particular obligations (such as those to conationals) are 
legitimate in so far as they are constrained by principles of global justice. This does not 
necessarily reduce the worth of particular ties on its own.362 Again, he argues that 
particular obligations are legitimate so long as they do not violate general principles of 
justice. Hence, particular obligations are conditional on their being consistent with 
principles of global justice; this is a different claim than saying that particular obligations 
are derivative of global obligations (i.e. the instrumental strategy).363 Tan states: “We do 
not seek to explain a person’s conception of the good in terms of some general and 
abstract universal principle, but we nonetheless hold that the pursuit of that conception of 
the good is to be limited against certain standards of justice that are external to and 
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independent of that conception of the good.”364 This in itself appears to be a legitimate 
principle of global justice that reconciles particular and global obligations: particular 
obligations are legitimate so long as they do not violate our global obligations. However, 
this still misunderstands the central point. On one level, Miller could respond here that 
the constraining thesis (particular obligations are constrained by global principles) is fine, 
but our global obligations are non-comparative. This reading of global obligations 
contends that they do not include distributive equality, but are solely concerned with 
protecting basic rights. But, there is a greater issue here still. 
 The problem appears to be one of priorities. That is, for Tan, global justice and 
global obligations appear to attain ethical priority over particular obligations. Again, 
particular obligations are legitimate conditional on their being constrained by principles 
of global justice. Liberal nationalists will find this to be unsatisfactory, as it does not 
recognize the moral salience of national ties. Moreover, the way that people experience 
their particular obligations does not reflect the priority that Tan presents. This would 
suggest, then, that there is still a tension between the global and that particular that cannot 
be resolved by adopting Tan’s global luck egalitarianism. Tan’s position commits him to 
hold that cosmopolitan obligations are more fundamental than our particular ones. Yet, 
this is not how they are expressed, nor experienced in every day life. Most people tend to 
feel that their particular obligations hold great moral weight independent of their global 
obligations.  
 Despite the fact that Tan’s luck egalitarianism misses a fundamental point about 
liberal nationalism, his argument still holds great merit. Particularly, the need for a just 
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background institutional structure is quite an attractive claim. Additionally, rejecting his 
claims of the priority of cosmopolitanism does not commit one to reject cosmopolitan 
justice. Rather, in attempting to develop a rooted cosmopolitanism one must strike greater 
balance between our global and particular obligations. That is to suggest that claiming 
that our particular obligations are constrained by our global ones is entirely legitimate; 
however, at the same time, we can suggest that in some cases our particular obligations 
constrain our global obligations. The establishment of a just institutional order can help 
avoid the problem of prioritization.  
 Cosmopolitans tend to have the strongest case for fulfilling global obligations in 
the absolute and extreme cases - those of abject poverty in the face of excessive wealth. 
Clearly in the most absolute cases, which may not be the fringe case by any means, 
fulfilling our global obligations should take priority. This is especially true when we 
consider the marginal expenses and burdens that the wealthiest would incur.365 However, 
how do we prioritize between the cases that are much closer together? As Miller states: 
“Global egalitarians faced with this challenge will probably respond that the most urgent 
cases are cases of gross inequality where no reasonable person could doubt that the 
resources and opportunities available to members of A are superior to those available to 
members of B. We are not primarily concerned about Iceland/Portugal comparisons...”366 
And yet, there is something to be said that in these cases where opportunities, 
capabilities, or whatever metrics of comparison we adopt are much closer, then priority 
between global and local can reasonably shift. Global luck egalitarianism helpfully 
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illustrates that we should be focusing on the background context of interaction at the 
global level, and that partiality is reasonable within that just international setting. 
However, Tan’s argument fails to adequately address the concerns that liberal nationalists 
and other partialists have about cosmopolitan egalitarianism. 
 
5.5 Tan’s Rootedness and Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have explored global egalitarianism and tried to frame it as a 
response to the nationalist position presented in chapter four. In the fourth chapter I 
argued that Miller’s nationalist position focuses far too much on the rooted aspect of our 
obligations, and forgoes support for any substantively cosmopolitan arguments. While 
Miller argues for a minimalist cosmopolitanism, I contend that it is an insufficient 
framework for fulfilling global obligations. In this chapter, I argue that Tan focuses too 
much on the global and ignores crucial aspects of our roots. Tan’s cosmopolitanism is 
very much political – he argues for the establishment of global institutions that can 
govern (and be governed by) principles of justice. His political argument is grounded in 
support for moral cosmopolitanism. He helpfully illustrates the need for focusing on 
institutions at the global level. However, he is unable to account for our roots in an 
important way.  
 If rooted cosmopolitanism is going to account for political institutions then we 
must do a better job of balancing our priorities. As I argue, Tan prioritizes our global 
obligations in a way that obfuscates the importance and strength of our local ones. 
Moreover, his argument for distributive equality ignores the fundamental role that social 
context plays in establishing the meaning and value of distributive goods. While I think 
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the goal of global egalitarianism is admirable, it may not be feasible, nor compatible with 
rooted cosmopolitanism. Tan’s emphasis on the role of institutions is helpful nonetheless. 
By shifting our analysis we may be better able to understand and account for the role of 
power at the international level. The role that international actors play on individual’s 
lives is complex and cannot be accounted for by focusing exclusively on the international 
level. It is a very complex relationship and one that will require ongoing interpretation. 
Yet, we can begin to build a theory of rooted political cosmopolitanism that reflects the 
impact of institutions at various levels.   
 Tan’s argument offers much to the rooted cosmopolitanism debate. Specifically 
his focus on the institutional background and the structure under which individuals and 
nations interact can help to achieve global equality, and this type of argument may not 
necessarily eschew particular obligations. There is no doubt that global justice takes 
priority in Tan’s work, but he still leaves room for particular obligations. While I argue 
that his position on global justice offers much insight into the theory, it needs to 
significantly change if it is to address the tension. Nonetheless there are two major 
shortcomings with Tan’s argument. 
 First, I addressed the problem of context and social goods. It was shown that the 
meaning and value of particular goods is embedded in certain contexts. Given this 
premise, attempting to ensure material equality across borders may not be feasible. 
Rather, we should aim our focus at engaging in cross-cultural dialogue to determine the 
areas where groups converge and where they differ, as well as shift our focus to the 
distribution of capabilities. This does not require abandoning principles of global justice, 
but rather can lead to a strengthened notion of global justice that is more reflective of 
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cultural difference. While I found that Tan’s argument does not give much thought to the 
problem of valuation of social goods, he does not appear to advocate global distribution 
in an overly problematic way. Tan’s egalitarianism can be seen as sensitive to context if 
we understand it to be concerned with the ability to participate in the global economy. 
Global egalitarianism may be a useful strategy in approaching cosmopolitanism, if we are 
also concerned with equality of capabilities.  
 Second, and more fundamental, Tan’s thesis prioritizes global justice and global 
obligations in a way that will ultimately be unsatisfactory to liberal nationalists. By 
arguing that national membership is a morally arbitrary category, Tan misses one of the 
central claims of liberal nationalism. That is, liberal nationalists argue that national 
membership ought to hold moral salience, as it provides individuals with the means for 
exercising meaningful autonomy. Tan’s constraining thesis is not necessarily incorrect; 
our local obligations ought to be constrained by our global obligations in many cases. Of 
note are the most extreme cases: the ones where incurring a slight inconvenience on the 
wealthiest would have a great impact on the world’s poorest. In cases such as these global 
obligations ought to take priority, this is not controversial. Further, there are many 
reasons to support the notion that some principles of global justice ought to always 
constrain particular obligations, such as a list of basic human rights. However, this does 
not mean that we should conclude that global obligations ought to always take priority. 
Tan’s version of global egalitarianism relies on prioritizing global obligations in such a 
way as to reduce the overall value of particular obligations.  
 Discussions of global egalitarianism may, nonetheless, lead towards a tenable 
form of rooted cosmopolitanism. Though I reject the notion of global distributive justice 
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as the distribution of material goods, if we understand distribution in terms of capabilities 
it may be able to provide the foundations for rooted cosmopolitanism. The theory needs 
to be able to account for our particular obligations without forgoing our global ones. 
Framing a just international institutional arena on the distribution of capabilities and 
intercultural dialogue may provide the conditions for rooted cosmopolitanism to thrive. 
The existence of a just institutional order framed on these principles may also lead to the 
resolution of Scheffler’s tension. Thus, by taking some of the ideas Tan presents and 
significantly augmenting them, we may be able to develop rooted cosmopolitanism from 
global egalitarianism. It remains to be determined, however, if we are able to provide a 
non-instrumental defense of particular obligations that does not undermine 
cosmopolitanism. In the final chapter I begin to explore what is required for this to occur.  
 
Chapter 6 
6 Constructing an Alternative Approach: Complex Open-Ended Rooted 
Cosmopolitanism 
6.1 Introduction 
 In this final chapter I look at the possibilities for rooted cosmopolitanism. In what 
has preceded I explored three different approaches to the theory, in each of these 
approaches I found that there was something lacking. In each, my central concern was an 
attempt to reconcile our global obligations and our particular ones. In other words, my 
aim was to test how well each theory responds to Scheffler’s tension as described in 
chapter two. I found that none of these theories sufficiently reconciles our two sets of 
obligations or responds to the tension. All is not lost, however, as rooted 
cosmopolitanism may still be a viable theory if we recast our approach. In what follows, I 
explore the potential for a new theory of rooted cosmopolitanism that can adequately 
respond to Scheffler’s tension. First I explore the prospects for a theory of global justice 
in light of the strength of Scheffler’s tension. In the second section I look at the role of 
coercion and global justice through an assessment of Thomas Nagel and Laura Valentini. 
I conclude the project with a brief exposition of an alternative framework – complex, 
open-ended, rooted cosmopolitanism.  
 
6.3 Assessing the Prospects for a Rooted Cosmopolitanism 
 Given the problems presented by Scheffler’s tension, in this section I explore the 
prospects for rooted cosmopolitanism. Scheffler’s tension presents a very serious problem 
for those that wish to commit themselves to the cosmopolitan ideal without shirking their 
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very real particular obligations. Again, as detailed above, our particular obligations play 
an important part in our moral lives - we crave social relationships and value them. At the 
same time, however, many would contend that global inequality exists at such a level as 
to be considered fundamentally unjust, or that all people - regardless of citizenship - are 
of equal moral worth. As I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this project, the 
claim of ‘equal moral worth’ can take on many meanings - it can mean that all people are 
due some moral consideration, or it can mean that all people are due equal treatment. I 
argue that global justice plays a central role in a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism, but 
that occupies the central theme of the next section. In this section I begin to develop a 
coherent theory of rooted cosmopolitanism. To do this I begin with the question of moral 
agency. In doing so, I begin to unravel the question of what it means to be ‘morally 
equal’ beyond state or national borders. Although I remain sceptical of global 
egalitarianism, such as that purported by Tan, I argue for some form of global equality. 
Rooted cosmopolitanism, I argue must not be conceived of as ‘starting from’ the ground 
or as ‘starting from’ above (i.e. starting from the local and moving global or starting from 
the global and moving local). Rather, as I conceive of it, rooted cosmopolitanism 
employs a variety of strategies that demonstrate that we have multiple moral ‘starting 
points’. However, before sketching out the theory in detail, I begin by looking at our 
moral agency and our moral obligations. 
 In previous chapters I have addressed the question of moral agency through the 
lens of others. Here I go into more detail on this question in order to begin to develop an 
understanding of the source, and strength, of our moral obligations. As I attempt to show 
it is not really a question of communitarian moral thinking or cosmopolitan moral 
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thinking, nor it is a question of moral subjectivity or objectivity. Rather, what is more 
likely is that our moral thinking occupies both spaces (and hence the force of Scheffler’s 
tension). Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, can be understood as questioning both our moral 
starting point and our moral end point.367   
 Moral agency begins from a particularist standpoint. By this I mean to say that we 
get our basic moral learning, the ability to understand and interpret concepts, the ability 
to form meaningful relationships with those around us, from our community. Following a 
similar argument to Taylor, our social framework provides us with the conceptual 
framework for understanding and interpreting the world around us. Indeed, many of our 
conceptions of morality and moral claims are inherently socially constructed concepts. 
This is not to suggest that morality is a culturally relative idea. Rather, here I am merely 
claiming that moral learning begins in our social context, this does not signal the end 
point. I think it is important that we recognize the social contingency of moral concepts, 
not because it could lead to weakened claims for global justice, but because it can 
actually help strengthen our conceptions of global justice and our ability (as well as 
motivation) to fulfill its principles. When I claim that morality is socially constructed I 
simply mean that what we recognize as morally true are those social norms that have 
been inculcated in us over time. In other words, much of our moral learning is cultural 
learning.  
 We understand ourselves, our identities, and our moralities, not through isolated 
thinking, nor through atomized decision making, but rather through engagement with our 
                                                 
367
 Henry Shue offers a good discussion on this idea. See: Henry Shue, “Thickening Convergence”, in The 
Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen Chatterjee, 217-241, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
  195 
community around us. As Taylor argues, identity formation is a dialogical process - 
understanding who we are as moral agents requires engagement with the community that 
helped form us.368 This is not to suggest that we are simply synonymous with our ends, or 
that all we need to do to know who we are is figure out what roles we play in our context, 
and properly play it. Rather, there is room for agency and choice within a weaker 
communitarian model. Although much of our individual identity is determined by 
unchosen context, we still have the ability to choose many factors about our identity, we 
have the ability to reject a role and adopt another. I argue that this works much in the 
same way that Kymlicka claims that we have the ability to make meaningful choices in 
life only when we have access to a cultural framework.369 Our social context (or cultural 
framework) provides us with the ability to interpret, understand, and rationalize the world 
around us. Only within particular contexts can we make sense of concepts and ideas and 
only with reference to other concepts and ideas within that same context. We operate 
within a field of meaning where language and action are interpreted in a particular way. 
This field is something that we all have - we are born into one, we move between fields 
throughout our lives, etc.370 Throughout our lives we incorporate new meanings, new 
moral ideas, and new fields into our identities. Our field of meaning can be 
geographically located, culturally located, and/or socio-economically located.371 
Importantly, however, our field of meanings and social context changes over time. 
                                                 
368
 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, ed. 
Amy Gutmann, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
369
 See: Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 
370
 Here we can make sense of Appiah’s criticism of Kymlicka when he claims that it is odd to want to 
protect cultural contexts as we ‘can’t but have one’.  
371
 Following Pierre Bourdieu in his Language and Symbolic Power, (Cambridge: Harvard Uinversity 
Press, 1993). 
  196 
Moreover, it would be incorrect to presume that our field must be located within a 
particular geographic range. What is more likely the case is that our behaviours and 
beliefs (and moral concepts) are shaped by the institutions that govern our lives.  
 The notion of the morally constitutive community as drawn from Toni Erskine, I 
think, is very helpful in illustrating this point. She contends that we are morally 
constituted by relevant communities - both those that we have chosen to be apart of, and 
those unchosen ones into which we are born.372 However, I argue (along with Erskine) 
that the state need not operate as the sole - or even primary - morally relevant community. 
This is not to suggest that the state does not play an important role in the development of 
our moral agency. Rather, the state does play an important defining role, especially under 
the current arrangement of political association whereby the state is established as the 
most important political community of which we are members. This does not mean, 
however, that there are no other communities that we identify with that are morally 
salient, nor does this necessarily require that our identification with the state as a morally 
salient community be considered our primary source of loyalty or as the most important 
moral community in our lives. The notion of a dislocated morally constitutive community 
can help show to us that we can identify with and hold salient moral relations with non-
geographically bound communities. These communities are identity groups that we 
belong to that are not defined by geography but by another feature. For example, people 
who are fans of a particular sports team would express solidarity with one another despite 
the fact that they may be from different places. Erskine claims that these dislocated 
                                                 
372
 For more on this idea of unchosen and chosen community see Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
  197 
communities can help extend our sphere of ‘equal moral standing’.373 This does not, I 
contend, remove us from a particularist moral starting point. Rather, it works to show that 
in contemporary political life the particularist starting point need not be located 
geographically.  
 Our identity, and the morally salient communities that help inform it, is composed 
of many different sources. Who we are as individuals is a question that can only be 
answered within context. How I present myself to others, and how others receive me, will 
depend upon the morally relevant communities I identify with. Certainly the state and the 
nation that I am born into will play a significant role in forming my identity and the 
special relationships that go along with it. However, I also identify with morally relevant 
communities beyond the state level. I identify with a variety of communities, some 
geographically bound, some dislocated (to borrow Erskine’s language), that all play a 
significant role in the formation of my identity and my ‘sphere of moral concern’. 
Additionally, there is no reason to suppose that the state or nation ought to be considered 
the primary source of identity or morally relevant community. I think this is especially 
true in light of contemporary international politics whereby communication and 
interaction is increasingly cosmopolitan. Our moral claims are derived from our 
constitutive communities in an important way, but as Erskine has shown, these 
communities need not be geographically located.374 Sen, further, claims that 
understanding identity as fluid and not entirely constituted by geographically bound 
identity groups is vital. He contends that our understanding of belonging has a significant 
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impact on obligation: “Indeed, the normative demands of being guided by ‘humanity’ or 
‘humaneness’ can build on our membership of the wide category of human beings, 
irrespective of our particular nationalities, or sects, or tribal affiliations (traditional or 
modern).”375 Who we are, the groups we identify with, and the solidarity we express with 
others can be, and often is, done at a global level. We need not relegate human identity – 
and the obligations generated from identification with a group – to nationality or 
citizenship, as Sen points out individuals may not only share a nationality but “…can 
share other identities, such as a language, a literature, a profession, a location and many 
other bases of categorization.”376 Though he is referring to the multiple ways in which 
identities overlap within a nation or state, this is an equally valid description of cross-
national identification. 
 If we take associative obligation to be the most defensible form of special 
responsibility, as I do in this project, then we must look to the communities with which 
we identify as members to see what our sets of obligations are. In this way, I believe, 
Erskine develops her embedded cosmopolitanism. The central task of her project is to 
build a substantively cosmopolitan position that incorporates the insights of moral 
experience from thinkers such as Walzer.377 Erskine is concerned with determining the 
ways in which a communitarian (“embedded”) starting point can allow us to develop an 
inclusive universalist position.378 For her, cosmopolitanism developed out of particularist 
moral starting points is possible only by looking to our dislocated communities, those that 
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are not tied to geography. We have special responsibilities to these people, then, through 
our association and identification as members with them.379 I think this is a very useful 
way to conceive of our identities and ourselves as moral agents - that it is complex and 
not necessarily tied to geographical place. We, as moral agents, are not bound to the 
borders of our state, even if they do give us important special responsibilities by way of 
association. Problematically, however, Erskine’s embedded cosmopolitanism does not 
provide us with a systematic response to addressing concerns of global justice - concerns 
that I take to be central to rooted cosmopolitanism.  
 What I take to be the largest failure of previous attempts at establishing a theory 
of rooted cosmopolitanism is the presumption of sovereign state-hood, or the state-based 
system as the primary unit of political association. I argue below that we may need to 
augment our notion of sovereignty and political association to better fit contemporary 
politics, and in doing so we can better establish global obligations as rooted in our 
morally constitutive communities. Rooted cosmopolitanism is only viable, I contend, 
insofar as it is considered as a claim about justice and political institutions. Tan helpfully 
demonstrates that global egalitarianism need not require that every state have the exact 
same set of resources. Global egalitarianism is a relevant idea so long as it requires a 
balancing of power at a global level. This requires that international institutions, such as 
the United Nations for example, be reformed (or created where necessary) to act as an 
equalizing measure to ensure that no one community is dominated and exploited under 
unfair terms of interaction, such as those that currently exist. This will further require the 
subjugation of entities that operate outside the governance of states that subject states and 
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groups of people to unfair arrangements that only place them in a situation of further 
dependence and bondage. Global egalitarianism should only be considered as a way to 
conceive of the power relations between relevant political communities, and not 
necessarily about the distribution of particular holdings. Under the current arrangement of 
the international sphere, most of the power is located within a small set of states and 
corporate entities, by strengthening global institutions we have the ability to mitigate the 
power imbalances that exist and equalize the international sphere. Additionally, through 
strengthening international institutions we may be better able to realize global justice. 
Before further exploring rooted cosmopolitanism, I feel it prudent to briefly return to the 
question of the site, scope, and focus of justice. 
 
6.4 Global Justice Re-Considered 
 In this section of the chapter I briefly explore whether justice is global in scope. 
As I argue above, our moral reasoning and obligations are particularist in origin. This 
does not, however, entail anything about their scope. Certainly justice exists in the 
domestic sphere - we are embedded in relations of justice at the national level. Despite 
the fact that this is a fairly controversial statement to make in and of itself, I will take the 
existence of national justice for granted. That is to say, obligations to compatriots can be 
obligations of justice. This section proceeds as follows: first, I explore what about our 
domestic situation establishes relations of justice; second, I argue against claims that 
obligations beyond the state are simply duties of humanitarian assistance; third, I explain 
how relations of justice exist at the global level. 
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 Strong moral cosmopolitanism - the kind that claims that all humans are equal and 
owed equal treatment - comes under attack by liberal nationalists who argue that 
cosmopolitanism fails to account for the special responsibilities owed to co-nationals.380 
This claim, I argue, proves to be the central tension of rooted cosmopolitanism - whether 
or not cosmopolitans can account for special duties. In accounting for these special 
duties, however, first it is worthwhile to assess if they are duties of justice or merely 
humanitarian assistance. The aforementioned liberal nationalists, of whom David Miller 
is one, claim that duties of justice exist at the national level and beyond that we may have 
duties of humanitarian assistance. In doing so Miller attempts to show that cosmopolitan 
duties do exist, in fact he gives a very defensible argument for global duties, but they fall 
short of duties of global justice. Although this may seem like splitting hairs, this 
distinction is important. A duty of humanitarian assistance, as discussed previously, is 
one that ought to be discharged and once fulfilled ceases to exist - they arise only under 
particular circumstances (e.g. natural disaster requiring relief) and once the circumstances 
return to ‘normal’ they cease to exist. A duty of justice, on the other hand, does not cease 
to exist once it has been fulfilled in a given circumstance; it governs relations between 
members of a group. Following a natural disaster, for example, a state may offer 
humanitarian assistance in the form of relief, once the situation returns to normal that 
duty ceases to exist or be relevant. A duty of justice, however, could be seen to govern 
ongoing relations between states, for example. This distinction is made much clearer in 
the discussion between Miller and Pogge where Pogge argues that above duties of 
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humanitarian assistance, there are duties of justice that come in the form of negative 
duties (e.g. the duty to not subject a state or group of people to poor economic 
arrangements).381 My goal here is to first explore what establishes the duties of justice in 
the domestic sphere and to address why some have argued that this does not exist in the 
international sphere. In doing this I will focus my attention primarily on the argument 
from coercion. This is done primarily for two reasons. First, the version of the coercion 
argument as presented by Thomas Nagel382 is the one that I see as a defensible argument 
for special responsibilities to co-nationals. This is not to say that the coercion view is 
without fault. As Richard Vernon has pointed out, the coercion argument establishes 
“…too sharp a line between state and interstate organizations.”383 Vernon opts for a 
unique strategy that focuses on shared exposure to risk, which can avoid some of the 
problems of the coercion argument.384 Nonetheless, I contend that the argument from 
coercion can be utilized to lay the groundwork for cosmopolitanism. Secondly, I have 
already addressed other forms of the special responsibilities argument; most notably I 
have addressed Miller’s concerns of special responsibilities, national responsibility, and 
global justice in a previous chapter.  
 
6.5 The Argument From Coercion 
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 The argument from coercion is a useful way of conceiving of domestic justice 
and, as Nagel puts it, the ‘problem’ of global justice.385 Following Nagel, domestic 
justice is a well-defined area of political theory – there is a large literature dedicated to 
the idea and several well-accepted theories that attempt to explain it.386 According to 
Nagel, the nation-state is the “...primary locus of political legitimacy and the pursuit of 
justice...”387 I take this claim to be of central importance. So what is it particularly about 
the domestic sphere and the nation-state that Nagel takes to be of primary importance? 
His argument builds on Hobbes’s claim that justice can only be achieved within a 
sovereign state.388 He further contends that domestic (liberal) justice can attain equality 
only under the social structures that exist in the nation-state. Nagel’s argument, then, 
relies on both Hobbes’s and Rawls’s central claims; first that justice can only exist under 
a sovereign, and that equality - as a goal of justice - is only attainable under the social 
structure that exists in the nation-state. This has serious implications for the plight of 
global justice; if Nagel’s argument succeeds, then there can be no global justice. To put it 
in Nagel’s words: “If Hobbes is right, the idea of global justice without a world 
government is a chimera. If Rawls is right, perhaps there can be something that might be 
called justice or injustice in the relations between states, but it bears only a distant 
relation to the evaluation of societies themselves as just or unjust...”389It is clear that 
Nagel supports the Hobbesian claim that justice and sovereignty are inextricably linked. 
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He supports this claim primarily as he sees justice as dependent on “...the coordinated 
conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot be achieved without law backed up by 
a monopoly of force.”390 Alternatively, put in Hobbes’s words: “And covenants, without 
the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.”391 Relations of justice, 
then, are established only under a sovereign who can enforce them. While he uses the 
Hobbesian notion of justice requiring a sovereign, he does not rely on the notion that 
justice is collective self-interest. Rather, Nagel contends that justice can be considered as 
a wider ideal aimed at the elimination of arbitrary inequality. Even with this definition of 
justice (which I take to be the Rawlsian understanding of justice as a political project), we 
still require a sovereign to effectively coordinate actions and motivations.  
 Nagel contends that the coercive institutions of the state create the conditions for 
relations of justice between individuals that do not exist at the international level. This 
does not mean that he argues that cosmopolitan justice (i.e. global justice) is not a 
possibility, just that it does not exist under the current framework. Indeed he claims that 
cosmopolitan justice is a possibility under a global federal system that mimics the 
institutional structure of individual states.392 For Nagel this is only a possibility, and not 
necessarily the most desirable outcome. Under the current institutional arrangement (i.e. 
nation-state sovereignty), we have duties of justice intrastate and duties of humanitarian 
assistance interstate. Again, for Nagel, justice “...is something we owe through our shared 
institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation. It is, in the 
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standard terminology, an associative obligation.”393 Following this claim, then, justice 
considered as an associative obligation presents an issue to cosmopolitans. Here, Nagel is 
simply presenting Scheffler’s tension in other language: we have special responsibilities - 
of which our associative obligations are one kind - that we do not owe to humanity writ 
large, yet we still have duties to humanity. In fact we may even have duties to humanity 
that are born out of a concern for equality, a concern central to liberal conceptions of 
justice. It is easy, then, to misunderstand a call for reduction of gross inequalities in the 
world, the cost of which would be quite small, as a call for justice. Indeed Nagel even 
admits that while it may be incoherent to call for global justice, this does not mean we 
live in a just world as it is. The gross inequalities, the ones that cause starvation and are 
the plight of the world’s poorest require action. That action, for Nagel, however, is not 
motivated from a duty of justice, but rather from one of humanitarian assistance.394 
Nagel, following Rawls, seems to contend that a moral minimum may be all that is 
required.  
 As justice is something that arises only under the conditions of a social structure 
that is coercively imposed, justice may not be possible at the global level. To continue his 
argument that justice is an associative obligation, Nagel contends:  
Furthermore, though the obligations of justice arise as a result of a special relation, 
there is no obligation to enter into that relation with those to whom we do not yet 
have it, thereby acquiring those obligations toward them. If we find ourselves in 
such a relation, then we must accept the obligations, but we do not have to seek 
them out, and may even try to avoid incurring them, as with other contingent 
obligations of a more personal kind: one does not have to marry and have children 
for example.395 
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The nation-state structure, as arbitrary as it may be, imposes on us a coercive institution 
that establishes a special relationship with fellow nationals. Within the state there exists a 
set of social institutions that govern aspects of our conduct and only under these 
conditions do we have the ability to coordinate our efforts in such a way as to make our 
projects viable. The social structure that exists, and the sovereign that governs it, give the 
nation-state the unique ability to put citizens into “...a relation that they do not have with 
the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the special 
standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice.”396 Although the 
point should be patently clear by now I should reiterate: for Nagel, relations of justice can 
only arise under institutional conditions of coercion, such as those exhibited in sovereign 
statehood. So the argument goes, justice cannot be global as there is no such coercive 
institutional structure.  
 Following this argument, then, we must question why the state holds the 
legitimacy to coerce us into relations of justice. Taking for granted the existence of the 
state, legitimacy derives from our ability to author the norms and rules of governance, at 
least this appears to be the case for Nagel. Following his Hobbesian argument, life under 
a sovereign authority is seen as desirable as it protects our self-interest from the arbitrary 
wills of others. Nonetheless, we are born into a state and do not have a choice in the 
matter, as such we ought to be given the opportunity to author the rules so as to ensure 
they allow for the actualization of justice. In other words, it ought to be democratic. 
Nagel claims: “A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual 
advantage. The societal rules determining its basic structure are coercively imposed: it is 
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not a voluntary association. I submit that it is this complex fact - that we are both putative 
joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms.”397 Again it is 
the existence of a defined set of social institutions that both imposes the norms upon us, 
but also gives us the ability to author the norms going forward in an effective way.398  
 Nagel’s argument relies on the lack of a set of coercive institutions at the global 
level. This does not mean that there are no global institutions that impact our lives. Nagel 
admits that there is a set of important international institutions that exist - global NGOs, 
the WHO, the UN, the EU, NAFTA, NATO, various international trade agreements, the 
IMF, and the International Court, for example. Yet, none of these represent the coherent 
set of institutions that impose coercion in the way that Nagel contends the nation state 
does. Indeed calls for socioeconomic equality are only coherent within the nation-state - 
“We are required to accord equal status to anyone with whom we are joined in a strong 
coercively imposed political community.”399 Further, Nagel places emphasis on the fact 
that membership in a nation-state is not one we actively choose, but one that is imposed 
on us. Of course the existence of international institutions that affect us is not something 
we choose either, it is also imposed on us. Nonetheless, he contends that these institutions 
do not impose the same level of relations as statehood does, and more importantly, they 
lack a sovereign authority. Precisely for these two reasons he contends that international 
institutions, as they currently exist, do not establish relations of justice at the global level: 
“Current international institutions...lack something that according to the political 
conception [of justice] is crucial for the application and implementation of standards of 
                                                 
397
 Ibid., 401. 
398
 Ibid., 400. 
399
 Ibid., 404. 
  208 
justice: They are not collectively enacted and coercively imposed in the name of all the 
individuals whose lives they affect...”400 Further, the current set of international 
institutions cannot impose relations of justice as they do not have the legitimate right to 
impose decisions by force.401 This requires that the argument for coercion critically 
incorporates both a coercively imposed set of institutions as well as the ability to author 
their direction. Nagel sees this as a critical failure of current international arrangements: 
“…they do not ask for the kind of authorization by individuals that carries with it a 
responsibility to treat all those individuals in some sense equally.”402 Tied to the notion 
of sovereignty, then, (which Nagel sees as critical to the implementation of justice) is 
authorship or representation. We must, in some ways, be the authors of institutional 
policy; this could be done directly in a deliberative-participatory model or through 
representation.403  
 Nagel’s argument closes speculatively, arguing that there is a future where global 
justice is a possibility. Curiously, though, that world is only born out of global injustice. 
He claims:  
...I believe the most likely path toward some version of global justice is through the 
creation of patently unjust and illegitimate global structures of power that are 
tolerable to the interests of the most powerful current nation-states. Only in that 
way will institutions come into being that are worth taking over in the service of 
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more democratic purposes, and only in that way will there be something concrete 
for the demand for legitimacy to go to work on.404 
 
 Nonetheless, for our purposes here, he seems to end on the notion that arguments for 
global justice are incoherent under the current situation of international anarchy.405 
 
6.6 Coercion in the International Sphere 
 If Nagel’s argument is correct - that coercion establishes relations of justice, and 
that the international sphere currently does not admit the level of coercion required - then 
the prospects for rooted cosmopolitanism are dim. This is primarily, as I contend, because 
one of the central tenets of rooted cosmopolitanism must be the fulfillment of principles 
of global justice discovered through particularist moral starting points. To briefly 
reiterate, rooted cosmopolitanism about justice attempts to account for global inequalities 
while maintaining a commitment to particular obligations (i.e. special responsibilities). If 
Nagel’s argument is correct, then, there may be no real concern for global justice in 
rooted cosmopolitanism. However, I contend that Nagel’s argument, while correct that 
relations of justice only arise under the conditions of coercion, fundamentally under 
represents the ways in which international institutions and global actors are unjustly 
imposing their wills (i.e. acting coercively). Thus, while I agree with him that sovereignty 
and the social structure of the state uniquely impose relations of justice among members, 
I disagree that the current status of the international sphere is one of mere anarchy and 
not of international injustice. Further, I argue that the international sphere admits a level 
of coercion that puts members (both states and individuals) in an important relation of 
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justice with one another. I contend that the types of coercion that currently exist in the 
international realm subject members to unjust and otherwise unfair conditions. In 
defending my account I must first provide a proper definition of coercion. 
 Plainly speaking, coercion is the act of persuading others with the use of (or threat 
of) force. This does not mean that coercion is simply synonymous with the use of 
physical force. Rather, it is marked by the fact that it leaves the coercee with an inability 
to choose to act otherwise, or in Laura Valentini’s words: “...the coercee has virtually no 
choice but to execute the coercer’s commands.”406 Further, coercion requires justification 
as it limits a person’s freedom - despite the fact that I want to run a red light to arrive at 
my destination quicker, I am coerced to stop as the threat of fines and penalties (as well 
as fears for my safety) compel me. Valentini formalizes coercion as follows: “...agent A 
coerces another agent B if A forseeably and avoidably places non-trivial constraints on 
B’s freedom; compared to B’s freedom in the absence of A’s intervention (other things 
being equal).”407 Importantly this definition requires a responsible agent who coerces. For 
Valentini this could be an individual moral agent (“...an agent with the capacity to grasp, 
and act on, moral reasons and who can therefore bear responsibility for her/his 
actions.”408), but it could also be a group. A group can be conceived of a morally 
responsible agent under certain conditions, primary to these is that the group must be 
organized with the purpose of meeting the general conditions of moral agency: “...namely 
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grasping reasons for action, and acting on their basis.”409 Valentini contends that groups 
such as states, universities, churches, and hospitals meet these conditions as they have the 
ability to form a collective will.410 States, then, can be seen as imposing the type of 
interactional coercion defined above by Valentini that Nagel argues is required for 
establishing relations of justice among citizens.  
 Valentini further refines her definition of coercion by incorporating a notion of 
systematic coercion. While the interaction-based definition used above is certainly 
applicable to the claims Nagel makes, systematic coercion provides a further 
understanding that may allow us to better understand the just or unjust relations that exist 
in the international sphere. Systematic coercion is defined as “a system of rules S is 
coercive if it forseeably and avoidably places non-trivial constraints on some agents’ 
freedom, compared to their freedom in the absence of that system.”411 These rules may be 
formal or informal, but they must visibly show that individuals’ behaviour follows a 
‘rule-governed pattern’.412 Thus, if we incorporate this definition into our understanding 
of coercion, then we need to look more closely at what systematic coercion (a) requires 
and (b) how it impacts individuals. Following Valentini’s definition, systematic coercion 
simply requires that there be a system of rules in place that visibly governs behaviour. 
She helpfully illustrates this with the example of capitalism. Capitalism can be said to be 
systematically coercive as “...the proletariat is appropriately said to be forced (coerced) to 
sell its labour because the structure of capitalism ‘is sustained by a great deal of 
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deliberate human action’.”413 There is no single agent responsible for sustaining 
capitalism or coercing proletarians into following the rules. Rather, both the capitalist 
class and the existence of the rules governing the markets sustain capitalism.414 This 
dramatically changes the picture of international coercion. While Nagel’s understanding 
relies on a coherent set of institutions that govern (i.e. an agent), systematic coercion can 
be applied to a set of rules that govern behaviour. Valentini concludes that “For justice to 
apply, we only need a system of rules placing non-trivial constraints on freedom. This 
will obviously have important implications for the question of global justice since, at the 
global level, there are complex systems of rules, but there is no overarching global 
Leviathan.”415 The argument could be made, then, that the international arena currently 
admits a level of coercion required for establishing relations of justice - either between 
individuals or between states. I argue that the international arena is, importantly, different 
from the domestic arena in that the relations of justice are between groups and institutions 
(e.g. state-to-state, institution-to-state, etc.) as well as relations between individuals via 
transaction and interaction in the global economy. Thus, by adopting Valentini’s wider 
definition of coercion - one that I argue to be a relevant and accurate description of 
contemporary international politics - we can see that it is coherent to speak of global 
justice in addition to domestic justice. As the two forms of justice are not simply 
synonymous (i.e. global justice is not domestic justice on a much larger scale), we must 
look more closely at what is required, and what we mean by justice. Additionally, I argue 
that my claims here are fully consistent with Nagel’s arguments presented above; the 
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difference between our conclusions emerges from a disagreement about the levels and 
types of coercion that exist in international politics.  
 Nagel’s Rawlsian framework for domestic justice helpfully illustrates the type of 
immense institutional structure required to establish the necessary social relations to 
speak of justice. That is to say, if justice is concerned with socioeconomic equality, the 
society in which we are describing must have a conception of equality from which to 
draw. Thus, when Nagel speaks of being products and authors of the coercive system, he 
is referring to the fact that our domestic institutions are part of our morally constitutive 
selves, and we have the ability to guide and change the norms. I believe the content and 
structure of domestic justice can follow the Walzerian claims about our ability to change 
the system that, in some ways, ‘makes us’. I firmly believe that our moral starting point is 
domestic - what we understand to be the content of justice will be unique to our context - 
but this need not lead to a conservative understanding of our ability to criticize and 
change social practices. Social change occurs, but it is not usually revolutionary, it tends 
to be gradual and occurs when current practices and moral stances do not resonate with 
other aspects of our identity. Returning briefly to Erskine’s notion of dislocated 
communities we can see that moral learning can happen through membership in these 
communities as well as through intercultural dialogue, such as championed by the likes of 
Appiah and Taylor. The content of domestic justice relies on an overarching structure of 
social institutions that provide us with the ability to understand and interpret the world 
around us. This speaks to both the Walzerian, or communitarian, notion of pluralistic 
conceptions of morality and moral concepts that they argue is context-specific, as well as 
the Rawlsian idea that the content and structure of justice is something that is internal to a 
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society. Beyond that, for Rawls, we are speaking of the interaction between (ideally) 
well-ordered societies.416 For either group, then, it becomes quite difficult to speak of 
justice globally.  
 Internationally, I argue, a similar structure of institutions exists, although they do 
not have the same pervasive structure that guides social relations that our domestic 
institutions have. This set of institutions, and here I am speaking particularly of the 
economic institutions, have both the ability to coerce agents as well as to create and 
sustain a system of rules that subjects others to unjust conditions. Nagel concludes that 
there is a group of international institutions that are not coercive in a way that establishes 
relations of justice. I argue, however, that if we look at coercion both as interaction (the 
type that Nagel appears to use) and systematic, then coercion at the international level is 
sufficient to establish relations of justice. Indeed I contend that these international 
institutions are an important part of the social structure that Nagel relies on domestically. 
I argue this particularly as international economic institutions - the Bretton Woods 
institutions specifically - provide a fundamental allocative and distributive function. As 
such, we ought to consider them as having the ability to establish relations of justice.417 
Moreover, following Simon Caney, these institutions can be seen as forming a (coercive) 
global basic structure comprised of “...a common set of regulations, codes, and practices 
which are the same everywhere and encompass all within their jurisdiction.”418 
Importantly, this interpretation of international coercion does not rely on an argument 
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from interdependence. That is, my claim is not that global justice exists due to a level of 
global interdependence between economies. Rather, my claim is that international 
economic institutions coerce agents into following a system that impacts the distribution 
of social goods both within and between societies.  
Through extending our definition of coercion we can see that there is a sufficient 
amount at the global level to establish relations of justice. Nagel’s argument, however, 
also relies on the notion of joint authorship. That is, the coercive institutions that force us 
into relations of justice also include the ability to author their direction (i.e. they are 
democratic in some way). There is a definite lack of authorship at the global level, but I 
think that, following Nagel’s logic, this should be a call to establish democratic 
institutions. Under his conception of coercion, the international sphere is anarchic at best, 
but if we expand the definition to include Valentini’s systematic coercion then we can see 
that it is actually unjust.419 Thus, my argument does not reject Nagel’s conclusions. He 
sees the establishment of global justice as requiring the international sphere to go through 
three phases: 1. Anarchy 2. Injustice 3. Justice.420 By framing international coercion in 
the way that I have, we can conceive of the international sphere as unjust and requiring 
governance. The question now moves from the idea of global justice to the content of 
global justice. 
 According to Charles Beitz, justice governs the distribution and proper allocation 
of social goods.421 By social cooperation Beitz is referring to the Rawlsian idea that 
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society is a “...cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”422 As everyone is vying for 
access to social goods, principles of justice are required to identify the proper allocation 
of goods, and the institutions that can provide the allocative function. International 
economic institutions govern social distribution in many different ways. For example, 
trade law determines the types of trade that states, agents, and groups can enter into.423 
Gross inequality has arisen in part because of certain agents receiving favorable treatment 
to the detriment of others, all while operating well within the bounds of current 
international trade and economic law. As I argue that international institutions currently 
make up the type of coercive network that imposes relations of justice, inequalities that 
directly arise from the institutions, or the system within which they operate, must be 
justifiable to all parties involved. Put in other words, the coercive system must be 
governed by principles of global justice. As shown in earlier chapters, it is quite difficult 
to conceive of an idea of global egalitarianism, or even speak of equality where a 
plurality of social values exists. What one society or group determines to be fair may be 
different than what another says is required by justice. The problem persists, then, of how 
we arrive at principles of global justice that will both ensure a sufficient level of 
socioeconomic equality while remaining sensitive to the cultural and contextual 
variations of the value of particular goods. The theory must necessarily be cosmopolitan 
in the way it addresses global justice, but communitarian (particularist) in the way it 
describes the principles of justice. Once again, Scheffler’s tension emerges as the specter 
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haunting cosmopolitanism. As I have shown that justice exists at the global level I will 
now move to exploring an approach to this issue.  
 
6.7 Complex, Open-Ended, Rooted Cosmopolitanism: A Brief Sketch 
 In several of the previous chapters we have seen attempts to address this issue. I 
argue that these attempts have failed for a variety of reasons. Of these reasons the most 
important is an unnecessary compartmentalization of cosmopolitanism. Rooted 
cosmopolitanism in the variants explored here has been a rooted cultural 
cosmopolitanism (Appiah), a rooted political cosmopolitanism (Tan), or a rooted moral 
cosmopolitanism (Miller). Rooted cosmopolitanism, if it is to be successful, I argue, must 
account for the problem of inequality on a global level. Much like in the domestic arena, 
any inequalities that arise ought not to be arbitrary, and ought to be justifiable to those 
affected.424 In this final section of the chapter my aim is to provide a brief sketch of an 
alternative approach to rooted cosmopolitanism. This alternative approach will not 
attempt to fully address all issues presented in the thesis, nor is it necessarily seen as the 
final answer to Scheffler’s tension. I contend, however, that the real strength of the 
tension lies in the fact that our obligations are necessarily divided under the current 
institutional arrangement. My theory of rooted cosmopolitanism is termed complex and 
open-ended as it attempts to fuse all three variants of cosmopolitanism - cultural, 
political, and moral - while remaining hesitant to determine the exact structure of the 
institutions; it is deliberately vague. I contend that Scheffler’s tension is resolvable only 
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insofar as we augment the way we approach and conceive of domestic and international 
spheres.  
 In the previous section my goal was to determine whether or not it made sense to 
speak of ‘global justice’ given the particularist starting point of our moral thinking and 
identity. I have shown that relations of justice emerge where there is a sufficient level of 
coercion sustained by either an agent (i.e. individual or ‘will forming group’) or a system 
that governs behaviour and interaction. Further, I argued that the international sphere 
exhibits this level of coercion, despite Nagel’s conclusion that the necessary level of 
coercion is not there. As international institutions currently govern the distribution of 
socioeconomic goods, I argue that global justice is a coherent idea. Moreover, removing 
the institutions that govern practice would likely not remove the relations of justice that 
exist internationally, as groups, states, and individuals now help sustain and ensure the 
stability of the system of coercion. Finally, I contend that the levels of inequality that 
currently exist at the global level are unjust insofar as they would not be justifiable to all 
of those affected. My conclusion, then, is that there ought to be principles of global 
justice that govern international institutions and guide the coercive system (in such a way 
as to make it justifiable). I argue that complex open-ended rooted cosmopolitanism may 
be able to provide a way to both discover the principles of global justice and establish a 
framework for global governance that I contend is necessary.  
 I should note that much of the theory is already embedded within the arguments 
explored in previous chapters. I am merely dwelling on certain implications and insights I 
have drawn from their arguments, or of what I perceive to be their failing. The section 
proceeds as follows: first I explore how principles of global justice can be discovered 
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through intercultural dialogue marked by a recognition of difference; second, I argue that 
through a federal system of global governance centered around disaggregated 
sovereignty, the political will and resources necessary to fulfilling these principles can be 
acquired; third, the shape of the institutions and the principles that guide them are open to 
change as necessary over time in order to best allow individuals and groups to fulfill both 
local and global obligations. In this way I contend that rooted cosmopolitanism cannot 
take one particular form. We cannot describe rooted cosmopolitanism as a particular set 
of institutions or particular principles of justice, rather the descriptions ascribed to it and 
the form it takes must necessarily change in order to be able to relevantly address both 
global and domestic obligations throughout time.  
 The particularist stance on our moral origins resonates with much of our lived 
moral experience. Who I describe myself to be, what my beliefs are, and how I 
understand my obligations to others will emerge out of my particular context. It is 
understandable, then, why we have plural conceptions of the good and multiple 
conceptions of the value of particular social goods. Determining a coherent description of 
‘justice’ globally may seem problematic. While one group contends that what is just is 
ensuring that all people have access to particular goods, the value of those goods may not 
be universal. Thus, rooted cosmopolitanism must be marked by intercultural dialogue on 
the content, role, and function of justice. I argued above that domestic and international 
justice are different in that they are concerned with the distribution of different sets of 
goods. Arriving at principles of global justice marked by fairness and equality need not 
rely on one particular definition of fairness or equality. Discovering the principles of 
global justice that are fair to all relies on recognition-based intercultural dialogue. 
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 I argue that the role of recognition is central here. Following the work of Appiah 
and Nussbaum, in order to fully understand what we want and what is fair requires 
engagement with ourselves as moral agents as well as a recognition that who we are, and 
what we believe is not an objective position. Recognition-based approaches, such as 
those championed by Taylor and debated by Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, can help to 
ensure that the principles of justice are not simply descriptive of one group, but 
applicable to all.425 As we learned from Appiah, understanding who we are and where we 
come from is of primary importance. However, in learning who we are we need to avoid, 
as Nussbaum contends, developing the assumption that our way is the ‘normal’ way and 
that all other ways of life are abnormal or in some way inferior.426 Moreover, recognition-
based approaches are marked by the genuine recognition of others and their ‘otherness’ as 
it is. The cultural cosmopolitans discussed in the first chapter highlight the contingency 
of cultural identities and their fluidity, which I think helps to inculcate our ability to 
critically reflect on ourselves and others. Certainly, this will require a significant amount 
of cultural learning that can be inculcated through education, but also through dialogue 
and interaction with others. This type of approach relies on a coming to terms with the 
past and with historical relations among groups, it requires shifting our perceptions of 
other groups and avoiding the misrecognition that can occur when we ascribe 
characteristics to groups that may not be representative of who they are. Recognition of 
our identity, Taylor argues, is a fundamental human need. He derives his account of 
recognition mostly from a reading of Hegel, which is unnecessary to discuss at length 
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here. Nonetheless, it is important to note that we strive for recognition from others that 
we are valuable human beings. As Appiah argues, we need to be recognized as having 
something of value to offer to the human experience. A lack of this can lead to 
misrecognition, either through a refusal to acknowledge a particular way of life as 
valuable, or by ascribing characteristics that lead to negative perceptions of a group of 
people.  
 Recognition can be achieved through engagement with both our own cultural 
groups as well as with others. I believe that Nussbaum’s call for ‘cosmopolitan 
education’ is of fundamental importance here. As opposed to the nationalistic civic 
education that focuses on the uniqueness and greatness of our particular ways of life, such 
as the type we see through the use of ideas like American Exceptionalism and manifest 
destiny, cultural education should focus more on explaining our native cultures as one 
among many. Thus we may be able to approach our own cultural group more 
anthropologically, much in the same way we approach others. By doing so we can avoid 
chauvinistic notions that help cause misrecognition. The type of intercultural dialogue I 
argue rooted cosmopolitanism ought to be centered around is similar to that as argued by 
Appiah and Taylor. Recognition does not require us to abandon our cultural identities; 
rather it can help us celebrate them along with others.  
 Once we can achieve intercultural dialogue that genuinely recognizes other 
groups, then the principles of global justice become discoverable. Recognition-based 
approaches do not require that we equally value all ideas and stances. It does not mean 
that we need to give up our fundamental beliefs on essentially contested concepts like 
justice and equality. Rather, it simply requires that we value those who hold opposing 
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opinions as equal members; we don’t need to value or endorse their actual opinions. 
Intercultural dialogue allows us to discover what Taylor describes as horizons of 
significance - the areas where many of our significant ideas and beliefs converge. As 
opposed to having a dominant group determine principles that they deem fair and equal, 
they ought to be discovered out of dialogue among groups. We may be better able to 
understand the position of others if we recognize our differences. Through this, I argue, 
we can discover principles of justice that are applicable to all groups without appearing as 
domineering or imposing a particular way of understanding social goods on others. 
 This stance may seem somewhat controversial so I feel I should qualify it slightly. 
I contend that much can be achieved through recognition-based intercultural dialogue, 
however our most pressing issues of inequality - the plight of the world’s poorest, for 
example - is something that needs to be addressed first. There is a moral minimum that, I 
argue, can be universally agreed upon without making value-based judgments on the 
good. That is, I believe that there is a universal minimum standard of living that is 
applicable to all, regardless of the community in which they inhabit.427 Much of this is 
already apparent in my critique of Appiah in chapter three. In order to develop the 
culturally specific conceptions of the good and cultural projects we need access to 
particular resources. By removing the cultural valuations inherent to social goods, I argue 
that we can arrive at a list of necessary human goods. In a similar vein, Brian Barry 
argues that there is a human nature we can speak of - all humans, regardless of their 
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cultural background, require particular basic goods in order to live a decent life.428 
Although the term ‘decent’ appears to carry significant cultural baggage, here I am 
simply referring to a life where one has access to the necessary resources for 
sustainability - access to clean water, food, and shelter, freedom from arbitrary arrest, 
freedom from war, etc. Others, such as Sen and Nussbaum, have gone so far as to 
establish a set of capabilities that can be seen as similar to the primary goods that can 
address the real levels that an individual is able to develop and achieve their conception 
of the good. Above all else, I contend, that this moral minimum must be achieved in order 
to universally secure our biological needs and basic human freedoms. This is arguably 
one of the most pressing issues facing humanity. Once a baseline has been achieved we 
can begin to move towards recognition-based intercultural dialogue. Despite the 
similarity in approaches, Barry distinguishes himself from Taylor and the ‘culturalists’. 
Nonetheless, I find that the positions are compatible if we consider Barry’s claims about 
human nature to represent the minimal requirements. Once we have a minimalist list of 
human rights, then we can incorporate the intercultural dialogue that is a necessary part of 
global justice.  
 Through this dialogue we will discover principles that can help govern 
international institutions. However, as most of the issues of global inequality and 
injustice are not compartmentalized in the international sphere, fulfilling the principles of 
global justice will require altering political institutions. The insights gained from political 
cosmopolitans can help illuminate the need for, and the abilities of, global governing 
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institutions to properly govern international institutions. Some have argued for the 
strengthening of current international governing institutions like the United Nations, and 
others have argued that they are marred by history and new institutions ought to be 
developed.429 This is not the type of argument I am concerned with, despite its apparent 
importance. Rather, I am concerned with assessing the way that global governing 
institutions can work to address problems of global justice.  
 Rooted cosmopolitanism, I contend, ought to be marked by scepticism of state-
based sovereignty. This does not mean I favour a world state or the eradication of states 
entirely. In fact, I believe that states provide an important distributive function alongside 
their ability to provide us with a morally salient identity community. What I argue for, 
instead, is a form of disaggregated sovereignty. That is, states ought to have sovereignty 
over certain matters but not over everything that happens within their borders. In 
particular, international institutions ought to be established that have jurisdiction over 
matters that move between intra and interstate. What I envision, then, is a federal system 
of global governance that can ensure the principles of global justice are fulfilled without 
requiring us to abandon our particular obligations. Institutions that currently exist, or 
would be created, would have jurisdictional authority over political issues that exist 
outside of the traditional jurisdiction of the state. The arrangement envisioned by Ayelet 
Shachar in her Multicultural Jurisdictions demonstrates the viability of this model.430 
 As it stands, our obligations are falsely split. I believe that this is, in part, due to 
the unnecessary strength of state sovereignty. One of the reasons why Scheffler’s tension 
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remains so strong is that we have limited resources, and a limited ability to effectively 
implement change at great distances. Proximity to our obligations is less and less of a 
problem as technological change has made it possible to see and experience virtually 
anything around the world. We have the ability to see into the lives of those that are 
affected by our actions around the world, we have the ability to travel great distances, and 
the ability to interact with people through the world on a daily basis. What we do not 
have, however, is an institutional network to effectively implement change and fulfill our 
obligations to others. Thus, institutions of global governance are needed that can more 
effectively allow us to fulfill our obligations to others.  
 The particular shape of the institutions is something that will necessarily change 
over time. Additionally, I argue that they ought not to be conceived of as either super or 
supra national. Their jurisdiction will reach above and below the state level as required to 
address issues. Most issues of global justice are not simply located in the international 
sphere, they are experienced locally and globally. Moreover, much of what we 
understand to be part of our global obligations can be fulfilled locally. The issue of 
climate change, for example, overlaps between our local and global obligations. That is, 
we owe to both our particular others and to humanity writ large a clean environment. 
Governing institutions that focus on the environment, then, would have jurisdiction that 
spans from the local to the global. Again, I am not concerned with the exact structure of 
the institution, just that they be marked by disaggregated sovereignty. Further, I contend 
that a federal model where issues and jurisdictional authority are subdivided between 
groups would be most effective.  
  226 
 Governing institutions are necessary as, following Nagel and Hobbes, covenants 
without a sword are just words. Looking at current international institutions we see 
massive exploitation, gross inequality, and abuse of the environment. States have entered 
into agreements and arrangements in the past to varying degrees of success. However, 
and as Canada’s recent withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol shows, states are not really 
held to their agreements. The ability to opt out is far too strong. Although I am optimistic 
about the prospects for global governance, it might prove to be one of the most 
challenging impediments to rooted cosmopolitanism. It’s likely that states won’t be 
willing to cede sovereignty until it is a necessity.  
 Finally, rooted cosmopolitanism ought to be marked by a willingness to change 
over time as necessary. In a different but related argument, Tariq Modood presents his 
theory of multiculturalism as one that is marked by an open-ended process of negotiation 
that is continually revisited.431 Similarly, I contend that rooted cosmopolitanism - 
understood as both a process of intercultural dialogue and institutional change - is one 
that ought not to be fixed. The intercultural dialogue marked by recognition described 
above, relies on constant change - change in the way we understand ourselves, what is 
meaningful to us, and change in the way we perceive others. More importantly, however, 
I argue that the institutional arrangements must be open to negotiation and change over 
time. Doing so can help ensure that the global institutions make sense for contemporary 
politics. As new problems and challenges to global and domestic justice emerge, new 
institutions may be necessary and old ones may be redundant or needless. As is likely 
apparent by now, one of the main motivators for this project is a firm belief that 
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contemporary international politics should not be governed by institutions set around the 
Peace of Westphalia. Again, state-based sovereignty is useful, it helps subdivide 
important political projects, makes it possible for us to fulfill these projects, and it serves 
an important distributive function. However, there is no reason to suppose that this 
should be the only way to subdivide jurisdictional authority.432 As issues will necessarily 
change over time, new institutional arrangements may be necessary. Moreover, by 
dividing authority to a variety of institutions, we may be better able to fulfill the 
principles of global justice. 
 Discovering what the institutions will look like is a long-term process that must 
be democratic. That is, all member groups (be they states, nations, or individuals) ought 
to have a say in the matter. Ensuring that institutions are democratic is beyond the scope 
of this project, but needless to say there is an immense literature on the topic. 
International democracy is a problematic issue, one that will require great political effort 
to ensure, but it is necessary if we are to avoid global tyranny.  
 
6.8 On the Necessity of Moral, Cultural, and Political Cosmopolitanism 
 I take moral cosmopolitanism to be the main impetus behind rooted 
cosmopolitanism. The strength of Scheffler’s tension lies in the fact that people consider 
themselves to be particularists (i.e. holding particular obligations) at the same time as 
recognizing the moral equality of all (i.e. a weak cosmopolitan egalitarianism). The 
tension’s perceived irresolvability derives from the fact that under our current 
                                                 
432
 Shachar,, 119-122. 
  228 
institutional arrangement, our obligations are unnecessarily split. In my analysis of rooted 
cosmopolitanism I take the following for granted:  
1. We, as humans, have special responsibilities that I describe primarily (though 
not exclusively) as associative obligations. 
2. All humans are fundamentally equal and arbitrary differences should not 
impact one’s life chances. 
3. Current units of political association (i.e. states) provide an important 
distributive function that work to divide our obligations.  
 
Given these statements, I wish to briefly explore why rooted cosmopolitanism must 
necessarily be moral, cultural, and political. 
 My central motivation in this project has been the conflict between a commitment 
to moral cosmopolitanism, as a claim about universal equality, and the fulfillment of our 
particular obligations. In this exploration I have been unable to find a convincing 
argument that supports the particularist claims to such a degree as to abandon my 
cosmopolitan stance. Nonetheless, I firmly contend that particularists have much to teach 
cosmopolitans about our moral starting points, about the way communities around us 
fundamentally shape our identity, and about the role of relationships on our moral 
framework. With this in mind I began to explore the ways in which we can arrive at a 
substantively cosmopolitan position that is amenable to the claims of particularists. In 
previous chapters I have attempted to determine which particularist arguments are sound, 
and those that I believe are coherent but do not necessitate anti-cosmopolitan conclusions. 
In particular, the claims of liberal nationalists who contend that the state-based system is 
necessary, I believe, misconstrue the ways in which our particular obligations are linked 
to institutional arrangements.  
 While I contend that the state-based system is important in separating our 
obligations and making large political projects tenable, I do not believe that states 
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represent the golden idol that some present them to be. There is an important cultural and 
national character embedded within the institutions of the state, a character that is 
necessary to fulfilling large scale political projects (including fulfilling the primary 
functions of socioeconomic justice). That character, however, exists below the state level 
in smaller scale political institutions (be they national, provincial, municipal, etc.), and I 
see no reason as to why it cannot exist at a larger level or in conjunction with these 
already existing institutions. The state system as it currently exists does not allow for 
individuals or groups to fulfill their global obligations alongside their particular ones. By 
augmenting international institutions and disaggregating sovereignty so as to allow for 
authority above and below the state level we may be better able to fulfill our obligations. 
What this would require would be the creation of (or extension of already existing) 
institutions that govern on a jurisdictional basis. By restructuring state sovereignty in this 
way we could remove the institutional barriers to governing international issues that 
overlap contexts. Given that both particular and global obligations are legitimate we 
ought to develop a way to fulfill both where possible.  
 Though cultural cosmopolitanism does not play as significant of a role here as the 
moral and political varieties, I contend that it is nonetheless important. The lessons we 
can learn from cultural cosmopolitans about the nature of cultural identities can help to 
better establish recognition-based dialogue. Scheffler’s cultural cosmopolitanism requires 
us to see cultural affiliation as part of a framework of ‘Heraclitean pluralism’. That is, he 
sees cultural identities as constantly in flux – new symbols, ideas, rituals, and traditions 
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are incorporated into a group and the meaning of older symbols change over time.433 
Waldron, similarly, argues that we need not be deeply immersed within our cultural 
group and our cultural identity can borrow from a variety of sources (we can ‘wade in the 
cultural pool’, so to speak).434 Incorporating a notion of cultural cosmopolitanism – i.e. 
that cultural identities are not fixed – may allow us to critically reflect on our own 
cultural identities as well as those of others. This critical reflection, I contend, is 
necessary if recognition-based dialogue is to be successful. Indeed having the ability to 
critically reflect on ourselves as well as others may allow us to better understand the 
claims of others, especially when they seem so otherwise foreign.435  
 In the end, Scheffler’s tension may not be entirely resolvable. There will likely be 
instances where we are still forced to choose between fulfilling one set of obligations 
against the other. However, this is the reality of fulfilling obligations in the first place. 
We have limited resources, and by fulfilling one obligation we are eliminating the 
possibility of fulfilling many others. Our choosing between which obligations to fulfill is 
something that is a necessary part of the lived moral experience - we cultivate many 
relationships and have many obligations deriving from them, at various points we have to 
choose between paths. Although this choice is far from easy in many cases, we still make 
the choice and use various factors to decide which way to go - the importance of the 
relationship, the direness of the situation, etc. Under current institutional arrangements 
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we are wrongfully forced into a position where we must choose between fulfilling local 
obligations and fulfilling global obligations. As a moral cosmopolitan, this is an issue. If 
we were to augment state-based sovereignty, and reconceive of our institutional 
relationship to the state and other institutions both below and above the state, we may be 
better aligned to fulfill both sets of obligations. This may not be the ideal solution, and it 
does not guarantee resolution of Scheffler’s tension. However, it removes the false 
dichotomy between global and local by giving us institutional access to fulfilling our 
global obligations. Moreover, it establishes as situation in which individuals have a much 
better ability to efficiently fulfill particular and global obligations. Finally, under this 
model, when there are times when we need to choose between obligations, individuals 
may have more theoretical resources at their disposal to make a reasonable decision of 
which way to go. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have attempted to provide a brief alternative framework for 
rooted cosmopolitanism. This is a daunting task, and this chapter should not be taken to 
be an ending point. Rather, my goal is only to provide the starting point for conceiving of 
a viable rooted cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism, I argue, is only possible insofar as it 
takes account of our special responsibilities and associative obligations. That is, a viable 
cosmopolitanism is a rooted cosmopolitanism - one that recognizes that our moral 
experience is grounded in the various morally salient communities of which we are 
members. Rooted cosmopolitanism, as I understand it, is an attempt at resolving a tension 
identified by Scheffler, one I discuss at great length throughout the dissertation. 
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Scheffler’s tension highlights how our particular and global moral obligations are in 
tension with one another. For a variety of reasons we are unable, or unwilling to fulfill 
both sets.  
 Here, I first attempt to show that Scheffler’s tension cannot be easily pushed to 
the side. It represents a fundamental tension that resonates with our lived experience. The 
desire to prioritize and fulfill our particular obligations to those with whom we stand in a 
meaningful relationship is at odds with a belief in human equality. Working through the 
particularist position I attempt to show that our moral starting point is particularist in 
nature, but this does not mean that our moral identities are coextensive with a single 
nation or state, as some contend. Rather, our moral identities extend well beyond the 
state; we identify with many non-territorial groups in an important and formative way. 
The existence of these identities, I argue, gives hope for rooted cosmopolitanism. 
Particularism does not represent nearly as great a threat to cosmopolitanism as it would 
first appear. 
 After determining that Scheffler’s tension is real, and that rooted cosmopolitanism 
is a coherent idea, I move to assessing what global justice is. Moral cosmopolitanism is at 
the heart of my cosmopolitanism, and it is at the heart of Scheffler’s tension. Simply put, 
without moral cosmopolitanism, there is no tension. With this in mind, I explore the 
relationship between institutional coercion and relations of justice. Following Nagel, I 
found that institutional coercion plays a significant role in establishing relations of justice 
among individuals. A further exploration of coercion, guided by the work of Valentini, 
demonstrated that similar, and sufficient, levels of coercion exist at the global level. This 
led me to the conclusion that it makes sense to speak of relations of justice at the global 
  233 
level (i.e. global justice). Given this, I contend that current institutional arrangements at 
the international level have either created and sustained a fundamentally unjust system of 
coercion, or allow for unjust inequality to persist.  
 In the final section I briefly explore what rooted cosmopolitanism entails. I argue 
that rooted cosmopolitanism ought not to be fractured by moral, cultural, or political 
arguments. Rather, a successful rooted cosmopolitanism must account for each of the 
different types of cosmopolitanism. It is fundamentally moral in nature, and from that 
arises a cultural and political argument. Culturally speaking, rooted cosmopolitanism is 
marked by a commitment to recognition-based intercultural dialogue. This is similar to 
what is argued by Appiah, and explored here in chapter three. Recognition-based 
intercultural dialogue works to strengthen our perception of our global obligations, while 
at the same time providing a forum for debate and voice for oppressed groups. Rooted 
cosmopolitanism ought to also be political in the way it explores international 
institutions. As opposed to removing the state system, I contend that we should augment 
state-based sovereignty to better allow for us to realize the principles of global justice and 
fulfill global obligations. As I am only able to briefly explore this alternative approach, I 
should say that it is not fully formed. Moreover, the sketch I provide here is deliberately 
vague: rooted cosmopolitanism is marked by a global voice. It would go against my 
purposes entirely if I were to argue for a single set of institutions or a set of ideas that I 
call ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’. Instead, I contend that it is necessarily complex, open-
ended, and always open for negotiation as need presents itself. Successfully responding to 
Scheffler’s tension is a serious task and will require great philosophical and political 
effort. This is a project that is necessarily going to be long term and take a variety of 
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shapes over time. In this way I resist defining it as a particular idea or set of institutions. 
It is, however, defined by participation and recognition. I hope a rooted cosmopolitanism 
can emerge that provides the theoretical resources needed for discovering and fulfilling 
principles of global justice. 
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Conclusion 
 Rooted cosmopolitanism appears to have considerable potential at this point. The 
theory’s greatest potential seems to rest on the possibility of successfully navigating the 
tension between two fundamental areas of moral obligation. We have important moral 
obligations to particular others with whom we stand in a meaningful relationship that 
need to be reconciled with global obligations owed to humanity as a whole. In recent 
years cosmopolitanism has come under attack for failing to recognize the importance or 
strength of our particular duties. At the same time, cosmopolitans have replied that we 
cannot overemphasize our particular duties if they come at the cost of fulfilling our global 
duties. Hence, establishing a theory that can reconcile both is needed.  
 If rooted cosmopolitanism is to be a successful theory then it needs to be able to 
navigate the complex relationship between particular and global moral spaces. I believe 
that if we conceive of the theory as necessarily complex and open-ended then this may be 
possible. In my final chapter here I presented the outline to approaching this theory. I feel 
that I should reiterate here that I see this only as an initial step. The main task of this 
project was to assess previous instances of rooted cosmopolitanism, address why they are 
problematic, and begin to develop an alternative approach. Given the limitations of scope 
on a project such as this, I am unable to do more than present an outline for a new 
approach to rooted cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, I believe that my project brings 
together several prominent scholars in a unique way that reconceives of the central issues 
of rooted cosmopolitanism.  
 I began the project by bringing conceptual clarity to cosmopolitanism in general. 
If I am to be able to meaningfully explore rooted varieties of the theory, then I must first 
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offer clarification on the theory more generally. I therefore separated cosmopolitanism 
into three different types of claims: claims about morality, claims about political 
institutions, and claims about culture. I argue that cosmopolitan arguments typically have 
more than one type of claim. For example, political cosmopolitans tend to be influenced 
by a moral claim, but this is not necessarily the case. While I focus on distinguishing 
between three types here, it is important to note that the typology quickly collapses once 
we begin to assess cosmopolitan arguments. It is nonetheless important to clarify between 
the different types of claims that are being made so that I can better assess the arguments 
throughout the thesis.  
 In the second chapter my task was to elucidate Samuel Scheffler’s position and 
highlight the key tension that rooted cosmopolitanism attempts to address. Simply put, 
Scheffler’s tension is the tension between our particular and global obligations. In this 
chapter I described the tension in two different ways. First, I described it as a tension 
between general and associative duties. And second, I described it as a tension between 
egalitarianism and nationalism. Both versions of the tension represent a theme the runs 
throughout the remainder of the thesis. The first version questions the relationship 
between general and associative duties. This theme is perhaps the most important 
throughout the project; if we are to reconcile our global and particular ends then we must 
(I argue) find a way to reconcile our general and associative duties. The second version 
confronts egalitarianism with the limiting goals of nationalism. From this I take 
nationalism to be a particularly pressing form of particular obligation. While many 
cosmopolitans would be quick to admit room for special responsibilities to family and 
friends, they would be hesitant to extend the same for duties to co-nationals on the basis 
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of shared nationality. This suggests that familial and friendship-based obligations could 
be considered non-controversial (within reason). On the other hand, nationality-based 
obligations are very controversial, as the assign benefits to in-group members on the basis 
of, what can be described as, an arbitrary aspect of one’s life. Nonetheless, as I have 
discussed throughout the project shared nationality is a meaningful relationship that 
establishes important moral obligations that impact the strength and content of our global 
obligations. National obligations, then, cannot simply be dismissed as arbitrary.   
 The third, fourth, and fifth chapters each focused on a version of rooted 
cosmopolitanism. In the third chapter I explored Kwame Anthony Appiah’s rooted 
cultural position. There I argued that recognizing the role of cultural roots in developing 
our moral agency is of central importance, and intercultural dialogue plays an important 
role in cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, Appiah’s position fails to recognize the role of 
political cosmopolitanism, power in intercultural dialogue, and the strength of the 
distributive objection. For these reasons I concluded that Appiah’s rooted 
cosmopolitanism is unsatisfactory. 
  In the fourth chapter I addressed David Miller’s nationalist-minimalist 
cosmopolitanism. He rejects notions of strong cosmopolitanism in favour of national 
responsibility with minimal global obligations. I argued that the idea of national 
responsibility misconstrues the international sphere, and that it does not make sense to 
hold nations collectively responsible for their actions. Moreover, I concluded that 
Miller’s argument admits a much stronger version of both political and moral 
cosmopolitanism than he appears ready to defend. I therefore argued that nationalism, 
framed in this way, highlights an important source of our moral obligations, but that we 
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need to reconsider their relationship to our global obligations. Miller provides room for a 
very minimalist cosmopolitanism, but his argument implies much more. He appears to 
focus too much on our roots while forgoing our global obligations.  
 In the fifth chapter I explored Kok-Chor Tan’s global luck egalitarian position to 
see whether or not it was reconcilable with partiality. Tan sees a space for partiality under 
a just global sphere of interaction. I argue that his focus on the background context (e.g. 
the norms of international economics and governance) is helpful and can demonstrate 
how we can discover principles of global justice. Nonetheless, I argued that we need to 
look more closely at how we can effectively distribute across borders. While there should 
be space for global distribution, we need to recognize the problem of shared values so 
that we can more effectively distribute without disregarding our shared meanings. 
Additionally, I question his categorical prioritization of global obligations over particular 
ones. In the end I argued that Tan’s focus appears to be too much on the global level at 
the expense of particularism. 
 In the final chapter I described an alternative approach to conceiving of rooted 
cosmopolitanism. I argued that each of the previous chapters helped show some 
limitations as well as possible avenues for further exploration. Rooted cosmopolitanism, 
as I conceive of it, is complex and open-ended. It is complex in the sense that it is 
predicated upon moral, political, and cultural claims. The theory is open-ended by being 
susceptible to change and re-negotiation throughout time. I argued that the success of 
rooted cosmopolitanism relies on the successful establishment of global governance that 
will augment current norms of state sovereignty. I contended that this is necessary as our 
national obligations are institutionally separated from our global ones. If we augment 
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state sovereignty and develop stronger forms of global governance then our two spheres 
of obligations may not be dichotomous. At the same time, establishing global forms of 
governance will rely on successful intercultural dialogue. I conceive of this as dialogue 
between individuals and between groups. In order to establish principles of global justice 
that are universal and sensitive to context we need to engage in dialogue with others that 
recognizes who they are and where they come from. This form of cosmopolitanism is 
rooted in the sense that partiality and particular obligations are made consistent with 
global ones. It depends on our ability to reconceive of our spheres of obligation not as 
distinct from one another but as part of one moral framework. We must, then, have the 
political and conceptual tools to respond to complex in ways that would be impossible 
from either a strict cosmopolitan or strict particularist perspective.  
 As I mentioned, I conceive of my approach as an initial step and one that warrants 
further analysis. I argue that rooted cosmopolitanism can be successful but it will take 
great theoretical and political work. If we wish to take Scheffler’s tension seriously, then 
we must come to terms with the demands of particularists and cosmopolitans. Rooted 
cosmopolitanism, as I have conceived of it, will allow us to have more fruitful 
discussions on the role, strength, and content of our moral obligations. Achieving a just 
global order is worthwhile, but it relies on our ability to elaborate principles of global 
justice that do not ignore our salient particular obligations. Rooted cosmopolitanism, 
then, appears to be a theory that makes this possible. 
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